PAUL STUPNER AND MARILYN STUPNER, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
CONSTANCE CACACE AND TITO CACACE, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES
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Florida appellate court reversed a judgment for inadequate damages in a real estate contract breach, holding that evidence of a subsequent sale price is admissible to prove the property's value at the time of breach and the seller's profit from the breach.
Evidence of a subsequent sale of the property is admissible to establish the property's value at the time of breach and to calculate the buyer's lost bargain damages.
[1] Evidence of a subsequent sale of real property is admissible to establish the property's fair market value at the time of breach in a contract action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The general rule is that any evidence is admissible which proves or tends to prove any fact material to the issues.”
Court stating the evidentiary standard for admissibility of the subsequent sale price as proof of property value.
Buyers contracted to purchase a residence for $40,000 under a deposit receipt contract. After executing the contract, the sellers refused to complete …
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This is an appeal by the plaintiffs below from a $615.00 Final Judgment entered by the Civil Court of Record in a non-jury case. The plaintiffs were the purchasers under a deposit receipt contract wherein the defendant-appellees agreed to sell a residence for $40,000.00. After the contract was executed, the vendors refused to conclude the transaction and subsequently sold the residence to another party for $45,000.00.
The lower court refused to consider as an element of the plaintiffs’ damages the loss of the plaintiffs’ bargain, and profit made by the defaulting vendors on the second sale.
A motion for new trial as to damages alone was made, and denied by the trial court.
We think that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence relating to the value of the property at the time of the breach in the form of a subsequent deposit receipt for the sale of the property. The general rule is that any evidence is admissible which proves or tends to prove any fact material to the issues. Evidence is the means by which some fact in question is established or disproved. 13 Fla. Jur. Evidence § 2. The lower court should have permitted into evidence the deposit receipt of the second sale as reflecting on the value of the property at the time of the breach. See Gassner v. Lockett (1958, Fla.) 101 So.2d 33. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial as to damages only.
ON REHEARING
The appellees, petitioners for rehearing, state that this court erred in stating appel-lees subsequently sold their residence to another party and that indeed the sale did not take place. The record did reflect that appellants tried to introduce a deposit receipt contract between appellees and a third party for the sale of the property but the trial judge refused this evidence.
By our former opinion we did not intend that the trial judge on a retrial as to damages would be required to return a verdict *526m the amount of the alleged profit on the lost bargain, but that the deposit receipt contract should be admitted as evidence of the value of the property; so that if the trier of fact did determine (1) there was a lack of good faith on the appellees or (2) the appellee benefited from any mistake that may have been made, then a proper damage verdict could be entered.
If petitioners’ reasoning were followed, the trial judge could have found either of the alternatives mentioned, supra, to have existed but having excluded the deposit receipt as evidence not been able to return a verdict for appropriate damages.
Accordingly, we adhere to our former opinion and the petition for rehearing is denied.
The appellees, petitioners for rehearing, state that this court erred in stating appel-lees subsequently sold their residence to another party and that indeed the sale did not take place. The record did reflect that appellants tried to introduce a deposit receipt contract between appellees and a third party for the sale of the property but the trial judge refused this evidence.
By our former opinion we did not intend that the trial judge on a retrial as to damages would be required to return a verdict m the amount of the alleged profit on the lost bargain, but that the deposit receipt contract should be admitted as evidence of the value of the property; so that if the trier of fact did determine (1) there was a lack of good faith on the appellees or (2) the appellee benefited from any mistake that may have been made, then a proper damage verdict could be entered.
If petitioners’ reasoning were followed, the trial judge could have found either of the alternatives mentioned, supra, to have existed but having excluded the deposit receipt as evidence not been able to return a verdict for appropriate damages.
Accordingly, we adhere to our former opinion and the petition for rehearing is denied.
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George v. Hourihan and Katrina A. Hourihan, 396 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…cannot aid the appellees. Upon entering into the contract to purchase the home, any increase in value (or decrease, for that matter) rightfully belongs to the buyers. See, e.g., Gassner v. [*756] Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33 (Fla.1958); Stupner v. Cacace, 231 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Had the appellees constructed the house as contracted for, the buyers would have reaped the benefit of the increase in value of that home. Likewise, had the value of the home decreased, due to market conditions, the buyers would…
Authorities Cited
- Meredyth Violet Gassner v. Lockett, 101 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1958)