MADELYN BLACKBURN ADAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-11-03
No. 69-1056
Before PEARSON, C. J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.
240 So. 2d 529 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Madelyn Adams was convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana based on evidence that fell from her brassiere while a hospital attendant prepared her for a medical examination. The court affirmed her conviction, holding that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as an incidental search of a person in an unconscious condition at a hospital.


Holding

The court held that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment circumstances. The search of a person in an unconscious condition at a hospital serves legitimate purposes including checking for medical history indicators and identifying the person, and the evidence's admissibility does not depend on whether it was obtained incident to a formal arrest.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence discovered incidentally during a lawful search, even if not the primary purpose of the search, is admissible.

[2] A search of an unconscious or incapacitated person is legally permissible and necessary for medical identification and to ascertain medical history.

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Key Quotes

“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, but only those which are unreasonable.”

Establishes the governing legal standard for evaluating the challenged search

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Facts & Procedural History

Adams was arrested for a driving-related offense and taken to Dade County Jail. Twelve hours later, at her request, she was transferred to Jackson Mem…

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Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana. She pleaded not guilty and waived jury trial. Her trial resulted in a conviction and sentence of six months confinement in the state penitentiary.

Appellant seeks reversal on the grounds (1) that the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence which was obtained when it fell from appellant’s brassiere while she was at the hospital being prepared for a medical examination by a hospital attendant; (2) that the conviction was based upon insufficient circumstantial evidence and (3) that the state failed to prove a material element of the charge as alleged in the information.

The defendant had been drinking and had an accident while driving her automobile. She was arrested for the offense and taken to the Dade County Jail. Twelve hours later and at the request of the defendant, she was taken from the jail to Jackson Memorial Hospital for medical attention. While being prepared for the physical examination by a hospital attendant, a bottle of marijuana fell from defendant’s brassiere. She was later charged with possession of a narcotic drug, to-wit: marijuana.

The charge of possession of marijuana was based upon the evidence that fell from her brassiere while she was being prepared by one of the hospital attendants for medical attention at a time when the defendant was in great pain and not fully conscious.

The appellant contends that it was error for the trial judge to deny her motion to suppress the evidence obtained in such manner and under such circumstances. Her argument being that the search was not made pursuant to a valid and legal arrest because the prior arrest had taken place about twelve hours prior to the discovery of the marijuana on her person, and no such discovery was made while she was in jail on the charge for which she was originally arrested.

The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, but only those which are unreasonable. United States v. Fuller, 277 F.Supp. 97. (D.D.C., 1967). We find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. In Vauss v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 370 F.2d 250 (1966) the court said:

“Perhaps because in a typical factual setting of arrest plus discovery and seizure of evidence the arrest occurs first and the search and seizure are incidental to it, there is a tendency to forget momen*531tarily that evidence can be seized in other ways than by arrest, or by formal warrant. Admissible evidence may be acquired before or after an arrest or without an arrest. If discovered by search, its admissibility turns on whether the search was lawful, i. e., reasonable in the circumstances. That so reasonable a search as occurred here happens to yield evidence of a crime as a byproduct even though not so intended is irrelevant. A search of one found in an unconscious condition is both legally permissible and highly necessary. There is a positive need to see if the person is carrying some indication of a medical history, the rapid discovery of which may save his life; there is also a need to identify persons so found in order to notify relatives or friends. That the cause of appellant’s being unconscious was not known in no way impaired but rather enhanced the need and inherent power to search appellant.”

We have also considered the other points on appeal and have concluded that no reversible error has been made to appear. Hoover v. State, Fla.App.1968, 212 So. 95; Dreger v. State, Fla.App.1969, 228 So.2d 431; Borras v. State, Fla.1969, 229 So.2d 244. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Brown, 36 So. 3d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
    …y one’s home, are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla.1980); Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 321, 324-25 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Adams v. State, 240 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). One of these is the existence of “exigent circumstances,”1 which in turn include those which arise when police are conducting lawful “hot pursuits.” See Alvarez v. State, 573 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA [*772] 1991); see also Ge…
  • Delgado v. State, 574 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …the eye and hand, and in plain view without the necessity of a search. See Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3227, 49 L.Ed.2d 1221 (1976); State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1971); Adams v. State, 240 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); United States v. Jonas, 639 F. 2d 200 (5th Cir.1981). In the instant case, the police officers testified that the pieces of jewelry were in an open jewelry box and that the subject pieces were exposed. This testimony was uncontro…

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