VERONICA STOPKO AND JOHN STOPKO, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
PENN DUNLOP FARRINGTON AND CECIL FARRINGTON, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1970-05-06
No. 69-327
CROSS, C. J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
235 So. 2d 28 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The trial court conditionally granted defendants a new trial on damages, requiring plaintiffs to remit portions of their jury verdict or face retrial. The appellate court reversed, finding the trial judge abused his discretion in determining the verdict was excessive.


Holding

The trial judge abused his discretion. While courts must defer to trial judges' broad discretion on motions for new trial, such orders may be reviewed to determine if discretion has been abused, and if apparent from the record, the order should be set aside.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

[2] An appellate court may set aside a trial court's order granting a new trial if an abuse of discretion is apparent from the record.

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Key Quotes

“a motion for new trial is directed to the sound, broad discretion of the trial judge and that the ruling on such a motion should not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that such discretion has been abused”

Establishes the standard of review: trial judge discretion is broad but reviewable for abuse

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Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiffs Stopko brought a damages action arising from an automobile accident. A jury verdict awarded Mrs. Stopko $9,000 and Mr. Stopko $3,000. The t…

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Opinion of the Court
MCDONALD, PARKER LEE, Associate Judge.

MCDONALD, PARKER LEE, Associate Judge.

The appellants were plaintiffs in an action for damages against the appellees for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. The trial resulted in a jury verdict in the sum of Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) for Mrs. Stopko and Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) for Mr. Stopko.

The trial judge entered an order granting the defendants a new trial on the issues of damages only unless the plaintiffs filed a remittitur of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) on the verdict entered for Mrs. Stopko and a remittitur of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,-500.00) on the verdict for Mr. Stopko. The grounds assigned by the trial judge for his *29order were that the verdict was excessive, shocked the judicial conscience and was so grossly excessive as to manifest on its face that the jury was swayed by sympathy, passion or prejudice and/or was swayed by matters outside the record and/or was misled by the remarks of counsel in closing arguments. The appellants have declined to file the remittitur.

This court recognizes the rule that a motion for new trial is directed to the sound, broad discretion of the trial judge and that the ruling on such a motion should not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that such discretion has been abused. Cloud v. Fallis, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 669; Kraus v. Osteen, Fla.App.1961, 135 So.2d 885; Russo v. Clark, Fla. 1962, 147 So.2d 1.

In Russo v. Clark, the Court stated: “Nevertheless, this Court has consistently held that such an order may be reviewed on the record for the purpose of ascertaining whether the exercise of judicial discretion implicit in the order has been abused. If abuse of discretion is apparent from the record, then the order of the trial judge, in an appropriate appellate proceeding, may, and should be, set aside.” This principle is also enunciated in Kraus v. Osteen, Fla.App.1961, 135 So.2d 855; North Dade Imported Motors v. Brundage Motors, Inc., Fla.App.1969, 221 So.2d 170; Bailey v. Sympson, Fla.App. 1963, 148 So.2d 729 and others.

We have carefully reviewed the record. A summary of the record would serve no useful purpose. This study, however, which included argument of counsel as well as all the evidence in the case, directs us to the conclusion that in this instance the trial judge abused his discretion in entering the order granting a new trial.

The order granting a new trial unless the plaintiffs filed a remittitur is reversed and the trial judge is directed to enter judgment on the jury verdict.

Reversed.

CROSS, C. J., and WALDEN, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Cohen v. Margoa, Inc., 309 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975)
    …llowing cases: Cloud v. Fallis, Fla.1959, 110 So. 2d 669; Price v. Jordan, Fla.App.1959, 115 So. 2d 444; Laskey v. Smith, Fla.1970, 239 So. 2d 13; Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, Fla.1970, 234 So. 2d 645; Stopko v. Farrington, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So. 2d 28; Frazier v. Merricks, Fla.App.1972, 271 So. 2d 36, and Willard v. Bowen, Fla.App. 1974, 294 So. 2d 696. It is my opinion the District Court decision conflicts with the rationale of the cited cases as hereinafter explained. It appears from the Dist…
  • Schlesser v. Levinson, 406 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
    …v. Kuntz, 56 So. 2d 720 (Fla.1952). Further, a motion for new trial is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Stopko v. Farrington, 235 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). No such showing is made by this record. The second point on appeal is directed to the refusal of the trial court to give a requested instruction. For a plaintiff to recover in an action for malicious criminal prosecution it mus…
  • Bush v. Trans World Airlines, 312 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
    …, the trial judge granted a new trial on grounds other than those heretofore recognized in Cloud v. Fallis, supra. See also Price v. Jordan, Fla.App.1959, 115 So. 2d 444; Laskey v. Smith, Fla.1970, 239 So. 2d 13; Stopko v. Farrington, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So. 2d 28; Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, Fla. 1970, 234 So. 2d 645; Frazier v. Merricks, Fla.App.1972, 271 So. 2d 36; Willard v. Bowen, Fla.App. 1974, 294 So. 2d 696; Nunberg v. Brodsky, Fla.App. 1969, 224 So. 2d 727. Interestingly, although the mot…

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