J. M. LARKINS AND VIRGINIA L. BALDWIN, APPELLANTS,
v.
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-06-09
No. 69-401
Before CHARLES CARROLL, HEN-DRY and SWANN, JJ.
237 So. 2d 343 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Larkins and Baldwin sought rezoning of their South Dade County property from Agricultural Use (AU) to RU-4M to permit a four-story apartment building. The Zoning Appeals Board and County Commission denied the request, recommending EU-1 zoning instead. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the zoning restriction was no longer 'fairly debatable' given that 80% of the block had been commercially developed, making the property unsuitable for its estate zoning classification.


Holding

The zoning regulation was no longer 'fairly debatable' as applied to the property, and the property must be rezoned to allow a reasonable use. The appellants sustained their burden of showing the property was unsuitable for its estate zoning classification given the surrounding commercial development. The circuit court's order denying certiorari was reversed and the cause remanded with directions to rezone the property to a classification not more restrictive than RU-4M.


Headnotes

[1] A zoning regulation is "fairly debatable" and should be sustained if a reasonable basis exists for its enactment, even if courts might disagree with the legislative judgm…

[2] The burden is on parties seeking relief from a zoning ordinance as applied to a particular piece of property to show that the ordinance is not "fairly debatable".

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Key Quotes

“The courts will not ordinarily substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body of a municipality. The time-honored test established by the United States Supreme Court is whether or not the particular ordinance, as applied to the particular piece of property, is 'fairly debatable'. If it is such it should be sustained.”

Establishes the standard of review for zoning decisions and the deference ordinarily given to legislative bodies

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Facts & Procedural History

The appellants' property is located on the east side of S.W. 92nd Avenue between S.W. 92nd Street and S.W. 94th Street in South Dade County. The prope…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants instituted these proceedings by filing a petition with the Zoning Appeals Board requesting a rezoning of their property which is located in South Dade County. The Building and Zoning Department, as well as the County Planning Department, both recommended that the application be denied, and the Zoning Appeals Board, acting upon those recommendations, did deny the request that the property be rezoned to accommodate a four story apartment building. An appeal was taken to the County Commission, which was of the opinion that although the area was presently zoned AU (Agricultural Use), and it should be changed from that zoning classification, the property should not be granted a classification which would allow the construction of a high rise apartment building.

Ultimately, the County Commission recommended the property be zoned EU-1, *344since the parcels of land contained in the same general area were of that zoning. Certiorari was taken to the Circuit Court, and the writ for certiorari was denied. This appeal has followed.

The property in question is located on the east side of S.W. 92nd Avenue between the theoretical boundaries of S.W. 92nd Street and S.W. 94th Street. It is argued by the appellee that to grant the appellants their requested rezoning classification of RU-4M would increase traffic in the area by an unreasonable amount to the detriment of the estate residences in the general location; that proper sewage disposal would not be available for the amount of apartments to he built; that the construc•tion of high rise apartments will create an unsightly appearance and that such apartment buildings would be incompatible with the character of the neighborhood which contains houses ranging from $35,000 to $100,000 in value.

The appellants counter the arguments of the county by pointing out the proximity of other apartment complexes to the subject property; the submitted architectural plans which allow for the construction of less than maximum permitted units per acre, and the projected plans to landscape 50% of the subject property in order to preserve the aesthetic value of the land itself; that the existing and projected sewage facilities are more than adequate to service the area in the event that apartments are built thereon; and finally, the general nature of the surrounding property which includes the Baptist Hospital complex, the South Miami Riding Club, a nursing home, another public institution, plus adjacent apartment house developments.

The test to be applied by this court in reviewing the decision of the circuit court is referred to as the “fairly debatable” test. The rule was summarized in Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 281, when the court stated:

“The courts will not ordinarily substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body of a municipality. The time-honored test established by the United States Supreme Court is whether or not the particular ordinance, as applied to the particular piece of property, is ‘fairly debatable’. If it is such it should be sustained. If it is not, the courts were justified in striking it down. However, it has many times been pointed out that the burden of parties seeking relief from a zoning ordinance as to a particular piece of property is an extraordinary one. Neubauer v. Town of Surfside, Fla.App.1966, 181 So.2d 707.”

After a close examination of the record, we are compelled to hold that the zoning regulation in question is no longer “fairly debatable” and that this property must be rezoned to allow a reasonable use thereon. “In zoning cases, each issue created must be decided as and when it arises, and must depend upon the facts in each particular case * * * ”, Waring v. Peterson, Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 268, 272. It appears that 80% of the block containing the appellant’s property has been commercially developed at this point in time. This development has already imparted a character to the block which is incompatible with the single family development allowed by the present zoning. This court has, in the past, recognized the influence of the Baptist Hospital complex, the adjacent riding club and nursing homes, and the other factors connected with large scale public and commercial use in this area, in the case of Shearer v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1966, 189 So.2d 501. As in Shearer, we here feel that the appellants have sustained their “ * * * burden of showing [their] property was unsuitable for its estate zoning classification.” Id. at 503.

In conclusion then, the order of the circuit court which denied certiorari to the appellants is hereby reversed and the cause remanded with directions to rezone the *345subject property to a classification not more restrctiive than RU-4M.1

Reversed and remanded with directions.

SWANN, Judge

(dissenting).

I concur with the Building and Zoning Department, the County Planning Department, the Zoning Appeals Board, the County Commission, and the Circuit Court in their decision that this property should not be rezoned as requested by appellants to accommodate a four story apartment building.

I would affirm the decision of the Circuit Court Judge in denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Dissent
SWANN, Judge

SWANN, Judge

(dissenting).

I concur with the Building and Zoning Department, the County Planning Department, the Zoning Appeals Board, the County Commission, and the Circuit Court in their decision that this property should not be rezoned as requested by appellants to accommodate a four story apartment building.

I would affirm the decision of the Circuit Court Judge in denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …shore Realty, Inc., 444 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Dade County v. Yumbo, S.A., 348 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1977); City of Miami v. Schutte, 262 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Larkins v. Metropolitan Dade County, 237 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, 224 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Smith v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), writ discharged, 220 So. 2d 624 (Fla.1969). . Lambros, Inc. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, Fla.,…
    1 / 2
  • Hessen v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 293 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
    …Appellant’s property forms a part of the entire area contained in the former Larkins and Pierce tracts which were the subject of Metropolitan Dade County v. Pierce, Fla.App.1970, 236 So. 2d 202, and Larkins v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1970, 237 So. 2d 343. A portion of the former “Larkins tract” was also the subject of a recent appeal to this court. See Aronovitz v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App. 3rd 1974, 290 So. 2d 536. The factual basis of the present appeal differs from that dealt with in the…
  • Jemco Mastercraft Homes, Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 38 Fla. Supp. 111 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1971)
    …s recognized that when a developer agrees to reduce density by using 50% of the property for open space, it can in some instances cause the county commission to rezone for multiple dwelling use. See Larkin v. Metropolitan Dade County Fla. App. 1970, 237 So. 2d 343. Here the plan calls for some apartments and duplexes.…

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