LEO ZOHLMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
SYLVIA ZOHLMAN, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-05-19
No. 69-635
Before PEARSON, C. J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.
235 So. 2d 532 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court's award of $1,250 monthly alimony, $300 monthly child support, an $80,000 lump sum property settlement, and $10,000 in attorney fees. The appellate court affirms all awards, finding no abuse of discretion given the wife's poor health and lack of assets, the husband's substantial wealth, and evidence of his attempts to divest himself of property.


Holding

The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The alimony and lump sum awards were proper given the wife's poor health, lack of personal assets, future needs, and the husband's substantial wealth and ability to pay. The $10,000 attorney fee award was reasonable given expert testimony valuing the case higher and the complexity and skill required in the litigation.


Headnotes

[1] A court may award periodic alimony and a lump sum payment for property rights in a divorce judgment.

[2] A court may order a party to pay attorney fees for the opposing party's counsel in a divorce action.

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Key Quotes

“the court determined that, in view of the poor state of health of the parties and the absence of personal assets which the wife could utilize in sustaining herself for her remaining years, the lump sum award of $80,000.00 was proper”

Establishes the rationale for the lump sum property settlement award based on the wife's circumstances and need

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Facts & Procedural History

At the time of divorce, the wife (appellee) was 57 years old in poor health with no personal assets. The husband (appellant) was a man of substantial …

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Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

Divorce litigation was commenced by the wife, appellee herein. In the final judgment of divorce, the chancellor granted the divorce to her, and ordered the appellant to pay, as periodic alimony payment, the sum of $1,250.00 per month; moreover, the chancellor also ordered the appellant to pay, as child support for the minor son of the parties, $300.00 per month until the son either attains the age of twenty-one or otherwise becomes emancipated. The court further ordered that the appellant transfer to the appellee the sum of $80,000.00, as lump sum payment of the appellee’s property rights. There were other property settlement provisions contained in the judgment of divorce, and the final one pertinent to this appeal is the court’s order that the appellant pay the sum of $10,000.00 as attorney fees to the wife’s lawyers.

The appellant now contends that the chancellor abused his discretion by entering the above orders in connection with the property rights of the parties and the amount of attorney’s fees. We do not find merit in the appellant’s contentions. At the time of the divorce, the appellee was fifty-seven years old and evidence was adduced to demonstrate that she existed in a poor state of health. It was also demonstrated that the wife had no personal assets of her own. Her husband, however, was shown to be a man of substantial wealth. His health also was very poor at the time of the divorce, and it must be added parenthetically that his death occurred subsequent to the divorce proceedings. (In this appeal the appellee does not seek to claim any right against the deceased husband’s estate in regard to the periodic alimony payments *533since such were contingent on the husband’s survival.)

Evidence was submitted to show that the appellant had transferred business interests to his brother in return for consideration of the purchase of an annuity contract, under which the husband was beneficiary, which contract yielded approximately $55,000.00 per year. At the time of this transaction, the cost of the annuity contract amounted to almost One Million Dollars. There was also evidence to demonstrate that the appellant had stock holdings which were valued at the time of the divorce at $62,500.00. There was further evidence submitted to show that the appellant had engaged in a course of conduct intended to divest himself of large amounts of his substantial wealth, mainly by gift transfers and donations to family members. The court determined that, in view of the poor state of health of the parties and the absence of personal assets which the wife could utilize in sustaining herself for her remaining years, the lump sum award of $80,000.00 was proper. Moreover, acting pursuant to the authority contained in § 61.08, Fla.Stat. F.S.A., the chancellor ordered the payment of periodic alimony as well as the lump sum award. In view of the circumstances outlined above, we cannot construe the amounts awarded to the wife in this action as having constituted an abuse of discretion. The particular facts of this case leave no doubt that the chancellor properly characterized the financial status of the parties, contemplating the future needs of the wife and the present ability of the husband to pay, when he entered the final judgment of divorce. Arrington v. Arrington, Fla.App. 1963, 150 So.2d 473.

We do not view the award of attorney fees as being so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Expert testimony established the value of the case as greater than the amount ordered, and it appears to us from the lengthy record that the case involved such difficulty and required such skill of counsel as to make the $10,000.00 fee reasonable.

The remaining points on appeal are found to be without merit.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the final judgment of divorce being appealed is hereby affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1976)
    …en. 1975); Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1972); Baker v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138 (Fla.App.3d 1974); Schultz v. Schultz, [*1130] 290 So. 2d 146 (Fla.App.2d 1974); Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625 (Fla.App.3d 1972); Zohlman v. Zohlman, 235 So. 2d 532 (Fla.App.3d 1970) and Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So. 2d 744 (Fla.App.3d 1966). We grant certiorari and quash the decision below, with directions that the judgment of the trial court be reinstated. Application of the rules for determining alimony is pr…
  • Storer v. Storer, 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
    …nal judgment that the alimony payments to the wife should survive the death of either party. Again, we think not. Lump sum alimony awards have long been upheld in Florida courts. Yandell v. Yandell, supra; Pross v. Pross, supra; Zohlman v. Zohlman, 235 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Fishman v. Fishman, 245 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). By definition, an award of lump sum alimony vests in the recipient at the time of the final decree, and is not subjec…
  • Meltzer v. Meltzer, 400 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …achieved, and the quality of the services rendered.” 376 So. 2d at 1205-06. See also, Posner v. Posner, 315 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1975); Snider v. Snider, 375 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), appeal dismissed, 385 So. 2d 760 (Fla.1980); Zohlman v. Zohlman, 235 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), cert. denied, 238 So. 2d 430 (Fla.1970); Frischkorn v. Frischkorn, 223 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 229 So. 2d 868 (Fla.1969). By cross-appeal, Ms. Meltzer claims error in the fact that the trial judge awarded on…

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