MARGIE M. VAUGHN AND WEYMAN VAUGHN, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
ELSIE S. PATTERSON AND WALTER S. PATTERSON, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1970-07-30
No. M-32
JOHNSON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur.
238 So. 2d 129 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1970) Caution
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A plaintiff injured in a 1967 automobile collision appealed a jury verdict awarding only $1,000 in damages (plus $500 for her spouse), contending the award was inadequate given medical expenses exceeding $1,500. The appellate court affirmed, finding the verdict supported by evidence suggesting not all medical expenses were proximately caused by the accident.


Holding

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for new trial. The jury verdict of $1,000 was supported by competent evidence indicating that not all of plaintiff's medical expenses and damages were proximately caused by the accident, and the verdict was not so grossly inadequate as to require appellate intervention.


Headnotes

[1] A jury's verdict on damages will be upheld if supported by competent testimony, even if the evidence suggests a higher award might be warranted.

[2] A jury may consider whether medical expenses and claimed damages are a proximate result of the accident, or if other factors contributed to the plaintiff's condition.

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Key Quotes

“The appellate court must be ever alert against the temptation to substitute its 'verdict' for that of the jury. On the other hand, we must not refuse to act to relieve the injustice of either a grossly inadequate or excessive verdict.”

Establishes the standard for appellate review of jury verdicts—courts must respect jury determinations while remaining vigilant against manifestly unjust outcomes.

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Facts & Procedural History

On March 11, 1967, plaintiff suffered cervical and lumbo-sacral spine injuries in an automobile collision. She was treated by medical professionals an…

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Opinion of the Court
RAWLS, Judge.

RAWLS, Judge.

Appellant-plaintiff, by this appeal, contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying her motion for new trial as to damages.

On March 11, 1967, plaintiff suffered a sprain of the cervical and lumbo-sacral spine as the result of an automobile collision. The trial judge directed a verdict as to the issue of liability and submitted the issue of damages to the jury, which'returned a verdict of $1,000 for plaintiff and $500 for her husband.

Plaintiff was treated first by general practitioner and then by an orthopedic surgeon. The medical bills amounted to $782.01 plus an estimated $687 for a future varicose vein operation and an additional $30 to $50 doctor’s bill, the aggregate being approximately $1500. If the evidence reflected without contradiction that the outlay of plaintiff’s husband for medical expenses necessitated by the accident will amount to $1500, and the jury only returned $500 for same, we would not hesitate to agree with plaintiff’s contention that a jury of reasonable men 1 could not have returned such a verdict.2 But such is not the case.

We find in this record competent testimony, which the jury was at liberty to believe, to the effect that not all of plaintiff’s medical expenses and claim of damages were a proximate result of the accident. *130Illustrative of such testimony is the fact that plaintiff weighed 225 pounds prior to the accident. Her orthopedic surgeon put her in neck and back braces and on a diet. He anticipated that loss of weight, proper use of the braces and continued treatments would result in normal recovery. However, plaintiff failed to lose any significant amount of weight, and she testified that she was unable to dispense with the use of the back brace. Her obesity and long-term use of the back brace caused varicose veins. She was advised that she must reduce to 150 pounds before a varicose vein operation could be performed, but she gained to 245 pounds. The doctor testified that she was a compulsive eater, an indication of psychoneurosis, and her problems were about 50% emotional and 50% physical. Marital problems that besieged her in mid-1968 might well have led the jury to the conclusion that her compulsive eating resulted from this fact rather than the accident. The claim of permanent disability was based primarily upon subjective symptoms, and there is some testimony from which the jury might have concluded that plaintiff exaggerated her physical condition. A review of this record leads us to the conclusion that the jury’s verdict and the trial judge’s order refusing to grant a new trial are fully supported by the evidence.3

As stated in Griffis v. Hill :4

“The appellate court must be ever alert against the temptation to substitute its ‘verdict’ for that of the jury. On the other hand, we must not refuse to act to relieve the injustice of either a grossly inadequate or excessive verdict.”

We do not find the instant verdict to be so grossly inadequate as to compel us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge or the jury.

Affirmed.

JOHNSON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Grier v. Reed, 426 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …amount awarded does not approach the amount of compensation for the expenses incurred due to the necessary treatment, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages. See Griffis v. Hill, 230 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1969); Vaughn v. Patterson, 238 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur. . Because of the entry of default, the issue of liability was not, and will not be, a question for the jury’s consideration.…

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