STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
MADISON LEE REYNOLDS, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1970-03-11
No. 38848
ERVIN, C. J., DREW and CARLTON, JJ., and HENDRY, District Judge, concur.
238 So. 2d 598 Florida Supreme Court (1970) Negative Treatment
Cited by 66 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a prisoner incarcerated in another state is "in custody" within the meaning of Florida's Rule 1.850 post-conviction relief procedures and approved the District Court of Appeal's decision permitting such a prisoner to seek post-conviction relief in Florida courts.


Holding

A prisoner in the custody of a state other than Florida is "in custody" within the meaning of Rule 1.850 and may seek post-conviction relief in Florida courts. However, not every such prisoner need be brought before the Florida court; summary disposition is proper if the motion is defective or fails to state a prima facie case, and a hearing may be conducted without the prisoner's presence if the facts do not require his personal testimony and due process requirements are satisfied.


Headnotes

[1] A prisoner must be "in custody" when filing a post-conviction motion under Rule 3.850, and this requirement is jurisdictional.

[2] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a post-conviction motion if the movant has been released from custody prior to filing the motion.

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Key Quotes

“a prisoner in the custody of a state other than Florida is also "in custody" within the meaning of Rule 1.850, Cr.P.R.”

States the core holding that out-of-state prisoners qualify as "in custody" for post-conviction relief purposes

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Facts & Procedural History

Madison Lee Reynolds, while incarcerated in Texas, filed a petition in Florida seeking post-conviction relief. The District Court of Appeal held that …

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Opinion of the Court
ADKINS, Justice.

ADKINS, Justice.

By petition for certiorari, we are requested to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District (224 So.2d 769) because of alleged conflicts with prior decisions of this Court.

The respondent while incarcerated in Texas filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief in the Florida court. The District Court held that respondent was “in custody” within the meaning of Rule 1.850, Cr.P.R., 33 F.S.A., relating to post-conviction remedies. This decision is in conflict with the decisions of the First District in Holstein v. State, 205 So.2d 6 (1967) and of the Third District in Hill v. State, 184 So.2d 457 (1966). We have jurisdiction.

*600In Lawson v. State, Fla., 231 So.2d 205 (opinion filed January 28, 1970), this Court held that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is “in custody” under any one of them for the purposes of Rule 1.850, Cr.P.R. We now hold that a prisoner in the custody of a state other than Florida is also “in custody” within the meaning of Rule 1.850, Cr.P.R., and approve the opinion of the District Court.

This does not necessarily mean that each prisoner filing such a petition or motion must be brought before the Florida court. If the motion is defective in form or substance and insufficient to state a prima facie case entitling the prisoner to relief, the Court may make a summary disposition. If the motion appears to be sufficient, but the files and records in the case conclusively refute the allegations or otherwise conclusively preclude relief, summary denial is proper. Lawson v. State, supra; State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla.1964).

If the motion reflects substance and there is nothing conclusively in the record to the contrary, a hearing should be granted. Even in this instance the presence of the prisoner is not always required. Bryant v. State, 204 So.2d 9 (Fla.App.3d 1967); Ballard v. State, 200 So.2d 597 (Fla.App.3d 1967). This is a matter within the discretion of the Court, State v. Weeks, supra, which must be exercised in the light of other applicable principles of law, including the requirements of due process. If, upon hearing, there are questions of fact within the personal knowledge of the prisoner to be resolved, then the prisoner should be given an opportunity to testify. As stated in Bryant v. State, supra:

“When there are questions of fact to be decided, it may be the better practice to receive evidentiary statements from a movant either by his being present in the court or by written interrogatories or by deposition taken before a commissioner at the penal institution wherein the movant is incarcerated.”

Where evidence is to be heard at the hearing and the petitioner is not represented by counsel, due process requires that petitioner be produced so that he may confront all of the witnesses, interrogate his own witnesses and cross-examine those of the State. Dickens v. State, 165 So.2d 811 (Fla.App.2d 1964). A proceeding under Rule 1.850 is civil in nature and analogous to post-conviction habeas corpus, State v. Weeks, supra, so appointment of counsel may be an adequate alternative to the presence of the petitioner, if petitioner would not be prejudiced through his absence and if he were not personally involved in the factual dispute to be resolved. Dickens v. State, supra.

The writ of certiorari is discharged.

ERVIN, C. J., DREW and CARLTON, JJ., and HENDRY, District Judge, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (33 total)

  • McCRAE v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1983)
    …on their merits, and not where the previous motion was summarily denied or dismissed for legal insufficiency. See, e.g., Flores v. Wainwright, 240 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Reynolds v. State, 224 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. discharged, 238 So. 2d 598 (Fla.1970); Taylor v. State, 181 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1965). On the other hand, a second or successive motion by the same prisoner attacking the same judgment or sentence but stating substantially different legal grounds is permitted under the…
  • Weir v. State, 319 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
    …only to persons in custody. The custody required by the rule need not be under the sentence being attacked where the movant contends the sentence he is serving was enhanced by the conviction he seeks to have set aside. State v. Reynolds, Fla.1970, 238 So. 2d 598; Wilcox v. State, Fla.App. 1st, 1972, 267 So. 2d 15. But no Florida court has held that a person not .in custody is entitled to relief under Rule 3.850, RCrP. Judge Barns’ opinion in Tolar v. State, Fla.App. 4th, 1967, 196 So. 2d 1, suggests the po…
  • Scott v. State, 717 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1998)
    …545, 546 (Fla.1986) ("Whether a prisoner should be physically present at a 3.850 proceeding is discretionary with the trial court except when evidence is to be presented and the prisoner is not represented by counsel.”); see also State v. Reynolds, 238 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla.1970) ("Where evidence is to be heard at the hearing and the petitioner is not represented by counsel, due process requires that petitioner be produced so that he may confront all of the witnesses, interrogate his own witnesses and cross-e…

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