LILLIAN K. WILKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
SUPERX DRUGS OF FLORIDA, INC., AN OHIO CORPORATION, AND HUGH P. HIGGINS D/B/A C. & E. WINDOW CLEANING, APPELLEES
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In this slip-and-fall case, the court affirmed summary judgment for defendants but reversed and remanded the cost judgment because the trial court improperly awarded costs for depositions and court reporter fees that were not related to issues actually before the court on summary judgment.
The final summary judgment is affirmed, but the cost judgment is reversed and remanded for reassessment. Costs for court reporter services and depositions are only allowable when the court reporter has served a useful and necessary purpose in proceedings directly related to the issues decided by the court.
[1] A final summary judgment will be affirmed if the appellant fails to demonstrate clear error.
[2] A cost judgment may be reversed and remanded for reconsideration even if the underlying summary judgment is affirmed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If costs are awarded to any party the following shall also be allowed: (1) * * * (2) The expense of the court reporter for per diem, transcribing proceedings and depositions, * *”
Citation to the relevant statute governing the award of court reporter costs
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Lillian Wilkins brought a slip-and-fall action against Superx Drugs of Florida, Inc. and Hugh P. Higgins d/b/a C. & E. Window Cleaning. The …
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Having reviewed the briefs and record on appeal, we conclude that appellant-plaintiff has failed to sustain her burden of making error clearly appear as to the final summary judgment for appellees-defend-ants, but that sufficient cause exists for reversal and remand of the cost judgment entered.
In this slip and fall action, the trial judge upon the pleadings and documents of record, inclusive of depositions and affidavits, granted final summary judgment in favor of defendants and upon motion entered a cost judgment against plaintiff in favor of the defendant, Superx Drugs of Florida, Inc., in the amount of $232.40.
The motion for taxing costs listed (1) deposition of Dr. Musselman — $116.45,(2) deposition of Dr. Hundley — $86.50, (3) J. E. Bruno, court reporter, for transcript of depositions of Higgins and Baucomb — $14.-00, (4) professional reporting service for deposition of Gaunt — $7.80, and (5) Heinrich, court reporter, for hearing on summary judgment — $29.45. These total $254.-20. Among other things items (1) and (2) contain the doctors’ fees. Penciled “X” marks appear by items (3) and (4) which if deducted from the total would leave $232.-40.
The cost judgment of $232.40 does not itemize its allowance. The summary judgment does not state the reasons for its entry, however, the record clearly reflects it was based upon no liability being established on the part of the defendants.
F.S.1967 57.071, F.S.A. states:
“If costs are awarded to any party the following shall also be allowed:
“(1) * * *
“(2) The expense of the court reporter for per diem, transcribing proceedings and depositions, * *
Defendant, Superx, urges affirmance of the cost judgment under a manda*20tory construction of the cited statute. Such a carte blanche result would render meaningless the purpose of the act which we opine to be that in those instances where the court reporter has served a useful and necessary purpose in proceedings and depositions such expenses are allowable. Although the language of the present statute appears mandatory on the trial judge rather than discretionary ás its predecessor, F.S. 1965, 58.13, F.S.A. nevertheless the significance of costs being related to a useful and meaningful purpose is not altered. See Cohn v. Florida National Bank at Orlando, Fla.App.1969, 223 So.2d 767.
The issue of damages was not before the court when the final summary judgment was entered and costs allocated to this would not be taxable.
Therefore, the final summary judgment is affirmed but the cost judgment is reversed and this case is remanded for assessing of costs in conformity herewith.
Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part, and remanded.
WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur.
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Weiss v. Turtletaub, 386 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…eporter’s attendance fee for the trial at which the appellants prevailed as, in our view, such a cost served a useful purpose and was, therefore, taxable under Section 57.071(2), Florida Statutes (1979); see Wilkens v. SuperX Drugs of Florida, Inc., 232 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); 12 Fla.Jur.2d “Costs” 169-170 (1979); and (b) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing as taxable costs the balance of the costs sought herein as, in our view, the showing made on this record is far too sparse…1 / 2
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Schumacher v. Wellman, 415 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…opening statements and arguments by counsel.” Regardless of the apparently mandatory language of the statute, however, the requirement that costs be related to a useful and meaningful purpose is not altered. Wilkins v. SuperX Drugs of Florida, Inc., 232 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). It is unclear whether the trial court considered the requests for costs in terms of the “useful purpose” guideline. Accordingly, the cost judgment as between the broker and the seller is reversed and remanded for a determinatio…
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ST. Petersburg Sheraton Corp. v. Stuart, 242 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)…ainst the losing party” regardless of their use or non-use at trial. After the entry of the cost judgment in the case sub judice, our sister court of the Fourth District, in the case of Wilkins v. [*191] Superx Drugs of Florida, Inc., Fla.App. 1970, 232 So. 2d 19, held that the purpose of the statute is not altered, saying: “Although the language of the present statute appears mandatory on the trial judge rather than discretionary as its predecessor, F.S.1965, 58.13, F.S.A. nevertheless the significance of…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cohn v. Fla. Nat'l Bank AT Orlando, 223 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)