JOHN ELLIOTT BLOOD BANK OF DADE COUNTY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION NOT FOR PROFIT, APPELLANT,
v.
SHEILA SOSKEL AND SEYMOUR SOSKEL, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1969-09-23
No. 69-183
Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and SWANN, JJ.
226 So. 2d 465 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1969) Negative Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on the authority of Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, Fla.1967, 196 So.2d 115; and see: Green v. American Tobacco Company, Fla.1963, 154 So.2d 169.


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    …licy provisions are “more restrictive” than the statute. Here it is not more restrictive but rather more extensive, as initially indicated. The Third District Court of Appeal reasoned similarly in Raspall v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 226 So. 2d 465 (3d DCA Fla.1969). It reached the same conclusion in Cruger v. Allstate Insurance Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (3d DCA Fla.1964), as did the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Spinola, 374 F. 2d 873 (1967). Correct an…
  • Progressive Mut. Ins. Co. v. Raiford Brown, 229 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
    …er than less coverage (as in the Sellers and Powell cases, supra). A situation analogous to that in the case at bar confronted the District Court of Appeal, Third District of Florida, in the recent case of Raspall v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co., 226 So. 2d 465 (Fla.App.1969), in which that court held that an uninsured motorist provision in a policy limiting coverage in case of bodily injury caused by a hit-and-run automobile, where the identity of neither operator nor owner could be ascertained, to incide…
  • Cammack v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 34 Fla. Supp. 4 (Lake Cty. Cir. Ct. 1970)
    …bility should be limited to anything other than the face of the policy is a nullity. “What the policy gives the policy may take away, but what the statute gives the policy may not take away.” Raspall v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, 226 So. 2d 465. It is easy in the consideration of this case to argue that §627.0801 applies only to real property, because the statute excepted personal property from its operation. Today many buildings and structures are portable and it is physically possible t…

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