LEROY R. ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Leroy R. Anderson was convicted of uttering a forged bank check. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial after a police officer testified that he had shown "mug shots" to a complainant for identification purposes, arguing the reference prejudiced the jury by implying he was a criminal.
The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial. The reference to "mug shots" was brought about by defense counsel during cross-examination, and a defendant may not take advantage of an error he has himself induced. Additionally, no motion to strike the testimony or request for jury instruction was made.
[1] A defendant may not take advantage of an error which he has himself induced.
[2] A motion for mistrial may not be utilized to strike testimony or instruct the jury to disregard it.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“I showed mug shots to the complainant on this case, and he identified that Leroy Anderson as being the one that cashed that check”
The police officer testimony that Anderson claimed was prejudicial, referring to photographs used for identification as "mug shots"
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnderson was tried and found guilty by jury of unlawfully uttering a forged bank check. During cross-examination of a police officer witness by defens…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Induced Error cases and more on FLexlaw
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered against appellant Leroy R. Anderson after he was tried and found *705guilty by a jury of unlawfully uttering a forged bank check.
The only point raised worthy of consideration here is that the trial Court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a police officer, testifying as a State witness, in answer to a question on cross-examination by defense counsel as to “the basis for arresting” Anderson on the check charge, answered that “I showed mug shots to the complainant on this case, and he identified that Leroy Anderson as being the one that cashed that check”. It is contended that the use by the officer-witness of the term “mug shots” was prejudicial to defendant Anderson on trial as implying to the jury “that the defendant was a criminal and that it was not relevant to any issues before the Court, and that its ‘sole thrust’ was at the character and propensity of the defendant”.
Anderson relies on the 3rd District Court case of Jones v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 194 So.2d 24, a Split-Court decision, the majority opinion being written by a visiting Circuit Judge. In that case the prosecutor in the trial Court, in his opening statement to the jury, referred to defendant Jones as being included in “a bunch * * * of * * * mug shots”. The majority opinion held this was prejudicial error, and reversed. However, we cannot follow such rationale to the point of a reversal on this sole circumstance, even though we disapprove of such reference to a defendant on trial. We prefer the rationale of Judge Swann’s opinion in dissent.
But even so, the Jones majority opinion is not authority here, as was pointed out in the later 3rd District Court case of Gagnon v. State, Fla.App.1968, 212 So.2d 337, wherein Judge Pearson, who had concurred in the majority opinion in Jones, very aptly put the Jones opinion in proper perspective. In Gagnon there had been a reference by a State witness at the trial to certain pictures used for identification of Gagnon as “mug shots”. Affirming the conviction of Gagnon, it was pointed out that the “mug shot” reference was made during cross-examination of a State witness by counsel for Gagnon, the opinion observing that a defendant on trial “may not take advantage of an error which he has himself induced”.
Exactly the same situation occurred in the instant case. The reference to “mug shots” in connection with the identification of Anderson prior to trial was affirmatively occasioned and brought about by defense counsel during cross-examination of a local police officer as a State witness.
Furthermore, no motion was made to strike the testimony complained of or any request made to the Court to instruct the jury to disregard the same. A motion for mistrial may not be utilized for such purpose.
The judgment of conviction appealed is therefore affirmed.
LILES, A. C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Darion Northrup Castle v. State, 305 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…date and not another, and the witness gave his reason. Consequently, there is no error to complain about in the first place. A criminal defendant may not take advantage on appeal of an error which he himself induced at trial, cf., Anderson v. State, 230 So. 2d 704 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1970). At the trial, the Appellant made a proffer of testimony that Patricia Kirby made a “dying declaration”, exonerating him. This proffer was denied and this denial has been assigned as error. [*798] The dying declaration exception…
-
Loftin v. State, 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973)…d 1967), by an assigned circuit judge with one district judge dissenting with opinion, has apparently not found support in subsequent district court opinions over the state. Willis v. State, 208 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla.App.1st 1968); Anderson v. State, 230 So. 2d 704 (Fla.App.2d 1970); Moore v. State, 267 So. 2d 850 (Fla.App.4th 1972). The pertinent comment in the opinion in Jones refers to a definite statement made in the prosecutor’s opening “to the effect that appellant had been identified by mixing his pict…1 / 2
-
Palmer v. State, 486 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…instruct the jury to disregard the proffered testimony are thought to be necessary prerequisites to a motion for mistrial. Williams v. State, 443 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Smith v. State, 365 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Anderson v. State, 230 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Feldman v. State, 194 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). In such circumstances, the trial court should not grant a mistrial unless the remarks are such that instructing the jury to disregard them could not cure the error; that is, th…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Adler v. Copa Corp., 212 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Jones v. State, 194 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)