J. C. DAVANT
v.
J. CARL LAMBDIN, ET AL.
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In this equity case, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a bill of complaint challenging a property deed given by Mrs. Young to her attorney in payment for legal services rendered over eight years. The Court held that if Mrs. Young was competent when she executed the deed and acted in good faith, the transaction was legal, though such attorney-client transactions require careful scrutiny.
The deed was valid if Mrs. Young was competent when she executed it, acted in good faith, and was not imposed upon, though such transactions between attorneys and clients are always subject to careful scrutiny. If Mrs. Young was incompetent, the real question becomes the amount due her counsel for services rendered, not rescission of the entire transaction. The bill of complaint was insufficient to show a conspiracy and failed to properly frame the legal issues.
“If Mrs. Young was incompetent at the time she deeded her property to her attorney, that fact may void the contract but if she was in her right mind, was not imposed on, and traded in good faith the contract was legal though such transactions are always subject to most careful scrutiny.”
Establishes the central legal test: competency and good faith determine validity of attorney-client property transactions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Young engaged defendant Lambdin as her attorney and counsel for over eight years. Lambdin made monetary advances to Mrs. Young and rendered servi…
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The bill of complaint herein prayed that defendants, who are Appellees here, be restrained from interfering with James W. Bofird in the possession of certain premises described therein and from demanding rents thereon, he, Bofird, being a tenant of said premises. A temporary restraining- order was granted without notice which was later dissolved. The hill of complaint was dismissed as to the defendant Lambdin, and a motion to strike certain portions of the answer to the bill was denied. The instant appeal brings these decrees up for review.
The pleadings and the briefs have been examined and they reveal a transaction between defendant, Mrs. Young, and her attorney, the party appellant. It is shown that they reveal a transaction between defendant, Mrs. Young, as her counsel over a period of eight years or longer, that lie made advances in money and that she was not able to restore the advances or compensate him for his services, that she conveyed to him certain valuable property, and reserved a life estate therein in payment for his services. She now contends that she was incompetent when she executed this deed but admits the services, the advances, and that neither has been paid.
"If Mrs. Young was incompetent at the time she deeded *702her.property to her attorney, that fact may void the contract but if she was in her right mind, was not imposed on, and traded in good faith the contract was legal though such transactions are always subject to most careful scrutiny. It is shown and admitted that the property in question would have been lost had it not been for the services rendered Mrs. Young by her counsel. If Mrs. Young was sane when the contract was made, that ends the case. If she was insape, the real question is the amount due her counsel for his services. The bill of complaint is not sufficient to show a conspiracy on the part of defendants.
We find much irrelevant and immaterial substance in the briefs and'pleadings which should be disregarded. Instead of litigating the real issue in the cause, the energy of defendant's counsel was employed largely in assaulting and charging bad faith on the part of complainant. This is not the way to try a lawsuit. The decrees appealed from were of the class in which the Chancellor is vested with a very broad discretion and in the state of the record must be affirmed but with the suggestion that we are interested here solely in the legal issues involved.
The judgment below is affirmed but with the directions to permit the pleadings to be amended and litigate the cause in the manner outlined in this opinion.
Affirmed.
Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Buford and Chapman, J. J., concur.
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Renno v. Fay R. Sigmon, 148 Fla. 229 (Fla. 1941)…en is on the attorney to show not only the existence of conditions supporting his position, but to also show that no advantage has been taken by him. See Hal-stead v. Florence Citrus Growers Association, 104 Fla. 21, 139 Sou. 132; DeVant v. Lambdin, 135 Fla. 700, 186 Sou. 201. Appellant has not made it clearly to appear that reversible error is disclosed by the record. Decree is affirmed. Brown, C. J., Whitfield, Buford and Adams, J. J., concurs.…
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Ione H. Reid v. Johnson, 106 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)…den is on the attorney to show not only the existence of conditions supporting his position, but to also show that no advantage has been taken by him. See Halstead v. Florence Citrus Growers’ Association, 104 Fla. 21, 139 So. 132; Davant v. Lambdin, 135 Fla. 700, 186 So. 201.” We conclude therefore that the court erred in failing to credit Mrs. Reid with the $5,000 received by her attorneys directly from the trust funds as attorney’s fees. The third point presented is: “The Court erred in refusing to req…
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Toner v. Hubbard, 105 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)…ion with a client would not per se void the transaction. It would be voidable at the election of the client only upon proof of bad faith, overreaching, undue influence ■or other inequitable conduct on the part of the attorneys. In Davant v. Lambdin, 135 Fla. 700, 186 So. 201, the Supreme Court of Florida said in commenting upon a transaction between an attorney and client where the client contended that she was incompetent : “If Mrs. Young was incompetent at the time she deeded her property to her attorney…