THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GADSDEN COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1969-12-17
No. 39121
DREW, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
229 So. 2d 587 Florida Supreme Court (1969) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

Florida's State Attorney challenged the Circuit Court's validation of $400,000 in revenue certificates issued by Gadsden County to finance jail construction, funded by pari-mutuel tax revenues. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the validation, holding that the Legislature has constitutional authority to authorize a county to create vested rights in tax revenues that bind future legislatures.


Holding

The Legislature has constitutional power to authorize a county to make contracts creating vested rights in tax revenues that cannot be impaired by future legislatures. The Florida Constitution contains no express limitation on the Legislature's power to authorize such contracts, and the power to preempt taxes does not imply such a limitation.


Key Quotes

“The power to make any contract or authorize any contract includes the power to grant vested rights, which a future legislature cannot impair; the Constitution contains no express limitation on the power of a legislature to anthorize such a contract, and the power to preempt the tax does not imply such a limitation.”

Establishes the core holding that a legislature has constitutional power to authorize vested rights in tax revenues despite future legislatures' general preemption power.

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Facts & Procedural History

Gadsden County proposed to issue Revenue Certificates, Series 1969, in the amount of $400,000 to finance construction of a jail branch and prison camp…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court
ROBERTS, Acting Chief Justice.

ROBERTS, Acting Chief Justice.

This cause is before the court on appeal to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Gadsden County, validating Revenue Certificates, Series 1969, in the amount of $400,000.00, proposed to be issued to finance the cost of constructing, furnishing and equipping a branch of the county jail to comprise a prison camp with supplementary facilities. The Certificates are payable solely from taxes collected from the operation of pari-mutuel pools accruing annually to Gadsden County under the provisions of the Constitution of Florida and Chapters 550 and 551 and other applicable Florida Statutes and allocated by law to the Board of County Commissioners.

The validation of the Certificates was contested by the States Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, the appellant herein. The sole question involved in that court and here, is whether the Legislature can constitutionally, by the provisions of Section 9 of Chapter 69-1071, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1969, authorize Gadsden County to make a contract which would preclude future legislatures from pre-

empting the pari-mutuel money pledged to the payment of the principal of and interest on such Certificates. The Circuit Court held the contention of the State that the Certificates should not be validated was without merit, stating, “Any future legislature may preempt so much of said money as is not required to pay obligations of which the holders have a vested right to the continued allocation, but this principle does not prevent one legislature from authorizing the vesting of such rights. The power to make any contract or authorize any contract includes the power to grant vested rights, which a future legislature cannot impair; the Constitution contains no express limitation on the power of a legislature to anthorize such a contract, and the power to preempt the tax does not imply such a limitation. The recital1 in the form of certificate prescribed by said Resolution Number 69RC-1 referring to the covenant contained in Section 9 of Chapter 69-1071, Special Acts, Laws of Florida 1969, Regular Session, is hereby specifically approved.”

We agree with the reasoning of the Circuit Court and further note that the Legislature has the power under the Constitution of 1968, Section 7, Article VII, F.S.A., as it had under the Constitution of 1885, Section 15, Article IX, F.S.A., to allocate the parimutuel money to the counties and to enact legislation empowering them to finance projects such as that involved in this suit.

The Final Judgment validating the Revenue Certificates should be and it is hereby

Affirmed.

DREW, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 2013)
    …Because the Sheriffs case did not reach or contemplate changes such as these, this Court is bound to follow the express language of section 121.011(3)(d), Florida Statutes. The trial court concluded, and I agree, that under State v. Gadsden County, 229 So. 2d 587 (Fla.1969), the Legislature can, as part of its power to contract, authorize a contract which vests rights that a future legislature cannot impair; and the court below concluded that the Legislature did so when it adopted section 121.011(3)(d). The…
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  • State v. Orange Cnty., 281 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1973)
    …9 (1941); and that continuing line of cases prior to the 1968 constitutional change were expressly overruled in our State v. County of Dade, supra. Prescott v. Board of Public Instruction, 159 Fla. 663, 32 So. 2d 731 (1947); State v. Gadsden County, 229 So. 2d 587 (Fla.1969), and related cases did not deal with the basic question here as to a requirement for referendum. The appellee’s contention that dicta in Davis v. Gronemeyer, 251 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1971), is unduly restrictive and if adhered to by the court w…
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  • Thompson v. Haynes, 36 Fla. Supp. 110 (Duval Cty. Cir. Ct. 1971)
    …n any tangible or intangible property of defendant, in the possession of or control of a third person . . . In Florida, some of the cases touching upon the matters involved in this cause are as follows — Nationwood Mutual Insurance Co. v. McNulty, 229 So. 2d 587, held, inter alia, as follows — [*113] . . . Accordingly, when an insurer under such a policy contract undertakes to defend an action against the insured and becomes involved in negotiations for settlement, the law imposes the duty that it act in go…

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