KENNETH CALDWELL, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Kenneth Caldwell sought habeas corpus relief from his five-year escape sentence, arguing that his escape was not unlawful because the two-year sentence he was serving when he escaped was itself invalid under an earlier Calloway Brown ruling. The court rejected this argument because the Calloway Brown decision had been reconsidered and overruled on rehearing, making Caldwell's legal theory unsound.
The court held that the two-year sentence underlying Caldwell's escape conviction was not invalid under the Calloway Brown decision because the Calloway Brown court had reconsidered and overruled its earlier opinion on rehearing. Therefore, Caldwell's escape was unlawful, and his habeas petition was properly denied.
[1] A criminal conviction and sentence are not rendered unlawful by an initial appellate court opinion that is later receded from on rehearing.
[2] Appellate court opinions are not final until the time for rehearing has expired and any rehearing has been disposed of.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“petitioner advances the interesting theory that his escape was not unlawful and, hence, not a crime inasmuch as the sentence he was serving at the time he escaped was itself unlawful”
Establishes Caldwell's central legal theory for the habeas petition
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCaldwell was convicted of escape from the Alachua County Jail and sentenced to five years. He was serving a two-year sentence for breaking and enterin…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Felony Vs. Misdemeanor Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
Petitioner in an original habeas corpus action seeks release from a five-year sentence imposed upon him after his convic*428tion of the crime of escape from the Alachua County Jail.
In support of his claim, petitioner advances the interesting theory that his escape was not unlawful and, hence, not a crime inasmuch as the sentence he was serving at the time he escaped was itself unlawful. The allegedly unlawful sentence was a two-year term imposed after he pled guilty to a charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. Petitioner’s claim is that the two-year prison sentence earlier imposed upon him was invalid by operation of the rule announced by the court in .the case of Calloway Brown v. State, Case No. 2481, original opinion dated October 22, 1969,' not reported. While the Calloway Brown decision relied upon by petitioner did stand for the proposition asserted by him, the said opinion never became final since it was receded from by the court on rehearing. The court’s final decision in Callo-way Brown was filed on February 12, 1970, 232 So.2d 55. Inasmuch as the original opinion dated October 22, 1969, in the Cal-loway Brown case spawned a spate of post-conviction motions to vacate judgments and sentences and habeas corpus actions, all of which proceed on the mistaken notion that crimes punishable by sentences of imprisonment in county jails or in the state prison are not felonies, we deem it especially appropriate to call to the attention of the members of the Raiford bar the fact that the court receded from its earlier views by its February 12 decision noted above. Much judicial time and labor has been expended in considering and disposing of cases of this type simply because prisoners have not taken proper note of the fact that the opinions of appellate courts are not final until the time for rehearing and disposition thereof, if any, has run. I suppose that failure to be cognizant of this latter rule has caused numerous prison inmates to sacrifice their few pennies and privileges given to their more sophisticated fellow inmates who hold out to them false hopes of release or new trials.
Viewing the legality of petitioner’s sentence in the breaking and entering case in light of the court’s opinion on rehearing in Calloway Brown, we hold that the said sentence is not invalid. Accordingly, pe-tioner’s claim, being predicated upon a fallacious legal premise, must fall.
The petition is denied.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Henderson v. State, 679 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…IONS FOR REHEARING DIRECTED TO THAT OPINION? . Coney was pending on rehearing at the time of Henderson’s trial. Opinions of appellate courts are not final until the time for rehearing and the disposition thereof, if any, has run. Caldwell v. State, 232 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).…
-
Hill v. State, 696 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…637710] (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 6,1996) (Coney inapplicable to case tried before Coney decision became final). The Henderson court assumed that a rule is “announced” when the opinion becomes “final.” It relied on a First District case, Caldwell v. State, 232 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), which involved an opinion that was withdrawn on rehearing. Although a decision of an appellate court is not enforceable between the parties to the appeal until it is “final,” it is not clear to me that trial courts in other case…
Authorities Cited
- Calloway Brown v. State, 232 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)