LOFTIN COTTON, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE UNITED STATES
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The United States brought a trespass action against Loftin Cotton for cutting and removing pine and juniper trees from federal land, and Cotton argued that the government's only remedy was criminal prosecution by indictment rather than a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that the United States, as a body politic capable of holding property, possesses the same common law remedies available to private persons to protect its property, and that the availability of criminal prosecution does not bar a civil action for trespass.
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Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of trespass .guare clausum fregit brought by the United States against Loftin Cotton, in which he is charged with cutting and carrying away a large number of pine and juniper trees from the lands of plaintiff.
On the trial below', the counsel for defendant requested the court to" instruct the jury, 1st. “ That the only remedy for the United States for cutting pine timber on the public lands was by indictment.” 2d. “ That the United States have no common law remedy for private wrongs.” The refusal by the court to give these instructions is now alleged as error. Every sovereign State is of necessity a . body politic, or artificial person, and as such capable of making contracts and holding property, both real and personal. It is true, that, in consequence of the peculiar distribution of the powers of government between the States and the United States, offences against 'the latter, as a sovereign, are those only which are defined by statute, while what are called common .law offences are the subjects of punishment only by the States and Territories within whose’ jurisdiction they are committed. But the powers of the United States as a sovereign, dealing with offenders against their laws, must not be confounded with their rights as a body politic. It would present a strange anomaly, indeed, if, having the power to make contracts and hold property as other persons, natural or artificial, they were not entitled to the same remedies for their protection. The restraints of the Constitution upon their sovereign powers cannot affect their civil rights. Although as a sovereign the United .States may not be sued, yet as a corporation or body politic they may bring suits to enforce their contracts and protect their property, in the State courts, or in their own tribunals administering the same laws. As an owner of property in.almost every State.of the Union, they have the same right to have it protected by the local laws that other persons have. As was said by this court in Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 181, “ It would be strange to deny thém a right which is secured to every citizen of the "United States.” In the United States v. The Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Peters, 392, it was decided that when the United States, by their authorized agents, become a party to «negotiable paper, they have all the rights and incur all the responsibilities of other persons who are parties to such instruments. In the United States v. Gear, 3 Howard, 120, the right of the United States to. maintain an action of trespass for taking ore from their lead mines was not questioned.
Many trespasses are also public-offences, by common law, or are made so by statute. But the punishment of the public offence is no bar to the remedy for the private injury. The fact, therefore, that .the defendant in this case might have been' punished by indictment as for a public offence, is no defence against the present action. Whether, if he had actually been indicted and amerced for this trespass in a criminal prosecution in the name of the-United States, such conviction and fine .could be pleaded in bar to a civil action by the same plaintiff, is a question not before us in this case, and is therefore not decided.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.
Order. .This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of' the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.
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Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (U.S. 1979)…es politic and corporate” would certainly have referred to the States.12 See Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 188 (1915); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 24 (1892); Poin [*357] dexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 231 (1851); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 447 (Iredell, J.), 468 (Cushing, J.) (1793); Utah State Building Comm’n v. Great American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 16, 140 P. 2d 763, 766 (1943); Board of Comm’rs of Hamilton County v. Noyes, 3 Am.…
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Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1989)…tution and Laws of the United States of America 185 (11th ed. 1866); W. Shumaker & G. Longsdorf, Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law 104 (1901); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419, 447 (1793) (Iredell, J.); id., at 468 (Cushing, J.); Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 231 (1851) (“Every sovereign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person”); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 24 (1892); Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 188 (1915). See also United S…
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United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (U.S. 1943)…a body politic. It would present a strange anomaly, indeed, if, having the power to make contracts and hold property as other persons, natural or artificial, they were not entitled to the same remedies for their protection.” Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 231. This remedy does not lose the quality of a civil action because more than the precise amount of so-called actual damage is recovered. As to the double damage provision, it cannot be said that there is any recovery in excess of actual loss for…
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- Loftin Cotton v. The United States, 9 How. 579 (U.S. 1850)