SHAFER & MILLER, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
MIAMI HEART INSTITUTE, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-06-09
No. 69-1093
Per Curiam
237 So. 2d 310 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

The court affirmed summary judgment for Miami Heart Institute on its indemnity crossclaim against general contractor Shafer & Miller, holding that the indemnity agreement's plain language clearly obligated the contractor to indemnify the owner for injuries caused by the contractor's acts or omissions.


Holding

An indemnity agreement obligating a contractor to indemnify an owner for losses caused by the contractor's acts or omissions is enforceable as a matter of law when the contract language is clear and unambiguous.


Headnotes

[1] When the determination of liability depends upon the legal effect of a clear and unambiguous written contract between the parties, the question is one of law only and is…

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Facts & Procedural History

Shafer & Miller, general contractors on a construction project, executed an indemnity agreement with Miami Heart Institute, the owner, agreeing to ind…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final summary judgment as to liability for Miami Heart Institute, Inc., upon its crossclaim against its co-defendant Shafer & Miller, a corporation, in a suit claiming personal injury on a construction site. The appellants Shafer & Miller were the general contractors upon the job and gave to the ap-pellee, who were the owners, the following indemnity agreement:

“Indemnity — The contractor covenants to indemnify and save harmless the Owner from and against all losses and all claims, demands, payment, suits, actions, recoveries and judgments of every nature and description suffered or sustained by the Owner or brought against the Owner, or by anyone or more of same, by reason for any act or omission of the said Contractor, the Contractor’s agents or employees in any manner relating to the execution of the work or in guarding the same.”

The trial judge correctly held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to ultimate fact that if liability existed for the injury that the liability existed because of an “act or omission of the said contractor”. It follows from the clear wording of the contract that as a matter of law the appellee was entitled to the partial summary judgment upon liability. Where determination of liability depends upon a written instrument of the parties thereto and the legal effect to be drawn therefrom, the question at issue is one of law only and ordinarily is determinable by summary judgment. Kochan v. American Fire and Casualty Company, Fla.App.1967, 200 So.2d 213, 220.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. In-Sink-Erator, 252 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
    …ds on a written instrument of the parties thereto and the legal effect to be drawn therefrom, the question at issue is one of law only, and ordinarily is determinable by summary judgment. Shafer & Miller v. Miami Heart Institute, Inc., Fla.App.1970, 237 So. 2d 310. However, where the terms of the instrument are ambiguous, casting doubt upon the intent of the parties, this intent must be determined by the trier of fact, and is not to be determined upon a motion for summary judgment. See Smith v. Baker, Fla.App…
  • Font v. Lazarus Homes Corp., 339 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
    …e question is essentially one of law and ordinarily would be determinable by entry of summary judgment by the trial judge. Rochan v. American Fire and Casualty Company, 200 So. 2d 213, 220 (Fla.2d DCA 1967); Shafer & Miller v. Miami Heart Institute, 237 So. 2d 310 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). It is uncontested that Lazarus obtained a permanent mortgage assumable by the plaintiffs and, in effect, plaintiffs qualified for the financing required by the deposit receipt agreement. Thus, plaintiffs’ failure to close constit…
  • Ball v. Fla. Podiatrist Tr., 620 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …y of summary judgment. National Luggage Services, Inc. v. Reedy Forwarding Company, Inc., 339 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Font v. Lazarus Homes Corporation, 339 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); accord Shafer & Miller v. Miami Heart Institute, Inc., 237 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) and Kochan v. American Fire and Casualty Company, 200 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Buckner v. Physicians Protective Trust Fund, 376 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The issue before us is simply a matter of law as to the constru…

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