MILTON JOHN GESSNER, PETITIONER,
v.
FRANK POWELL, SR., RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court clarified that a legally adopted child does not have standing to bring a wrongful death action for their natural parent, as adoption severs all legal ties between the child and natural parent except for specified inheritance rights. The court reconciled conflicting interpretations of the adoption statute to establish that adoption removes the child from the category of 'surviving minor child' under the Wrongful Death Act.
A legally adopted child does not have a right of action for the wrongful death of his natural parent. The adoption statute severs all legal ties between the child and natural parent except for inheritance rights expressly reserved by statute. The court clarified that In re Levy's holding regarding retained inheritance rights must be interpreted in context and does not contradict the general rule that adoption severs legal ties.
[1] A legal adoption severs all legal ties between a child and his natural parents, except for express inheritance rights.
[2] A legal adoption removes an adopted child from the category of a surviving "minor child" for purposes of the Wrongful Death Act.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the effect of a legal adoption is to sever completely 'every legal and moral tie which theretofore existed between the child and its natural parent or parents.'”
Establishes the central holding that adoption completely severs the parent-child relationship, except for expressly reserved rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMilton John Gessner, a minor child who had been legally adopted, sought to bring a wrongful death action following the death of his natural father. Th…
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This cause is before the court on cer-tiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Powell v. Gessner, Fla.App.1970, 231 So.2d 50. We issued the writ because of an apparent conflict in the interpretation of the adoption statute, § 63.151, Fla.Stat. 1969, F.S.A., between the decision here reviewed and that of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in In re Levy’s Estate, Fla.App.1962, 141 So.2d 803.
The sole issue in the cause sub judice is whether a minor child who has been legally adopted by another has a right of action for the wrongful death of his natural father. In holding that the legal adoption had the effect of removing the child from the category of a surviving “minor child” within the meaning and intent of the Wrongful Death Act, § 768.02, Fla.Stat. 1969, F.S.A., the appellate court said that, except for the right of an adopted child to inherit from his natural parents (which is expressly reserved by the adoption statute) the effect of a legal adoption is to sever completely “every legal and moral tie which theretofore existed between the child and its natural parent or parents.” In the Levy case, supra, the sole issue was whether persons who had been legally adopted by others were entitled to an intestate share of the estate of a collateral *102blood relative. In holding that they were entitled to inherit, the court said that the adoption statutes give new rights to adop-tees but do not attempt “to limit or take away rights already in existence with the exception that the natural parent may not inherit from his natural child who has been adopted.”
It is clear that, under the express terms of Florida’s statute, a decree of adoption has the effect of severing the legal ties between a child and his natural parents, except for the inheritance rights expressly reserved. No other construction of § 63.-151, supra, is possible. It reads as follows insofar as here relevant:—
“After the adoption the natural parents, if living, are relieved of all legal duties and obligations due from them to the child and are divested of all rights with respect to the child * * * ”,
Conversely, after the adoption, the child has no right to and cannot compel his natural parents to provide for his support. Thus, the statement in In re Levy, supra, that the adoption statute does not “limit or take away rights already in existence” must be interpreted in context, namely, with respect to the right of adoptees to inherit from blood relatives as well as from their adoptive parents and adoptive brothers and sisters as expressly authorized by § 731.30, Fla.Stat.1969, F.S.A. Cf. In re Baker’s Estate, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 268.
Having taken jurisdiction to clarify an inconsistency that might have generated some confusion, we have carefully considered the decision brought here for review and have concluded that it expresses, clearly and succinctly, our views concerning the issue before the court. It is hereby adopted as the opinion of this court.
The writ heretofore issued is, therefore, discharged.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C. J., and DREW, THORNAL and CARLTON, JJ., concur.
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Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971)…was granted in this action to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District (237 So. 2d 25), which conflicts with a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (Powell v. Gessner, 231 So. 2d 50, writ disch., Fla., 238 So. 2d 101) on the same point of law. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4 (F.S.A.) The decisions here for review both concern application of Fla.Stat. §§ 768.01 and 768.02, F.S.A., which are companion measures to Fla.Stat. § 768.03, F.S.A. These sections provide for caus…
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In re Est. of Perry Carlton v. Rogers, 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1979)…lt of that case. It does enhance the inheritance rights of an adoptee to permit him to inherit from his adoptive brothers and sisters — but no further. 141 So. 2d at 805. In re Levy’s Estate, supra, was considered by the Court in Gessner v. Powell, 238 So. 2d 101 (Fla.1970), in disposing of an alleged conflict between the decision in that case and that of a district court of appeal ruling that an adopted minor child had no cause of action for the wrongful death of his natural fatheV. In discharging the writ…
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Domino's Pizza, LLC v. Wiederhold, 248 So. 3d 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…he decedent's death. See, e.g., Powell v. Gessner, 231 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. 4th DCA) ("[T]he status of a child in respect to its right to sue for the wrongful death of a parent is determined at the time of the death of the parent."), opinion adopted, 238 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1970). It also would be contrary to the legislative intent expressed in section 768.17, Florida Statutes (2012), which states, "It is the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Est. of Abe Levy v. Levy, 141 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Powell v. Gessner, 231 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- In re Est. of Lilian C. Baker v. Glenna B. Blaine, 172 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)