EMMETT JAMES PARAMORE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Emmett Paramore was convicted of rape by jury verdict without a recommendation of mercy. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding sufficient evidence of both the crime and the defendant's identity, and holding that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the required scrutiny of the victim's testimony.
The conviction was affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict because the victim's testimony was properly corroborated by physical evidence (appellant's thumbprint, seminal fluid), identification evidence (voice, facial features), and the trial judge properly instructed the jury to rigidly scrutinize the victim's testimony while considering the surrounding circumstances.
[1] In a rape prosecution, the testimony of the prosecutrix should be rigidly scrutinized, especially concerning the nature and extent of force used and whether consent was u…
[2] The amount of resistance required in a rape case depends on the circumstances, including the relative strength of the parties, the age and condition of the female, the ap…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon a prosecution for rape alleged to have been committed 'forcibly and against the will of' the prosecuting witness, reasonable latitude should be allowed in adducing evidence to test the probative force of the testimony of the prosecutrix as to the nature and extent of the force used and as to whether consent was or was not ultimately yielded, since the accomplishment of the act by force, and against the will of the female are the essential elements in the crime”
Establishes the standard requiring rigorous scrutiny of victim testimony in rape cases where force and consent are central elements
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe prosecutrix testified that two men accosted her at a laundromat and, on three separate occasions that evening, each had unlawful carnal intercours…
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The appellant has appealed to this Court from a judgment based on a verdict finding *605him guilty of rape without a recommendation of mercy.
The prosecutrix testified that two men accosted her as she was preparing to leave a laundromat for home and, during the evening, on three separate occasions each of the two men had unlawful carnal intercourse with her while the other held a gun on her. She testified that she did not physically resist because they threatened to kill her if she didn’t do as they told her to and she was afraid they would carry out their threats. There is no necessity of detailing the sordid events which occurred.
Only the prosecutrix and the assailant had knowledge of the facts surrounding the incident and the appellant did not testify. As a result the only evidence of force or fear was the testimony of the prosecutrix. Appellant relies upon Coker v. State, 83 Fla. 672, 93 So. 176 (1922), where the Court said:
“Upon a prosecution for rape alleged to have been committed ‘forcibly and against the will of’ the prosecuting witness, reasonable latitude should be allowed in adducing evidence to test the probative force of the testimony of the prosecutrix as to the nature and extent of the force used and as to whether consent was or was not ultimately yielded, since the accomplishment of the act by force, and against the will of the female are the essential elements in the crime, and where no other person was an immediate witness to the act, the testimony of the prosecutrix should be rigidly scrutinized to avoid an unmerited conviction for a capital offense.”
The trial judge properly instructed the jury that the testimony of the prose-cutrix should be rigidly scrutinized, especially as to the nature and extent of the force used and as to whether consent was not ultimately yielded, and that in doing so the jury should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged assault, such as the strength of and physical development of the parties, the evidence or lack of evidence of injuries and other such relevant factors.
The Court in Thomas v. State, 167 So.2d 309 (Fla.1964), said:
“The female need not resist as long as either strength endures or consciousness continues. The amount of resistance required depends on the circumstances, including the relative strength of the parties, the age and condition of the female, the apparent uselessness of resistance, and the degree of force manifested. It is only necessary that the resistance of the female be such as to make non-consent and actual resistance real, under the circumstances prevailing.”
Where corroboration is utilized, it is generally available only as to the surrounding facts and circumstances and not to the fact of rape or penetration. See 20 F.L.P., Rape, § 12, citing Truluck v. State, 108 So.2d 748 (Fla.1959).
The prosecutrix’s identity of appellant was made by voice (see Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 So. 706, 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 373 (1907) ; Paul v. State, 110 So.2d 388 (Fla.1959); Weinshenker v. State, 223 So.2d 561 (3d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1969)), as well as by his facial features. In addition, appellant’s thumbprint was found on the prose-cutrix’s automobile window.
Swab tests, as well as a garment found at the scene of the crime, revealed the existence of seminal fluid. This was further corroboration. See Sellers v. State, 212 So.2d 659 (3d Dist.Ct.App.1968).
We have carefully read the record, not only because the assignments are directed to the sufficiency of the proof but also for the reason that we are required to do so under the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 924.32 (2), F.S.A., and find that the ends of justice do not require a new trial.
The trial judge meticulously guarded the rights of the defendant during the course *606of the trial and his instructions to the jury were correct.
The verdict, adjudication of guilt and sentence are hereby
Affirmed.
ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Jiri Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…duress or threats is not such a consent as will shield the offender. See Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 So. 504 (1938); Flowers v. State, 152 Fla. 649, 12 So. 2d 772 (1943); Thomas v. State, Fla. 1964, 167 So. 2d 309; Paramore v. State, Fla.1970, 238 So. 2d 604 and Jackson v. State, Fla.App.1958, 107 So. 2d 247. We point out that only the pros-ecutrix and the defendant had knowledge of the facts surrounding the incident involved and, as in so many rape prosecutions, the defendant chose not to testify. Thu…
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Kirby v. State, 625 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…in pertinent part, “You should rigidly scrutinize the testimony of the prosecutrix ... in this case as to the extent and nature of force used and as to whether consent was or was not ultimately yielded.” This language, taken from Paramore v. State, 238 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla.1970), is obsolete in light of Florida’s subsequent comprehensive revision of its sexual battery laws in chapter 794, Florida Statutes. See McIlwain v. State, 402 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA1981). The proposed instruction is also a com…
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McILWAIN v. State, 402 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…n well before trial. Those documents contained the basic substance of the State’s case against him which was presented at the trial. Hughes v. State, 103 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). . Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla.1976); Paramore v. State, 238 So. 2d 604 (Fla.1970); Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 350 So. 2d 80 (Fla.1977), on remand, 351 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA); O’Bryan v. State, 324 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1184 (F…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Elbert Coker v. State, 83 Fla. 672 (Fla. 1922)
- Ellis Thomas, Jr. v. State, 167 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1964)
- Weinshenker v. State, 223 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Dock Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55 (Fla. 1907)
- Sellers v. State, 212 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Truluck v. State, 108 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1959)
- Paul v. State, 110 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1959)