ARTHUR L. MINTZ, APPELLANT,
v.
JUDITH MINTZ ELLISON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A former husband appeals an interlocutory order requiring him to make mortgage payments on a former marital home after his ex-wife vacated it. The court held it lacked jurisdiction to impose this obligation because the house was no longer being used as a home by the wife and children, reversing the order.
The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the mortgage payment obligation because the home was no longer being used as a home by the wife and minor children. The order was therefore quashed.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a final judgment by adding new obligations not contemplated by the original judgment or stipulation, absent specific statutory…
[2] Upon divorce, real property held as an estate by the entirety is converted to an estate in common.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to change the terms of a final judgment after it has lost jurisdiction of the judgment by the expiration of the time for filing a motion for rehearing.”
Establishes the core jurisdictional principle limiting the trial court's authority to modify the judgment
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a divorce decree, the parties agreed that the wife and two minor children could occupy the marital home at 845 North Rainbow Drive, Hollywood, Flor…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jurisdiction To Modify Final Judgment cases and more on FLexlaw
The former husband brings this interlocutory appeal from a post-judgment order which required him to “bring the mortgages current on the former home of the parties * * * and keep the same current until further order of this court”. We hold that the court lacked jurisdiction to require the former husband to make the mortgage payments after the residence was no longer used as a home by the wife and the minor children. We reverse.
In the final judgment of divorce the court adopted a stipulation between the parties. The stipulation, among other things, provided:
“that the home of the parties located at 845 North Rainbow Drive, Hollywood,. Florida (which is held as an estate by the entireties), shall be occupied by the *157Plaintiff and the two minor children of the parties up to and including the date of September 14, 1969, at which time the Plaintiff shall vacate the premsies and leave same unfurnished, except for the personal belongings of the Defendant husband, and the home of the parties shall be sold as soon as possible thereafter and the net proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally between the parties after deductions in favor of ARTHUR MINTZ, from the date of this Order, for any payments paid on the first or second mortgages of the home. * * *»
The final judgment provided:
“3. That, pursuant to the terms of said Stipulation, the plaintiff may continue to reside in the home of the parties located at 845 North Rainbow Drive, Hollywood, Florida, until September 14, 1969, at which time she shall vacate the premises and leave same unfurnished except for the personal belongings of the defendant.
“4. That the said home shall be sold as soon as possible after September 14, 1969, and the net proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally between the parties, after the deductions set forth in said Stipulation in favor of the defendant,”
On November 12, 1969, the appellee filed her motion for an order holding the appellant in contempt for his failure to make the mortgage payments for October and November 1969 after the appellee had vacated the residence and before its sale. The motion to hold appellant in contempt was denied, but the court added new provisions to the final judgment by ordering the appellant to “bring the mortgages current” and “keep same current until further order of the court.”
A trial court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to change the terms of a final judgment after it has lost jurisdiction of the judgment by the expiration of the time for filing a motion for rehearing. Batteiger v. Batteiger, Fla.App.1959, 109 So.2d 602. Special exceptions are made by § 61.-14, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. (providing for the modification of agreements for support, maintenance, or alimony), and Rule 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A. (providing for relief from judgments under enumerated circumstances). The order in the instant case is not bottomed upon nor does the motion allege that the relief sought by the appellee is based upon either provision of law.
Real estate held as an estate by the entirety becomes an estate in common upon the entry of a decree of divorce between the parties. Section 689.15, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.; Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629, 21 So.2d 145 (1945). Tenants in common have a mutual obligation to pay charges upon the property held in common. See Spencer v. Spencer, 160 Fla. 749, 36 So.2d 424, 426 (1948). Either tenant in common may make the payment of the charges and maintain an action to recover the proportionate share from the other tenants in common. Meckler v. Weiss, Fla. 1955, 80 So.2d 608.
The order appealed from is quashed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
-
Maita P. Singer v. Singer, 342 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…die, or they marry, or they are no longer dependent. The marital home became a tenancy in common upon entry of the judgment dissolving the marriage. Tenants in common have a mutual obligation to pay the charges upon the property. Mintz v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). The equity of one of the parties should not be increased by any expenditures made by the other party. Maroun v. Maroun, 277 So. 2d 572 (Fla.3d DCA 1973). The judgment before us violates both of these principles. The judgment shoul…
-
Tinsley v. Tinsley, 490 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…the tenants have joint responsibilities, Abella-Fernandez v. Abella, 393 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and “have a mutual obligation to pay the charges upon the property,” Singer v. Singer, 342 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Mintz v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); see Maroun v. Maroun, 277 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). This statutory property obligation is distinct from any obligation which may result from the trial court’s final judgment grant ing dissolution of the marriage. See Sp…
-
Waskin v. Waskin, 346 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…the court to require Dr. Waskin to pay one-half of the charges on the former marital residence was clear error. See Singer v. Singer, 342 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See also Maroun v. Maroun, 277 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Mintz v. Ellison, 233 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); and Spencer v. Spencer, 160 Fla. 749, 36 So. 2d 424 (1948). It is both unjust and an abuse of discretion to require the mother, who has no resources other than the small alimony payment to be solely responsible for continuing to…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Markland v. Markland, 155 Fla. 629 (Fla. 1945)
- Spencer v. Spencer, 160 Fla. 749 (Fla. 1948)
- Meckler v. Weiss, 80 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1955)
- Batteiger v. Batteiger, 109 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Deauville Realty Co., Inc. v. Tobin, 109 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)