HENRY A. LASKEY AND CARLIE E. LASKEY, TRADING AND D/B/A LASKEY SALES COMPANY, AND ROBERT ALVIN MILLER, PETITIONERS,
v.
LOIS R. SMITH, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MICHELLE RENEE SMITH, DECEASED, A MINOR, RESPONDENT; HENRY A. LASKEY AND CARLIE E. LASKEY, TRADING AND D/B/A LASKEY SALES COMPANY, AND ROBERT ALVIN MILLER, PETITIONERS, V. LOIS R. SMITH, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the trial judge's authority to require remittitur of a jury verdict in a wrongful death case involving a minor. The court held that a trial judge's reduction of a jury verdict must be supported by the record showing impropriety, and that judges do not have unbridled veto power over jury determinations of damages.
A trial judge's authority to reduce a jury verdict through remittitur must be supported by the record affirmatively showing impropriety of the verdict or by the trial judge's independent determination, supported by findings, that the jury was influenced by considerations outside the record. The trial judge does not sit as a 'seventh juror with veto power' and must permit reasonable latitude for jury determinations within a broad range.
[1] A trial judge's decision to set aside a jury verdict must be supported by the record or by findings of influence outside the record.
[2] A trial judge does not possess veto power over a jury's verdict; the judge's review is limited to ensuring the verdict is not improper based on the evidence presented.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In other words, the trial judge does not sit as a seventh juror with veto power. His setting aside a verdict must be supported by the record, as in Cloud v. Fallis, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 669, or by findings reasonably amenable to judicial review.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that trial judges cannot arbitrarily reduce jury verdicts without record support
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA three-year-old child died 12 days after an accident. The jury awarded $31,200 in damages in a wrongful death action brought by the child's administr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Conscious Pain And Suffering cases and more on FLexlaw
In this case the trial judge required remittitur in the amount of $21,200, giving the plaintiff the alternative of choosing the $10,000 remaining of her $31,200 verdict or a new trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, one judge dis*14senting,1 and this court granted certiorari on allegations of conflict with Gresham v. Courson, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 33, and Burch v. Gilbert, Fla.App.1963, 148 So.2d 289.
In Gresham v. Courson the plaintiff had agreed to remittitur of $20,000 on a $25,000 verdict based largely on the loss of the child’s prospective estate. There it was the defendant who sought further reduction of the award. That decision is not in conflict.
In Burch v. Gilbert, the First District held a $20,000 verdict excessive which included minimal conscious pain and suffering and loss of prospective estate which must, to warrant a present value of $20,000, approximate $200,000 at the end of the deceased child’s expected life span.
The petitioners argue that the jury’s estimate of the prospective estate of the child whose administrator brought this action would exceed $300,000. This overlooks two factors, however. There is, above all, evidence that the child, who lived 12 days after the accident, suffered pain. There is also evidence that she was unconscious all the while, but the jury believed the plaintiff’s testimony on this point. Secondly, there is a difficulty in determining prospective estate in any open society in which the poorest born may the richest die. The permissible range of speculation is broader than it is with life expectancy: the rich man shares the poor man’s mortality.
It is true that no proof was adduced of prospective estate. It is difficult to imagine what proof might be offered by the plaintiff administrator to maximize and the defendant to minimize this element of damage which would not clutter our already crowded courts with “experts” predicting what a three-year-old would likely leave behind if she had lived out her normal life span. Allowance of recovery for something so nebulous as an infant’s prospective estate is a debatable matter of policy, but it is up to the Legislature to debate it.
A jury’s determination of damage is reviewable by the trial judge on precisely the same principles as govern his superintendence of determinations of liability. Mr. Justice Drew stated them clearly in Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, Fla., 234 So.2d 645, opinion filed April 22, 1970. The record must affirmatively show the impropriety of the verdict or there must be an independent determination by the trial judge that the jury was influenced by considerations outside the record.
In other words, the trial judge does not sit as a seventh juror with veto power. His setting aside a verdict must be supported by the record, as in Cloud v. Fallis, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 669, or by findings reasonably amenable to judicial review. Not every verdict which raises a judicial eyebrow should shock the judicial conscience.
In its movement toward constancy of principle, the law must permit a reasonable latitude for inconstancy of result in the performance of juries. The trial judge’s review of that performance is likewise sustainable within a broad range provided that the record or findings of influence outside it support his determination. The decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in this case is compatible with principles of trial court review of jury performance set forth in Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, supra, and the writ is accordingly discharged.
ERVIN, C. J., and ADKINS and BOYD, JJ-, concur.
FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge, dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (75 total)
-
The Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978)…he rule announced in Cloud v. Fallis, supra.” Id. at 648. Cloud and Hodge together were applied to the problem of when remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial may be ordered by a judge (the problem presented in this case) in Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13 (1970). This Court there concluded at page 14: “A jury’s determination of damage is reviewable by the trial judge on precisely the same principles as govern his superintendence of determinations of liability. Mr. Justice Drew stated them clearly in…1 / 2
-
Rupert B. Brown v. The Est. OF A.P. Stuckey, Sr., 749 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1999)…verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Justice Grimes, writing for the Court, succinctly explained the roles of the trial and appellate courts: [T]he trial judge should refrain from acting as an additional juror. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1970). Nevertheless, the trial judge can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict. Haendel v. Paterno, 388 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). In making this decision, the trial judge must neces…
-
Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986)…erdict must be supported by the record, as in Cloud v. Fallis, Fla.1959, 110 So. 2d 669, or by findings reasonably amenable to judicial review. Not every verdict which raises a judicial eyebrow should shock the judicial conscience. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla.1970). See also Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla.1978). Based on this criteria, petitioner argues that there is nothing in the record, or any indication of anything outside the record, to suggest that the jury was influenced by…
Previewing 3 of 75 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959)
- Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 234 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1970)
- Gresham v. Courson, 177 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Burch v. Gilbert, 148 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Smith v. Laskey, 222 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)