ALVIN S. SHERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
ERNEST HERMAN, TRUSTEE, AND DOME PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-03-20
Nos. 70-213, 214
Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.
233 So. 2d 138 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Sherman sought to intervene in a lawsuit after a final judgment had already been entered, but the trial court denied his motion to intervene. The appellate court affirmed the denial, finding that Sherman's allegations were insufficient under the applicable standard for intervention.


Holding

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sherman's motion to intervene. Sherman's allegations were insufficient to meet the requirements for intervention under the applicable standard, and therefore his motion was properly denied.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may not take judicial notice of records from a separate, unrelated proceeding.

[2] A motion to strike portions of a record and brief is granted when those portions allude to pleadings not before the trial judge in the cause below.

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Key Quotes

“We have consolidated those matters and have determined to treat this as an interlocutory appeal from an order entered in a civil action after final judgment.”

Establishes the procedural posture and how the court is treating Sherman's appeal and petition.

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Facts & Procedural History

A final judgment was signed on February 20, 1970, and filed on February 23, 1970, in a suit to which Sherman was not a party. On February 24, 1970, Sh…

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Opinion of the Court
SWANN, Judge.

SWANN, Judge.

A final judgment was signed by the trial judge on February 20, 1970, in a suit in which Alvin S. Sherman was not a party. The final judgment was filed on February 23, 1970, and recorded on February 24, 1970.

On February 24, 1970, Sherman filed a “motion for leave to intervene” as a party defendant in the suit. The motion was denied by the trial judge and he has filed an interlocutory appeal and a petition for writ of certiorari to the order of denial.

We have consolidated those matters and have determined to treat this as an interlocutory appeal from an order entered in a civil action after final judgment. Rule 4.2(a), F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., and Fort v. Fort, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 69.

Appellees have filed, in this interlocutory appeal, a motion to strike portions of the record and brief filed herein by Sherman. They assert that those portions of the record and brief allude to certain pleadings and a writ involved in a separate cer-tiorari proceeding filed by Sherman in another division of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida and those pleadings were not a part of the evidence or records before the trial judge in this cause. A certificate of the Clerk of the Circuit Court is attached which certifies that those pleadings were not a part of the record in this action. A trial judge may not take judicial notice of such records. Kostecos v. Johnson, Fla.1956, 85 So.2d 594; and Novack v. Novack, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 499. The motion to strike is granted. See Kelley v. Kelley, Fla.1954, 75 So.2d 191; and Sheldon v. Tiernan, Fla.App.1962, 147 So.2d 593.

Sherman says his motion to intervene should have been allowed under Wags Transportation System Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 751. Appellee says it was properly denied under the authority of Dickinson v. Segal, Fla.1969, 219 So.2d 435.

A review of the record and the motion for leave to intervene reveals insufficient allegations to bring this motion under the authority of Wags, supra. It is, therefore, controlled by Dickinson, supra, and we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for leave to intervene. See Wogisch v. Tiger, Fla.App. 1966, 193 So.2d 187.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Truxell v. Truxell, 259 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
    …n the party’s brief and rasied for the first time on appeal5 are considered waived. The judgment appealed is affirmed. S'PE'CTOR, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur. . Turk v. Turk (Fla.App.1960), 118 So. 2d 67. . Sherman, v. Herman (Fla.App.1970), 233 So. 2d 138; In re Estate of Simpkins (Fla.App.1967), 195 So. 2d 590. . Williams v. Williams (Fla.App.1965), 172 So. 2d 488; Fisher v. Maas Bros., Inc. (Fla.App.1963), 149 So. 2d 910; Vaughn v. Smith (Fla.1957), 96 So. 2d 143. . Anderson v. Smith (Fla.App.196…

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