SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JIMMY LAWRENCE JACKSON, APPELLEE
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Seaboard Air Line Railroad challenged the constitutionality of Florida Statutes § 357.08, which requires railroads to place lighted fusees or other warning devices when trains block public highways at night. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding that the term "adequate lighting" is not unconstitutionally vague when interpreted in context.
The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The term "adequate lighting" when read in context of the whole statute has a common sense meaning: lighting sufficient to allow motorists to see trains blocking the road in time to avoid collision. The Legislature reasonably could not define adequate lighting with a fixed standard since adequacy varies by circumstances at each crossing.
[1] A statute is not rendered void for vagueness simply because a term within it, such as "adequate lighting," is not explicitly defined, provided the term can be understood…
[2] The term "adequate lighting" in a statute requiring visual warnings for railroad trains blocking highways at night should be interpreted as lighting sufficient for motori…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A common sense interpretation of the term "adequate lighting" read in the context of the whole Statute means lighting sufficient to allow motorists to see trains blocking the road in time to avoid a collision.”
Establishes the Court's approach to interpreting the statutory term and how it provides sufficient definiteness despite lacking a numerical standard.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA railroad train operated by Seaboard Air Line blocked a public highway crossing near Chattahoochee, Florida during nighttime hours. Plaintiff Jackson…
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This cause is before us on appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County. That Court passed directly on the validity of Florida Statutes § 357.08, F.S.A., giving this Court jurisdiction under § 4, Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
Plaintiff, appellee herein, brought suit against defendant, appellant herein, alleging negligent operation of appellant’s train at a crossing near Chattahoochee, Florida, in Gadsden County. Appellee charged appellant with negligence in failing to place a fusee on the roadway pursuant to Florida Statutes § 357.08, F.S.A. The railroad denied any negligence, raised defenses of contributory negligence and third party negligence and challenged the constitutionality of § 357.08 on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and does not specify a standard with any decree of certainty.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to hold the Statute unconstitutional and charged the jury that violation of the Statute would be evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee.
Florida Statutes § 357.08, provides:
“(1) Whenever a railroad train shall engage in a switching operation or stop so as to block a public highway, road or street at any time from one half hour after sunset to one half hour before sunrise, the crew of such railroad train shall cause to be placed a lighted fusee or other visual warning' device in both directions from such railroad train upon or at the edge of the pavement of the highway, road or street to warn approaching motorists of the railroad train blocking the highway, road or street; provided, this section shall not apply to railroad crossings at which there are automatic warning devices properly functioning or at which there is adequate lighting.” (e. s.)
Appellant contends that the term “adequate lighting” appearing at the end of subsection (1) of the Statute is so vague and indefinite that it cannot be executed and renders the Statute void. Appellant states that since the Statute does not contain a definition of “adequate lighting” there is nothing to indicate what the Legislature had in mind when this proviso was adopted.
The question before us then is whether Florida Statutes § 357.08, F.S.A. is void because the term “adequate lighting” is not specifically defined. We think not. A common sense interpretation of the term “adequate lighting” read in the context of the whole Statute means lighting sufficient to allow motorists to see trains blocking the road in time to avoid a collision. If the lighting is inadequate for visual detection of the trains, as stated above, lighted fusees or other visual warning devices must be put out.
The Legislature could not feasibly define adequate lighting with any fixed standard such as so many candlepower, since what is adequate will vary according to the circumstances existing at each crossing. If there is doubt as to the adequacy of the lighting, fusees or other warning devices can be placed as provided by the Statute. This is a relatively small burden considering the potential threat to human life posed by trains blocking intersections.
*300Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C. J., CARLTON, J., SPEC-TOR, District Court Judge, and FRYE, Circuit Judge, concur.
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Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974)…58); Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla.1965). The reasonable relationship between Section 357.08 and public safety has already been noted by this Court in Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 235 So. 2d 298 (Fla.1970), wherein this Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 357.08 against an attack of vagueness. Therein, this Court announced: “The question before us then is whether Florida Statutes § 357.08, F.S.A. is void because the term ‘adequat…
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Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973)…8 (1936) ; Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 256 N.E. 2d 513 (N.Y.Ct.App.1970) ; Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E. 2d 815 (1936). . Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1972) ; Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company v. Jackson, 235 So. 2d 298 (Fla.1970). . Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla. 206, 17 So. 2d 105 (1944) ; Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1952) cert. den., 344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 165, 97 L.Ed. 680; Hudson v. Hudson, 59 Fla. 529, 51 So. 857 (1910) ; Busch v. Busch, 68 So. 2d 350 (F…
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Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc. v. McVEY, 739 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…common understanding and intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. See State v. Rodriquez, 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla.1978). In regard to “adequate and appropriate health care,” a similar challenge was raised in Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Jackson, 235 So. 2d 298 (Fla.1970), where the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a statute requiring “adequate lighting” at railroad crossings. Neither the statute nor the regulations defined “adequate lighting.” The court upheld the statute on a vagueness challenge and noted…