BILL AUTEN, VERNON MOLUSKY, SAM DOBBINS AND JAMES VERNON, APPELLANTS,
v.
HOYAL D. A. CONWAY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court upheld a trial judge's finding that a handwritten memorandum in Adele B. Crabtree's memo book constituted a valid testamentary instrument despite using precatory language, affirming that the deceased possessed testamentary intent even though the proposed changes to her formal will were never formally accomplished.
The court affirmed the trial court's finding of testamentary intent, holding that there was sufficient substantial and competent evidence to support the determination that the handwritten memorandum constituted a valid testamentary instrument despite the use of precatory language.
[1] A handwritten memorandum found in a personal notebook can be considered a testamentary instrument if sufficient evidence demonstrates the decedent's testamentary intent.
[2] Testamentary intent may be found even when a decedent uses precatory words in a document.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we find there was sufficient substantial, competent evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the trial judge as to the testamentary intent of Adele B. Crabtree even though she used precatory words in the instrument”
Establishes the holding that precatory language does not defeat testamentary intent when substantial evidence supports the intent to dispose of property.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAdele B. Crabtree, age 83, executed a formal will on November 4, 1968, prepared by her attorney. She died on September 29, 1969. Hoyal D. A. Conway fi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Petition For Revocation Of Will cases and more on FLexlaw
Adele B. Crabtree executed a will on November 4, 1968, prepared by her attorney. She was 83 years old when she passed away on September 29, 1969.
The will of November 4, 1968 was admitted to probate. Hoyal A. Conway, also known as D. Conway, thereafter filed a petition for revocation of that will and for the probate of an instrument dated July 23, 1969 alleged to be her last will and testament. The instrument was on a page in a memorandum book belonging to Adele B. Crabtree. The part of the will which is pertinent to this appeal is reproduced below:
*504Issues were joined by the pleadings and a final hearing was held at which testimony was introduced to prove, among other things, the testamentary intent of the deceased, Adele B. Crabtree.
The trial judge ruled, in part, that the writing of July 23, 1969 was a testamentary instrument as far as it related to the disposition of the property of Adele Crabtree. This appeal is from that order.
The sole and only point as framed and argued by appellant on this appeal is:
“Whether the lower court erred in finding testamentary intent in a fact situation where the decedent merely wrote a handwritten memorandum in a memo book concerning intentions of changing her formal will, which changes were never accomplished and where she later affirmed her formal will.”
No question is raised as to the proper execution and attestation of the will.
Essentially, this argument is whether there was sufficient substantial, competent evidence to support a finding by the trial court of testamentary intent on the part of Adele B. Crabtree.
Although there was conflicting and inconsistent testimony, we find there was sufficient substantial, competent evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the trial judge as to the testamentary intent of Adele B. Crabtree even though she used preca-tory words in the instrument. See In re Thompson’s Estate, Fla.1955, 84 So.2d 911; In re Estate of Perez, Fla.App.1968, 206 So.2d 58; In re Estate of Coles, Fla.App.1968, 205 So.2d 554; and In re Reid’s Estate, Fla.App.1962, 138 So.2d 342.
Affirmed.
CARROLL, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- In re Est. of Madelon C. Reid, 138 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Matter of the Estate of Lizzie Thompson v. Silver Squarcia, 84 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1955)
- In re Est. of Jose C. Perez v. Est. of Jose C. Perez, 206 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- In re Est. of Mildred Coles v. Heuckstaedt, 205 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)