FLOYD HERMAN RANDALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Floyd Randall appeals his conviction for concealing stolen property (ivory, jade, and amethyst carvings). The appellate court affirmed the denial of his suppression and mistrial motions but reversed because the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a separate, unrelated criminal offense (stolen money orders) that had no relevance beyond showing bad character.
The court affirmed the denials of the suppression and mistrial motions, but reversed the conviction because the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the separate criminal offense. Under Williams v. State, evidence of another crime is only admissible if relevant and probative of an issue in the case; when its sole relevance is to show bad character or criminal propensity, admission is reversible error.
[1] Evidence of a separate criminal offense is inadmissible if its sole relevancy is to demonstrate the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit a crime.
[2] Evidence of a separate criminal offense is admissible if it is relevant and has probative value in proving an issue in the case on trial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if the separate offense is relevant and has probative value in proof of any issue in the case on trial, such evidence is admissible. However, if the evidence of the commission of another crime has as its sole relevancy the bad character or propensity of the accused to commit a crime, it is reversible error for such evidence to be admitted and considered by the jury.”
Establishes the Williams rule governing admissibility of evidence of separate offenses
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStolen ivory, jade, and amethyst carvings belonging to Sheldon Klein were found in Randall's home pursuant to a valid search warrant on January 28, 19…
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Appellant appeals a judgment and sentence imposed upon him for the crime of concealing stolen property. The property in question was certain ivory, jade and amethyst carvings which the evidence showed were stolen from Sheldon Klein on the night of January 28, 1967. These articles were found in the home of the appellant pursuant to a search made under the authority of a search warrant.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial, and the trial court’s admission into evidence of the commission of a separate criminal offense.
We affirm the trial court’s rulings on the two motions; however, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence *82the commission of a separate criminál offense, under Williams v. State, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 654.
The facts which established the separate offense may be summarized as follows:
Mr. Brimmage, the owner of a small grocery store testified that his store had been entered sometime during the night of April 11, 1967 and that certain money order blanks, together with a money order machine used to make out the money orders, were missing on the morning of April 12, 1967. Detective Blitch testified that on April 26, 1967 he arrested1 the appellant as he disembarked from his truck. After the arrest he testified that he sat behind the wheel of the truck, pulled down the sun visor, and some money orders fell out. These money orders turned out to be some of the ones stolen from Mr. Brimmage’s store. This is the entire testimony as to the separate criminal offense.
The Williams case, supra, lays down the rule that if the separate offense is relevant and has probative value in proof of any issue in the case on trial, such evidence is admissible. However, if the evidence of the commission of another crime has as its sole relevancy the bad character or propensity of the accused to commit a crime, it is reversible error for such evidence to be admitted and considered by the jury.
Upon a careful reading of the entire transcript of the trial of this cause we can find no relevancy of the separate offense to the issues involved in the case being tried. The sole relevancy of the separate offense being the bad character of the appellant or his propensity to commit a crime, the judgment and sentence must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
PIERCE and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
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Smith v. State, 344 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…e case instead of the crime charged in the indictment. (See Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1960).) Numerous decisions have applied the so-called Williams rule. (See Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Randall v. State, 239 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Lucas v. State, 257 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971).) The state counters that evidence of the cover-up was to show the state of mind of the accused, relevant in light of appellant’s insanity defense. Appellant concedes, and we ag…
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Vazquez v. State, 405 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…dence at trial, and the error in denying same necessarily constitutes reversible error. See e. g., Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and cases [*180] collected; Randall v. State, 239 So. 2d 81, 82 (Fla.2d DCA 1970). The theory behind this line of cases is that such evidence, with rare exceptions, is so overwhelmingly prejudicial to a defendant that the presumption of innocence is thereafter destroyed and a fair trial rendered impossible.…
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Dinkens v. State, 291 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…dent evidence here. As presented on this record, the only purpose this testimony appears to have served was to illustrate Dinkens’ bad character and his propensity to commit robbery.1 As such it was inadmissible. Randall v. State, Fla.App.2nd, 1970, 239 So. 2d 81. Upon retrial, we do not foreclose the introduction of evidence concerning Dinkens’ connection with the drive-in robbery pro [*126] viding it rests, at least in part, on testimony other than that of James Williams, Jr. or could be said to be releva…
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- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)