MARY CLAIRE GARY, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD L. GARY, JR., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-06-16
Nos. 70-275, 70-432
Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ'
237 So. 2d 575 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

A wife appealed the trial court's orders awarding temporary alimony of $67.50 monthly and $100 in attorney fees and suit money during a divorce proceeding. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's allocation based on the parties' limited financial resources.


Holding

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its awards of temporary alimony and attorney fees given the parties' limited financial circumstances. The denial of additional suit money was also proper and may have served the interests of both parties by discouraging unnecessarily costly litigation.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's award of temporary alimony and attorney fees will be affirmed if the record does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

[2] A trial court has discretion to deny a motion for additional suit money when the parties' financial status suggests a need to minimize litigation expenses.

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Key Quotes

“On considering the financial status of the parties, we do not find basis on the record of this case to hold that the trial judge's orders for these temporary allowances represented an abuse of discretion.”

States the court's holding that the trial court's temporary awards were within its discretion given the parties' financial circumstances.

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Facts & Procedural History

The husband filed for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty. The wife answered denying fault and counterclaimed for alimony, alleging extreme cruelty,…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellee filed suit against his wife for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. The defendant answered denying fault,' and counterclaimed for alimony unconnected with divorce, charging the husband with extreme cruelty, habitual intemperance and adultery. The defendant wife moved for temporary alimony and attorney fees. By an order dated February 16, 1970, the trial court awarded, as temporary alimony, $67.50 per month, representing one half of the wife’s monthly rent. In addition the court allowed her $100 for temporary attorney fees and suit money. Thereupon, the wife, through her attorney, served notice for the taking of discovery depositions of the plaintiff and three witnesses, and moved for additional suit money. The latter motion was denied by an order dated March 24, 1970. The defendant wife filed interlocutory appeals from those orders. The appeals were consolidated here for briefing and argument.

The record reveals that the plaintiff husband is a student, taking a premedical course at Florida Atlantic University; is employed in a hospital where he earns $100 per month; and that he resides in his parents’ home and receives some additional financial assistance from them. It was disclosed that the defendant wife also is employed, earning approximately $50 < per week.

On considering the financial status of the parties, we do not find basis on the record of this case to hold that the trial judge’s orders for these temporary allowances represented an abuse of discretion.1

Affirmed.

*576PEARSON, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part).

I respectfully dissent from the holding that the order denying suit money is within the discretion of the trial court upon the facts of this case. The husband has instituted this action against his wife, who is without funds to defend herself. There is no finding nor does the record show any basis for a conclusion that the wife is doing anything more than is necessary to defend herself. Under these circumstances I think that the law of this state as well as the justice of the cause call for a reasonable allowance for discovery prior to trial. See McAllister v. McAllister, 140 Fla. 207, 191 So. 303 (1939); Helsel v. Helsel, Fla. App.1962, 138 So.2d 99, 101; Silberman v. Katcher, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 726.

Dissent
PEARSON, Chief Judge

[*576] PEARSON, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part).

I respectfully dissent from the holding that the order denying suit money is within the discretion of the trial court upon the facts of this case. The husband has instituted this action against his wife, who is without funds to defend herself. There is no finding nor does the record show any basis for a conclusion that the wife is doing anything more than is necessary to defend herself. Under these circumstances I think that the law of this state as well as the justice of the cause call for a reasonable allowance for discovery prior to trial. See McAllister v. McAllister, 140 Fla. 207, 191 So. 303 (1939); Helsel v. Helsel, Fla. App.1962, 138 So. 2d 99, 101; Silberman v. Katcher, Fla.App.1968, 214 So. 2d 726.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Perez v. Mestre, 567 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Kass v. Kass, 560 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Gary v. Gary, 237 So. 2d 575, 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).…

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