JULIAN VALDES, APPELLANT,
v.
PRUDENCE MUTUAL CASUALTY CO., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION AUTHORIZED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1969-07-22
No. 68-1100
Before PEARSON, C. J., and HEN-DRY and SWANN, JJ.
226 So. 2d 119 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1969) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

In this uninsured motorist insurance coverage dispute, the Florida appellate court reversed a directed verdict for the insurance company, holding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case that the at-fault driver was uninsured based on public records from the state's Financial Responsibility Division, and the insurer failed to meet its burden of rebutting this evidence.


Holding

The court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case through public records of the Financial Responsibility Division proving the at-fault driver had no automobile liability insurance. The burden then shifted to the defendant insurer to go forward with evidence, which it failed to do by merely raising the possibility that the driver might be a Virginia resident with Virginia insurance without actual proof.


Key Quotes

“In examining the record upon a point on appeal questioning a directed verdict, we must indulge in every conclusion favorable to the party moved against that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.”

This establishes the standard of review the court applies when examining whether a directed verdict was proper.

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Facts & Procedural History

Julian Valdes was injured in a collision with another vehicle and filed a claim under the uninsured motorist provision of his insurance policy with Pr…

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Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Chief Judge.

PEARSON, Chief Judge.

The appellant was the plaintiff in an action against his insurance carrier. The complaint alleged that appellant was injured by an uninsured motorist and was entitled to compensation under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. The appellee denied that the second party to the collision was an uninsured motorist. At trial the court directed a verdict for the appellee and entered final judgment for the appellee pursuant to the directed verdict.

In examining the record upon a point on appeal questioning a directed verdict, we must indulge in every conclusion favorable to the party moved against that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 152 Fla. 486, 12 So.2d 374 (1943). After examining the record in accordance with the foregoing rule, we conclude that we must reverse the judgment for the ap-pellee.

The appellant proved through public records of both the Miami office and the Tallahassee office of the Financial Responsibility Division, office of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, that the owner-driver of the offending automobile had no automobile liability insurance on the date of the collision. The automobile was registered in Florida and carried a Florida license plate. In addition the Miami Regional Co-ordinator for the State of Florida Financial Responsibility Division appearing as a witness for the appellant testified that the driver of the offending automobile did not respond to a notice asking him whether he was uninsured on the date of the collision and that as a consequence his right to operate an automobile in this state had been suspended. Upon cross examination it was disclosed that this driver was using a Virginia driver’s license.

We think the plaintiff established a pri-ma facie case and that the duty of going forward with the evidence shifted to the defendant-appellee. Cf. Leonetti v. Boone, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 551; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Lake Region Packing Ass’n, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 25, 28. And see 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 126, page 157. By simply raising the possibility that the driver of the offending vehicle was a resident of Virginia and that he may have had automobile liability insurance in Virginia the appellee did not fulfill its duty of going forward with the evidence. Cf. District Heights Apartments, Section D-E v. Noland Co., 202 Md. 43, 95 A.2d 90, 93-94, 39 A.L.R.2d 387 (1953).

The appellee has cross assigned as error the admission of the records of the Financial Responsibility Division. The records were properly admitted. See § 92.-12, Fla.Stat. (1967), F.S.A.; Corbett v. Berg, Fla.App.1963, 152 So.2d 196.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.


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Citator

Cited By

  • HAM v. Heintzeliman's Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
    …idence under the public records exception to the hearsay rule and would constitute prima facie evidence of what it purported to show; and the duly certified copy thereof would also be admissible. Valdes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., Fla.App.1969, 226 So. 2d 119; Corbett v. Berg, Fla.App.1963, 152 So. 2d 196; Smith v. Mott, Fla.1957, 100 So. 2d 173; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Knight, 1937, 130 Fla.733, 178 So. 898. See also F.S. Sections 92.12 and 119.011, F.S.A. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court…
  • Northland Ins. Co. v. Mautino, 433 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …policy otherwise provided coverage. See Mason v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee, 41 So. 2d 153 (Fla.1949); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Snite, 106 Fla. 702, 143 So. 615 (1932); Valdes v. Prudence Mutual [*1227] Casualty Co., 226 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Northland’s alternative argument, that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the issue of coverage because Streetzel acted intentionally, is equally unavailing. An insane person cannot be deemed to have acted intention…

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