D. J. MAYO, ALIAS JACK MAYO,
v.
STATE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for larceny of a heifer, finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and that the admission of certain testimony was not prejudicial error.
Yes, the evidence was amply sufficient to sustain the verdict. No, the court did not err in admitting the testimony, as it was not damaging or implicating and was admitted to show familiarity for identification purposes.
“The writ of 'error brings for review judgment of conviction of the plaintiff in error under an information charging the larceny of a heifer.”
Establishes the nature of the case and the conviction being reviewed.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff in error was convicted of larceny of a heifer. The conviction was challenged on the grounds of insufficient evidence and the improper ad…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Larceny cases and more on FLexlaw
—The writ of 'error brings for review judgment of conviction of the plaintiff in error under an information charging the larceny of a heifer. There was no attack on the sufficiency of the information.
Reversal is sought upon the grounds that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict and that the court erred in admitting certain evidence given by one Howard as to transactions between Howard and the accused other than the purchase of heifer by Howard from the accused. The testimony referred to was not objected to when given. A general motion was made to strike the testimony of Howard in regard to such other transactions but, upon the statement being made by the State’s Attorney to the effect that such testimony was introduced only to show to some extent the familiarity of Howard with the accused and to show that Howard’s acquaintance with the accused was such as to enable Howard to reasonably identify accused, the motion to strike was denied..
*825There was nothing in Howard’s testimony about the other transactions which was damaging to accused or which implicated him in any way with any other misconduct.
The evidence was amply sufficient to sustain the verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
Ellis, C. J., and AYhitfield, Brown, Buford and Chapman, J. J., concur.