JOHNNY DALLAS OWEN, APPELLANT,
v.
DALLAS HUBERT OWEN, APPELLEE
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A 19-year-old son sued his father for damages from an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment for the father, ruling the son was an unemancipated minor unable to maintain the suit. The appellate court reversed, holding that factual questions about de facto emancipation should be submitted to a jury rather than decided on summary judgment.
The court held that summary judgment was improper because the affidavits raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether de facto emancipation existed. The question of whether the son's independent financial status, self-direction, and equal participation in the car pool constituted sufficient emancipation to permit the suit should have been submitted to the jury.
[1] A minor's ability to maintain a lawsuit against a parent may depend on whether the minor has been emancipated, either by statute or by fact.
[2] Evidence that a minor is "his own boss," spends money as he wishes, and pays his own way in a car pool and at home may raise a question of fact regarding emancipation suf…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a careful study of the language of the affidavit of the defendant to the effect that the plaintiff was his "own boss" and spent his money like he wanted to including paying his own way at the house, coupled with the further statement that the plaintiff paid his way in the car pool and otherwise obligated himself equally with the other members of the pool, raises a question of fact which we think should have been determined by the jury”
Establishes that the affidavits created genuine factual disputes about de facto emancipation unsuitable for summary judgment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnny Owen, age 19, lived in his father's home but was described as his own boss who spent money as he wished and paid his own way at the house. He w…
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This is an appeal from an order entering a final summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, in an action for damages in an automobile accident in which the plaintiff was injured.
The plaintiff and defendant are father and son. At the time of the alleged acci*166dent, the plaintiff was 19 years of age and had not had his disability of non-age removed by law pursuant to Chapter 62, F.S.
On the date of the accident and prior thereto, according to the affidavits of both parties, the father and son and some other men were each members of a car pool, wherein each of the members of the car pool reciprocated in the transportation to and from work, either by paying cash or furnishing transportation. According to the affidavit of the defendant, the plaintiff, Johnny Owen, was a member of the pool and “was to drive his car when he got it,” and that he owed members of the pool some rides and that he did ride to and from work in the vehicles in the car pool.
A further significant statement in defendant’s affidavit was that on the date of the accident and at all times subsequent thereto, the said Johnny Owen “has been his own boss and spent his money like he wanted to.” Also that he paid his own way at the house — the home of the defendant with whom the plaintiff Johnny Owen lived.
The affidavit of Johnny Owen substantially supported this same set of facts.
Upon motion for summary judgment on the ground that the pleadings and attached affidavit (the affidavit of the defendant) showed there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, the court granted the motion and pointed out that in his opinion there had been no statutory emancipation of the plaintiff (under Chapter 62, F.S.) and that there had not been a complete severance of the filial tie and that the plaintiff was an unemancipated minor and could not maintain this action.
We have reviewed the record, affidavits and briefs and are of the opinion, and so hold, that the court erred in granting the summary judgment.
We agree, and there is no contrary contention, that there has not been a statutory emancipation of the plaintiff pursuant to Chapter 62, Florida Statutes, but a careful study of the language of the affidavit of the defendant to the effect that the plaintiff was his “own boss” and spent his money like he wanted to including paying his own way at the house, coupled with the further statement that the plaintiff paid his way in the car pool and otherwise obligated himself equally with the other members of the pool, raises a question of fact which we think should have been determined by the jury — whether emancipation did in fact exist to such an extent as to permit the suit in question. We have read Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So.2d 776 (Fla.App.2d, 1961), Fla.Jur. 24 — Parent and Child, and some cases cited in A.L.R. We believe, however, that the question raised here is well answered in Jackson v. Citizen’s Bank & Trust Co., 53 Fla. 265, 44 So. 516 (1907) head note 13 wherein it was held that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the submission to the jury of the question of emancipation of the minor son.
We therefore reverse the final summary judgment with directions to the lower court to proceed with the jury trial as prayed.
WIGGINTON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Ison v. Fla. Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 302 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…anding non-compliance with the statutory means of securing emancipation under F.S. § 62.011. E. g., Jackson v. Citizens’ Bank & Trust Co., 53 Fla. 265, 44 So. 516, 530; see Meehan v. Meehan, Fla. App.1961, 133 So. 2d 776; Owen v. Owen, Fla.App.1970, 234 So. 2d 165; 59 Am.Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 93, p. 191; Annot., Minor — Implied Emancipation, 165 A.L.R. 723. The facts and circumstances necessary to effect such an emancipation involve, as we have indicated, a breaking of the bonds of “subjection” of the…
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Owen v. Owen, 237 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1970)…Certiorari denied without opinion. 234 So. 2d 165.…
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Vinci v. Gensler, 269 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)…mily survived the crash. There is no family unity to maintain and unfortunately no family harmony to protect. We have been unable to find a case in Florida jurisprudence that fits this set of facts. Appellant cites to us Owen v. Owen, Fla.App.1970, 234 So. 2d 165, as an indication of Florida’s abandonment of the inter-spousal immunity doctrine. We believe that case was correctly decided but it sheds no light on the principle here involved. In that case the court merely held that the question of the emancipat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jackson v. The Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 53 Fla. 265 (Fla. 1907)
- Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)