ROBERT TROPE, APPELLANT,
v.
SYLVIA TROPE, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the former husband challenges the trial court's award of $500 per week alimony and $7,500 in attorney's fees to his ex-wife's counsel. The appellate court upholds the alimony award but finds the attorney's fee award constitutes clear abuse of discretion and reduces it to $5,000.
The court affirmed the alimony award of $500 per week, finding no clear abuse of discretion despite it being liberal, and noting that future changes in circumstances could support adjustment under statute. The court reversed the attorney's fee award, finding clear abuse of discretion, and reduced the fee to $5,000 based on the evidence presented.
[1] An award of permanent alimony may be adjusted if a substantial change in circumstances occurs, such as a significant increase in the recipient's income or inaccurate esti…
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion in awarding attorney fees when the evidence presented is insufficient to support the awarded amount.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under the circumstances of this case we think the amount of the fee set was clear abuse of discretion. The evidence put forth by the appellee was insufficient to prove that the value (under the standards discussed in Provus v. Provus, Fla.1950, 44 So. 2d 656) of her last attorney's services was worth $7,500.”
Establishes the court's finding of clear abuse of discretion in the attorney's fee award and the applicable legal standard from Provus v. Provus.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife obtained a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. Full financial disclosure was made at trial. The husband is a physician earning approxim…
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This appeal is by the former husband from two of the financial provisions of a final judgment of divorce. The appellee wife sued for and obtained a divorce upon the ground of extreme cruelty. The record reveals that full financial disclosure was made and that based thereupon the wife was awarded alimony of $500 per week. Expert testimony was received and ap-pellee’s last counsel was awarded a fee of $7,500. It is these two provisions of the judgment which are alleged to be erroneous.
Appellant’s first point is directed to the award of alimony. He urges that the award constitutes an abuse of discretion because it exceeds the needs of the appellee as set forth in the record. The record does reveal that appellee wife was able to “make do” with temporary alimony in a much smaller amount, but we do not think this fact shows conclusively that the permanent award was excessive. It is also true that the award seems very liberal in view of the wife’s prospective income and her use of the marital home as her residence. Nevertheless we are not convinced that error in this regard appears on this record. See Rogoff v. Rogoff, Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 456. In this connection it should be pointed out that the amount of the wife’s income and the accuracy of her *487estimates may be reviewed at a later time. If her income is substantial or her estimate of her needs is not reasonably accurate, then there will be such a change in circumstances as will support an adjustment of the amount of the alimony if the trial judge should find the adjustment proper under § 61.14, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. See, e. g„ Ludacer v. Ludacer, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 64.
Appellant’s second and third points are directed to the award of $7,500 as attorney fees for appellee’s third counsel of record. ■ Appellant’s first counsel, who filed the complaint undertook procedures for discovery and represented appellee from the filing of the complaint in August of 1968 until new counsel appeared in February of 1969, was awarded a fee of $2,500. Appellee’s second counsel secured permission to file and filed an amended complaint and secured an order directing discovery. Appellee’s present counsel filed an affidavit showing 90 hours time expended, but he testified that he did not keep time records and reconstructed the approximate time from his notes. More than one-third of the time expended is assigned to interviews with the appellee. Nothing in the record suggests that the cause was other than a routine divorce in which the defendant husband was a physician earning approximately $75,000 a year. Appellee’s expert testified to a reasonable fee of $9,000 based upon the 90 hours of work. One of appellant’s experts testified that $4,500 would be a reasonable fee, and the other testified that $4,500 or $5,000 would be reasonable.
Under the circumstances of this case we think the amount of the fee set was clear abuse of discretion. The evidence put forth by the appellee was insufficient to prove that the value (under the standards discussed in Provus v. Provus, Fla.1950, 44 So.2d 656) of her last attorney’s services was worth $7,500. The most the record will support is an award of $5,000. See Ortiz v. Ortiz, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 243. The amount of the fee allowed appellee’s last counsel is reduced to $5,000, and the cause is remanded for the entry of an order so amending the judgment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
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The Valparaiso Bank & Tr. Co. C. T. A. of the Est. of Coleman L. Kelly v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…sem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla.1973); Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla.3d DCA 1972), cert. den., 287 So. 2d 679 (Fla.1973); Novack v. Novack, 189 So. 2d 513 (Fla.3d DCA 1966), cert. disch. 195 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1967); and Trope v. Trope, 238 So. 2d 486 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of a judgment in favor of the former Mrs. Kelly, on account of fees, in the amount of $15,000.00. ERVIN, J., concurs. MILLS, Acting C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part.…
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Arie Lionel Bosem v. Bosem, 269 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…approximately double the amount per hour to which such allowances on several occasions have been reduced by the courts. See Chaachou v. Chaachou, Fla.1961, 135 So. 2d 206; Novack v. Novack, Fla.App.1966, 189 So. 2d 513; Trope v. Trope, Fla.App.1970, 238 So. 2d 486. The award of attorney’s fees in such cases should be made only for services that are shown to have been reasonably necessary. This case did not present substantial complexities. That was conceded by one of the experts testifying for the wife. The…
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Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…hat $425 per hour was far in excess of the amount per hour to which such allowances in several cases have been reduced. See Chaachou v. Chaachou, Fla.1961, 135 So. 2d 206; Novack v. Novack, Fla.App.1966, 189 So. 2d 513; Trope v. Trope, Fla.App.1970, 238 So. 2d 486; Bosem v. Bosem, Fla.App., 269 So. 2d 758. Accordingly, we find that a fee of $50,-000 would constitute adequate compensation, considering the time spent and the benefit the wife obtained as a result of the attorney’s investigation of the husband’s…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rogoff v. Rogoff, 115 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Provus v. Provus, 44 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1950)
- Ortiz v. Ortiz, 211 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Ellen v. Ludacer, 211 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)