MORTON A. CORN, APPELLANT,
v.
IRVING HOFFMAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Corn appeals from a judgment dismissing his contribution claim against Hoffman for an unequal share of a jointly-assessed federal tax lien. The Fourth District reversed, holding that estoppel by judgment does not bar a contribution claim when the tax lien was not actually litigated in the prior settlement agreement between the parties.
The court reversed and held that estoppel by judgment does not apply because the tax lien was not actually litigated and determined in the 1964 action. Estoppel by judgment is available only for matters actually litigated and determined, not for matters that might have been litigated but were not.
[1] Estoppel by judgment is available as a defense only to matters actually litigated and determined in an earlier action, not to matters that might have been litigated but w…
[2] The party asserting estoppel by judgment bears the burden of proving that the matters in dispute were previously litigated and determined.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Estoppel by judgment is available as a defense in a suit to those matters actually litigated and determined in an earlier action. It is not available to those matters which might have been litigated but were not.”
Establishes the narrow scope of estoppel by judgment doctrine—it only applies to matters truly at issue in prior litigation, not potential claims.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1961, a federal income tax lien was filed jointly against Corn, Hoffman, and two others based on equal profit-sharing; the lien totaled $25,103.22.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Estoppel By Judgment cases and more on FLexlaw
Plaintiff appeals from final judgment for defendant in a suit for contribution. We reverse.
The parties stipulated these essentials: In 1961 an internal revenue lien was filed and assessed jointly against plaintiff, defendant and two other persons; the lien with accrued interest totaled $25,103.22; *189these four individuals had shared equally in the profits upon which the lien was based; in 1964 a suit between plaintiff and defendant over their businesses and affairs was disposed of by judgment which accepted an agreement between these parties, the material portion of which reads:
“The object and purpose of this settlement is to amicably adjust all of the affairs between MORTON A. CORN and IRVING HOFFMAN and that upon transfer of these eight and one-half (8J4) shares by MORTON A. CORN to IRVING HOFFMAN, said parties are then quit, each from the other, in any of their principal objectives or in any of their business enterprises whatsoever.”;
the tax lien was paid and discharged in 1966 with plaintiff paying $1,681.76 over his one-quarter share and with defendant paying at least $1,681.76 less than his one-quarter share.
This action by plaintiff against defendant for contribution in the amount of $1,-681.76 followed. The stipulation established the sole issue to be the effect of the cited agreement. The judge found for defendant and dismissed the cause with prejudice.
Defendant, while candidly admitting that mutual release and res judicata are not applicable, contends that estoppel by judgment is. This assertion is grounded on the premise that the judgment in the earlier action by accepting the mutual release institutes an estoppel to any claim for contribution involving the tax lien. We cannot agree.
Estoppel by judgment is available as a defense in a suit to those matters actually litigated and determined in an earlier action. It is not available to those matters which might have been litigated but were not.1
Moreover, the party asserting this doctrine has the burden to show that the matters in dispute were previously litigated and determined.2
This record does not disclose the tax lien was in any way involved in the 1964 suit between these parties or that the court even considered it. If the lien was involved in that action, defendant failed to establish it and thereby failed to meet his burden.
Accordingly, the final judgment appealed from is reversed and this cause is hereby remanded for entry of judgment for plaintiff.
REED, J., concurs.
CROSS, C. J., concurs in conclusion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. A. D. H., Inc., 397 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…estoppel by judgment has the burden of proving that the fact which it contends cannot be relitigated has been previously determined. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Industrial Contracting Co., 260 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Corn v. Hoffman, 230 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Wacaster v. Wacaster, 220 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); Hohweiler v. Hohweiler, 167 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Stone v. Stone, 111 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). It is true, as A.D.H. contends, that Babcock cannot show fro…
Authorities Cited
- Sebastian v. THE City of Miami (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)
- Hohweiler v. Hohweiler, 167 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)