GLENN V. LIVELY, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, APPELLEE
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Glenn Lively, a Miami police officer granted disability retirement in 1964, sought reinstatement after a Medical Board found him fit to return to duty in 1967. The court held that while the Medical Board's finding removes disability status, it does not automatically entitle a retiree to reinstatement; the employee must still pass a medical examination by the City physician to be rehired.
The court held that the Medical Board's action, while sufficient to automatically retire an officer, is not sufficient to automatically reinstate a retiree. The Board's ruling merely removes any disability and restores the applicant's eligibility to apply for employment, but reinstatement requires passing an examination by the City physician.
[1] A medical board's finding that a disabled employee is fit to return to duty does not automatically entitle the employee to reinstatement in a hazardous occupation.
[2] A medical board's determination of fitness for return to duty may merely restore an employee to eligibility to apply for re-employment, requiring further examination.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the action of the Medical Board may be sufficient to automatically retire a member of the classified service which removes a police officer from duty, this is entirely different from determining whether a person occupying retirement status is fit to return to duty in a hazardous occupation.”
Establishes the court's distinction between the finality of Medical Board action in retirement versus reinstatement contexts
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLively was employed as a uniformed policeman by Miami and granted ordinary disability retirement in November 1964. In 1967, he applied for reexaminati…
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Prior to 1964, the appellant was employed by the City of Miami as a uniformed policeman. In November of that year he was granted an ordinary disability, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the ordinances and rules pertaining to the classified service. Thereafter, in 1967, the appellant applied for a reexamination by the Medical Board, in order to seek reinstatement as a police officer pursuant to the provisions of Ch. II, § 91(11) of the City Code.1 By a split decision, the Medical Board indicated he was fit to return to duty. This recommendation was passed on to the Retirement Board, who notified the Civil Service Board that it accepted the recommendation of the Medical Board. The Civil Service Board refused to reinstate the appellant because he did not satisfactorily pass a medical examination by the City physician.2 The appellant then instituted the action in the trial court, seeking a declaration of his rights and an *412order requiring the City to reinstate him as a uniformed police officer. Following final hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and this appeal ensued.
The ordinances, rules, and regulations of the City of Miami applicable to this matter are not entirely clear. The appellant relies heavily on this court’s opinion in City of Miami v. Groner, Fla.App.1964, 164 So. 2d 26, wherein this court held that [for retirement purposes] the action of the Medical Board was final and the classified employee involved was entitled to retirement status. The appellant contends that it should likewise be true that when a medical board finds a retired person fit to be returned to duty its action should be final and he should automatically be readmitted to the classified service. We do not agree.
Although the action of the Medical Board may be sufficient to automatically retire a member of the classified service which removes a police officer from duty, this is entirely different from determining whether a person occupying retirement status is fit to return to duty in a hazardous occupation. We hold that the trial court was correct in dismissing the appellant’s complaint and that, for purposes of re-employment by the City of Miami as a police officer, the effect of the ruling by the Medical Board was no more than to remove any disability the appellant might have been suffering as to employment as a police officer and, by its ruling, the Board merely returned the appellant to the status or eligibility where he could apply for employment again with the City, which would necessitate an examination by the City physician.
Wherefore, the final judgment hereunder appealed is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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City OF Miami v. Rumpf, 235 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)…Fla.Stat., F.S.A., for pension purposes, but not a police officer within the import of the Manual of Job Descriptions of the City of Miami relating to the Enforcement Division of the Police Department. Compare Lively v. City of Miami, Fla.App.1970, 234 So. 2d 411. Because of our ruling on the major issue in this appeal, the other points raised by the appellants are moot. Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the final judgment here under review be and the same is hereby reversed, with directions to dism…
Authorities Cited
- Samie Royster v. State, 164 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)