METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND P. W. HOMER, APPELLANTS,
v.
MILTON KLEIN, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1969-12-02
Nos. 69-571, 68-333, 68-338
Before PEARSON, C. J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.
229 So. 2d 589 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1969) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Holding

The court held that a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 1.540(b)(4) is not a proper ground for relief if the original judgment was not void.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant sought certiorari review of a board's action, which was denied by the circuit court. Appellant then moved to vacate the circuit court's judg…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Number 69-571 is an interlocutory appeal by Metropolitan Dade County from an order entered by the circuit court upon a mandate of this court, which mandate issued after we heard numbers 68-333 and 68-338 and remanded the cause for the entry of an order (Klein v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1969, 217 So.2d 155). We ordered consolidation for all appellate purposes. On this appeal the County contends that the appealed order is not consistent with that mandate.

*590The trial judge has fully set forth the basis of his order as follows:

* * * * * *
"On Motion for Order on Mandate, this Court entered and Order on March 10, 1969, directing the County to Initiate appropriate proceedings to remedy the procedural defects and accord Petitioner procedural due process. On March 13, 1969, the County Manager directed the Secretary of the Personnel Advisory Board to convene the members of the Board which heard the original hearings for the purpose of making the necessary findings and transmitting them to the County Manager. It is contended by the County that this constitutes a reference of the cause to the Personnel Advisory Board for the submission by that Board of findings of fact. It is contended that this constitutes a compliance with the Court's Order on the Mandate. Petitioner, however, contends that the only procedure now available is to reinstate Petitioner as of July 26, 1967, the date of the original recommendation of reinstatement by the Personnel Advisory Board."
* * * * * *
"At the time the Petitioner was suspended, the ordinances of Metropolitan Dade County provided for a Personnel Advisory Board of five members who had the right to exercise certain powers in the event a permanent employee was suspended, reduced in grade, or dismissed by the head of his department."
* * * * * *
"In order to accord the Petitioner due process, it is required that the County comply with the provisions of this ordinance.
"On November 4, 1968, the powers of the Personnel Advisory Board were repealed by the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, by Ordinance No. 68-63."
* * * * * *
"On September 19, 1968, the Personnel Advisory Board was completely changed in its components and make-up by Ordinance No. 68-50."
* * * * * *
"Under the letter or order of the County Manager hereinabove set forth, this matter was referred back to Mr. Edward P. Stephenson, Mrs. Marie Enterline, and Mr. Harold L. Freeburg. Mrs. Enterline and Mr. Freeburg are no longer members of the Personnel Advisory Board. Under no circumstances are these persons still vested with authority to make findings of fact as required by law. This was the procedure guaranteed to the petitioner at the time of his dismissal and at the time of his appeal therefrom under the terms of the Ordinance."
* * * * * *
"It appears to the Court that the County has commendably made changes in its personnel review procedures which are considerably improved over the prior procedures. This might even have resulted from comments made by the courts in this and other cases which reviewed appeals arising from prior proceedings. It further appears, however, that by making these changes the County has made it impossible to provide to this particular Petitioner, the due process which the Court of Appeals has ruled is due to him.
"Under such circumstances, It appears to the Court that the only order that can be rendered by it is an order requiring the County to reinstate the Petitioner."
* * * * * *

The essential question presented on this appeal is whether the circuit court's order was properly made pursuant to the mandate. We find nothing in the conclusions reached by the circuit court which are inconsistent with the holding of this court in Klein v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1969, 217 So.2d 155. Upon remand of a cause the trial court must carry *591out the mandate of the appellate court a manner consistent with the law applicable to the case and the directions of the appellate court. Beach Resort Hotel Corporation v. Wieder, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 52. A review of the record now before us fails to demonstrate that the circuit court departed from the foregoing principle.

One additional point raised by the County should be mentioned. It urges that because of the principles set forth in Nichols v. City of Hialeah, Fla.App.1966, 183 So.2d 611, the circuit court does not have the authority to enter the order directing the reinstatement of the appellee. We think this position is mistaken. While we fully adhere to the law as expressed in Nichols v. City of Hialeah we hold that under the circumstances of this case where a civil service employee has been denied due process of the law, the circuit court may upon petition for certiorari filed by the employee order the reinstatement of the employee. Cf. City of Miami v. Loughrey, Fla.App.1964, 166 So.2d 236; Rubin v. Sanford, Fla.App.1964, 168 So.2d 774.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Norbert J. Stein, 296 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
    …sult, the action taken by the trial judge does not amount to a departure from established principles of law. The result reached by the trial court is consistent with the ruling of this court in Metropolitan Dade County v. Klein, Fla. App.3rd, 1969, 229 So. 2d 589. We are not unmindful of the fact that Klein and the case at bar are distinguishable factually. However, the law enunciated in Klein is still controlling: . where a civil service employee has been denied due process of the law, the circuit court ma…
    1 / 2
  • Davis v. Civil Serv. Bd. OF City OF Tarpon Springs, 501 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …verify. Nor can the Board make findings in 1986 to support a decision it made in 1984. The circuit court had no power to reconvene the Board as it was previously constituted at the time of Davis’ hearing in 1984. Metropolitan Dade County v. Klein, 229 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Certainly the Board had no authority to reconvene itself in its former guise. Thus, the Board and the circuit court were obliged to follow the rule of Klein. In that case the third district court quoted with approval the opinion…
  • Clark S. Thompson v. Ramsdell, 342 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
    …. Gontz v. Cooper City, 228 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for the entry of an order or judgment in accordance herewith. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Klein, 229 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). REVERSED AND REMANDED. MAGER, C. J., CROSS, J., and WAD-DELL, TOM, Jr., Associate Judge, concur.…

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