JOHN COOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
GRANT CARROLL, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-09-29
No. 70-46
Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ-
239 So. 2d 511 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Negative Treatment
Cited by 25 cases

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Holding

A trial court has the power to set aside a notice of voluntary dismissal and allow an amended notice to dismiss only one of multiple defendants, as this constitutes a 'proceeding' from which relief can be granted under Rule 1.540(b).


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may grant relief from a voluntary dismissal notice filed by a plaintiff under Rule 1.540(b) F.R.C.P. …

[2] A voluntary dismissal notice filed by a plaintiff under Rule 1.420(a) F.R.C.P. …

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Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants. He then sought to amend, stating the original dismissal was a mistake an…

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Opinion of the Court
CARROLL, Judge.

CARROLL, Judge.

In this civil action brought by Grant Carroll as plaintiff against John Cooper, a minor, and others including a Trysting Place, d/b/a Six West, a notice of dismissal without prejudice was filed by the plaintiff under Rule 1.420(a) (1) F.R.C.P.,1 30 F.S.A. Promptly thereafter the plaintiff filed a motion reciting that his noticed dismissal of the action as to all defendants was done by mistake, in that it had been the intention of the plaintiff that the cause be dismissed only as to the defendant Six West, and requesting leave to file an amended notice which dismissed as to that defendant only.

The trial court after hearing granted the plaintiff’s motion, and ordered that “the original notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice filed herein by the plaintiff is hereby set aside and substituted therefor is plaintiff’s amended notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice.” The latter, as thus authorized by the court’s order, dismissed the cause as to the defendant Six West only. The defendant John Cooper took this appeal from that order.

Appellant contends first that upon the filing of the notice of dismissal the trial court was without power or jurisdiction to take any further action in the cause. In support of that contention appellant argues there was no authority under the rules of civil procedure to grant relief to the plaintiff from the effect of his filed notice of dismissal, contending that Rule 1.540 F.R.C.P., 31 F.S.A. authorizes relief only from a judgment or order, and not from a dismissal notice.

We do not agree. Rule 1.540(b) authorizes the trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment, decree, order or proceeding, for listed reasons including mistake or inadvertence. In authorizing dismissal of a cause by a plaintiff by the *513filing of a notice, Rule 1.420 provides a short cut, or expeditious manner of disposition of a cause which otherwise would be accomplished by order of the court on motion of the party. Such action in the cause, equivalent to dismissal by court order, constitutes a “proceeding” therein from the effect of which the party involved can be granted relief by the trial court under Rule 1.540(b) in an appropriate instance. Here it is clear by the wording of the court’s order that such relief was granted to the plaintiff, by setting aside the initial notice of dismissal. No abuse of discretion by the trial court in that connection was shown.

There remains for consideration the question of the effect of the further portion of the challenged order by which the trial court authorized the filing by the plaintiff of an amended notice of dismissal as to only the one defendant Six West.

The problem presented there is that the rule relating to dismissal by notice filed by a plaintiff refers to dismissal of “an action,” and does not appear to authorize dismissal by such notice of part of the action, that is, as to one or more defendants without dismissal as to all defendants. The rule has been so construed.

In Scott v. Permacrete, Inc., Fla.App.1960, 124 So.2d 887, 889, the first district court of appeal, speaking through Chief Judge Wigginton, said:

“* * * The mentioned rule [1.35(a) F.R.C.P., now numbered 1.420(a)] provides that a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss his action without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or motion for summary judgment or decree. This rule has been construed as applicable only to a dismissal of the entire action or controversy as distinguished from a dismissal of any claim or cause of action against one or more, but less than all, of the defendants. (Shannon v. McBride, Fla.App.1958, 105 So.2d 16; Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 215, 65 A.L.R.2d 637; Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 2 Cir., 203 F.2d 105.) The proper method of dropping parties defendant from a suit is to move for and procure an order of court dismissing the complaint as to the designated defendant or defendants as permitted by Rule 1.18, F.R.C.P.”

As indicated in the case just quoted from, when the trial court in this case set aside the initial notice of dismissal of the cause as to all defendants, the plaintiff’s desired dismissal as to only one of the defendants could not properly be accomplished by a notice of dismissal filed under Rule 1.420, but rather by an order of the court under Rule 1.250 F.R.C.P. Here the dismissal without prejudice (as to Six West) was not by the amended notice alone. The acceptance by the trial court of the proffered amended notice as a basis for dismissal as to Six West made the dismissal as to that party one which was authorized by the court’s order.

Accordingly, no reversible error having been made to appear, the order appealed from is affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (13 total)

  • …voluntary dismissal was preferred by Massey and Klock in their 1972 survey of civil procedure developments. 26 U. Miami L.Rev., 469, 532 n. 424 (1972). . The district court below adopted the reasoning of its previous decision in Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), in which the theory of continuing jurisdiction was first evolved. . Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b). . Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(1). . Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(d). . Fla.Bar Integr.Rule, preamble (b).…
  • Deseret Ranches OF Fla., Inc. v. Bowman, 340 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
    …be voluntarily dismissed under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(1); there can be no partial dismissal, no dismissal of less than all causes of action. Dave Hess, Inc. v. Black Angus of Pompano, Inc., 288 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Scott v. Permacrete, Inc., 124 So. 2d 887, 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). See also Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. A. H. Robins Co., 61 F.R.D. 24 (E.D.Pa.1973); Etablissements Neyrpic v. Elmer C. Gardner, Inc., 175 F.Supp. 355 (S…
  • Hinton v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. & Steve Dellinger, 317 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
    …the Defendants As authority for refusing to recognize the dropping of Dellinger and Iowa National as parties in the first case, the court below cited Scott v. Permacrete, Inc., Fla.App.1st, 1960, 124 So. 2d 887; Cooper v. Carroll, Fla.App.3d, 1970, 239 So. 2d 511, and Fears v. Lunsford, Fla.App.1st, 1974, 295 So. 2d 323. In Scott, the court held that, standing alone, a notice of voluntary dismissal filed pursuant to Rule 1.35 RCP (the predecessor of current Rule 1.420) and directed to some but not all of the…

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