HARRY COLLINS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Collins was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court reversibly erred by allowing the state to use his statement about obtaining counsel as evidence bearing on his insanity defense. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the statement was properly admitted as evidence of Collins's state of mind at the time of arrest, not as an admission of guilt.
The court held that the statement was properly admitted because it was introduced not as an admission of guilt but as evidence of Collins's state of mind at the time, relevant to the insanity question. The court rejected Collins's reliance on Jones v. United States, Simmons v. United States, and Griffin v. California as inapplicable to this situation.
“the statement made by the appellant relating to employment of counsel was not introduced by the state as an admission constituting evidence of guilt, but as revealing the state of mind of the appellant at the time made, as it might bear on the question of his sanity”
Establishes the court's rationale for why admission of the statement was proper—its relevance to state of mind on the insanity question, not guilt
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCollins shot and killed his wife in the presence of his son-in-law at the latter's home. The facts of the homicide were undisputed. Upon arrest, after…
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The appellant was indicted for first degree murder. He pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Trial before a jury resulted in a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation of mercy. A mandatory life sentence followed. The defendant appealed.
The sole contention made here is that the trial court committed reversible error in *539allowing the use, as evidence bearing on the issue of insanity, of a statement volunteered by the appellant at the time of his arrest, when advised of his rights (a la Miranda) including a right to an attorney, “I know. I guess I will have to get a lawyer.”
The sufficiency of the evidence otherwise was not challenged. The facts of the homicide were not in dispute. The appellant shot and killed his wife in the presence of his son-in-law, in the latter’s home in which his wife was then residing. He remained there until a police officer arrived. The officer, upon being informed as to what had occurred, placed the appellant under arrest and informed him sufficiently as to his rights, in the course of which, with respect to advice as to entitlement to a lawyer, the appellant made the statement above quoted of an awareness of the advisability of obtaining counsel. After advising the appellant of his rights the arresting officer did not interrogate him.
At the trial, in rebuttal of testimony presented on behalf of the defendant on the issue of insanity, the state brought out the statement in question, including it in hypothetical questions which were propounded to expert witnesses.
On behalf of Ihe appellant it is contended that his statement about obtaining a lawyer could not properly be revealed, as bearing on his sanity or insanity, because the statement dealt with an election to avail himself of a constitutionally provided right to counsel. As authority to support that contention the appellant cited Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106. Those cases do not appear applicable to this situation. The Jones case is not in point. In Simmons, the Supreme Court of the United States held that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth amendment grounds, his prior testimony on the motion is not admissible against him at trial over his objection, on the issue of guilt. In the Griffin case the court held that a defendant in a criminal case tried before a jury, who failed to testify in his own behalf, was protected against comment thereon by the prosecution or by the court.
Here the statement made by the appellant relating to employment of counsel was not introduced by the state as an admission constituting evidence of guilt, but as revealing the state of mind of the appellant at the time made, as it might bear on the question of his sanity. Entirely aside therefrom, the commission of the offense by the appellant was established beyond dispute. Moreover, as pointed out by the state, with supporting authority,1 the appellant’s contention is defective as a ground on appeal for want of objection at trial.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By
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Blatch v. State, 389 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…onfession, if error, was harmless. See Blatch v. State, supra. Blatch’s present contention, since it goes to the non-testimonial nature of the confession, does not implicate self-incrimination rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Collins v. State, 227 So. 2d 538 (Fla.3d DCA 1969). See also Greenfield v. State, 337 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). It does instead present a Fourth Amendment claim. If the interrogation which served as a seizure of evidence of Blatch’s conduct and behavior was unlawfully induced,…
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Freddy Duane Blakley v. State, 362 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…ith the dissent of Judge Grimes in Greenfield, supra, I also dissent here because of the order of things. Let us assume the refusal of the accused to make a statement is admissible on the issue of insanity, as it was found to be in Collins v. State, 227 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1969). I see no reason to further compound the problem by allowing its admission before [*310] the defendant has made an issue of his insanity by presenting evidence about his insanity. In Collins, supra, the officers’ testimony about…
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van Scyoc v. State, 354 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…o. 2d 515 (Fla.1967); DeRiggi v. State, 209 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Koran v. State, 213 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Powers v. State, 224 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Chariott v. State, 226 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Collins v. State, 227 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Arrington v. State, 233 So. 2d 634 (Fla.1970); Wimes v. State, 243 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Wheeler v. State, 311 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Willis v. State, 320 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Barry v. State, 330 So.…
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1960)
- Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1968)
- Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (U.S. 1965)
- State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1967)
- State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968)