JAMES J. O'BRIEN, APPELLANT,
v.
OSCAR FRANCIS AND REGINALD ULLMAN, APPELLEES
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In this negligence case arising from a rear-end collision, the defendant appealed a directed verdict of liability. The court reversed, holding that the defendant's explanation of the accident was sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence that arose from the rear-end collision itself, and the case should have gone to a jury.
The defendant's explanation of how the accident occurred was sufficient to remove the presumption of negligence arising from the rear-end collision. The issues presented by the plaintiffs' complaint and the defendant's answer should have been submitted to the jury rather than decided by directed verdict.
[1] A defendant's explanation of how a rear-end collision occurred may be sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from the accident.
[2] When a defendant provides an explanation that removes the presumption of negligence, the issues of liability should be submitted to the jury.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant's explanation of how the accident occurred was sufficient to remove the presumption of negligence, which arose because of the nature of the accident”
Establishes the core holding that a defendant's explanation can rebut the presumption of negligence in rear-end collisions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis case involved a multiple-car accident in which the defendant's vehicle struck another vehicle from behind. The defendant provided an explanation …
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Appellant, defendant in the trial court, seeks review of an adverse final judgment subsequent to a directed verdict of liability as a result of a rear-end collision in a multiple car accident.
We conclude that the defendant’s explanation of how the accident occurred was sufficient to remove the presumption of negligence, which arose because of the nature of the accident. The issues presented by the plaintiffs’ complaint and the defendant’s answer should have been submitted to the jury, under the following authorities: Pensacola Transit Co. v. Den-ton, Fla.App.1960, 119 So.2d 296; Stark v. Vasquez, Fla.1964, 168 So.2d 140, 141; Guile v. Boggs, Fla.1965, 174 So.2d 26; *14Baker v. Deeks, Fla.App.1965, 176 So.2d 108.
Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the verdict in favor of the appellees and against the appellant be and the same is hereby reversed, and the matter returned to the trial court for a new trial on all the issues made by the pleadings between these parties.1
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
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Wallace v. Rashkow, 270 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…This was a question of fact properly decided by the jury. Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, Fla.App.1960, 119 So. 2d 296. Stark v. Vasquez, Fla.1964, 168 So. 2d 140. Keyser v. Brunette, Fla.App. 1966, 188 So. 2d 840. O’Brien v. Francis, Fla.App.1970, 231 So. 2d 13. Affirmed.…
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Belcher v. First Nat'l Bank OF Miami, 405 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…NBM. For many years the rule in Florida was that a defendant could not appeal a judgment exonerating a codefendant because there was no contribution among tort-feasors. Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, 55 So. 2d 575 (Fla.1951); O’Brien v. Francis, 231 So. 2d 13 (Fla.3d DCA 1970); see also Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Watson-David Insurance Co., 167 So. 2d 34 (Fla.3d DCA 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1965). Appellants argue that this rule no longer pertains, and relying upon Pensacola Interstate Fa…
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N. Shore Hosp. v. Martin, 344 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…t they cannot, under the facts of this case. The appellee contends that a codefendant cannot challenge a verdict rendered in favor of another codefendant. While this rule appears to be firmly established in Florida case law, see O’Brien v. Francis, 231 So. 2d 13, 14 n. 1 (Fla.3d DCA 1970), our examination of decisions bearing on this point has disclosed that such cases were bottomed on the premise that there was no common law contribution among joint tort-feasors. See Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, Inc.,…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)
- Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, 55 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1951)
- Pensacola Transit Co., Inc. v. Denton, 119 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Ralph Johnson et ux. v. Edwin L, 168 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1964)
- Mansell v. Eidge, 179 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Adele Nutt v. James City, Inc., 162 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Otis Elevator Co. v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 137 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Baker v. Enid I. Deeks, 176 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Chapman v. State, 176 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)