MARIE W. SHARPE, APPELLANT,
v.
CECO CORPORATION, APPELLEE; HERMAN A. THOMAS, INC., APPELLANT, V. CECO CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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In a mechanic's lien foreclosure suit, the trial court awarded Ceco Corporation $28,869.45 (reduced from its $46,869.45 claim due to $18,000 in defective work costs) plus $5,000 in attorney fees and interest from the judgment date. The appellants challenged the attorney fee award and the defective work damage calculation, while Ceco cross-appealed the interest award.
The court affirmed the judgment in its entirety. A party receiving an affirmative judgment at the conclusion of the entire case is the 'prevailing party' entitled to attorney fees under Florida statute §713.29, regardless of whether the amount recovered equals the amount claimed. The trial court properly determined defective work costs at $18,000 based on conflicting evidence. Interest from the judgment date was properly allowed under applicable precedent.
[1] A party is considered the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney fees when an affirmative judgment is rendered in their favor at the conclusion of the enti…
[2] A trial court, acting as the trier of fact, may weigh conflicting evidence regarding the cost of correcting defective work and determine a reasonable amount for such corr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The prevailing party is regarded as that party who has affirmative judgment rendered in his favor at the conclusion of the entire case.”
Establishes the court's definition of 'prevailing party' for purposes of awarding attorney fees, rejecting the argument that only full recovery qualifies.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAllied Plastering, Inc. brought a mechanic's lien foreclosure suit against landowner Marie W. Sharpe and general contractor Herman A. Thomas, Inc. Cec…
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These appeals are directed to a judgment entered in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure suit, brought by a subcontractor, Allied Plastering, Inc., against Marie W. Sharpe, the landowner, and Herman A. Thomas, Inc., the general contractor. The appellee Ceco Corporation and other subcontractors were permitted to join in the suit for the purpose of foreclosing their separate liens.
Claiming $46,869.45 to be due and unpaid for concrete form work, Ceco cross-claimed against the owner Sharpe for foreclosure *465of lien, and against Thomas on its contract with the latter. Sharpe and Thomas counterclaimed against Ceco alleging inferior and defective work by the latter was such that it would require $60,000 for correction of the same. On final hearing the trial court entered a judgment in which $18,000 was determined to be the cost of correcting the defective work of Ceco, and thereupon granted judgment in favor of Ceco against Sharpe and Thomas for $28,869.45. Therein the court reserved jurisdiction “to determine at a future hearing the interest due and the attorney fees to be awarded.” By a later order the trial court allowed Ceco $5,000 attorney fees and entered judgment therefor against Sharpe and Thomas. The court allowed Ceco interest at the legal rate “only from July 8, 1969, the date of the judgment entered in favor of Ceco Corporation.”
Appellants contend the trial court erred (1) by granting attorney fees and (2) in allowing appellants only $18,000 as the cost to remedy defective work of the appellee. Ceco cross-assigned as error the failure of the court to allow interest prior to the date of the judgment.
Appellants contend there was unre-futed evidence that the correction of the defective work of Ceco would cost $60,000. The appellee contends, and we agree, that the record contained evidence in conflict therewith, upon which the trial court as the trier of the facts properly could hold the amount needed to correct the defective work was the lesser sum of $18,000. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment as rendered in the amount of $28,869.45.
Appellants contend the statute (§ 713.29 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) did not authorize allowance of an attorney fee in this case. The statute provides for allowance of a reasonable attorney fee to the prevailing party in an action to enforce a lien under Chapter 713. Appellants argue that Ceco was not the prevailing party because its recovery was not the amount claimed, but a lesser sum. We view that argument as unsound. The prevailing party is regarded as that party who has affirmative judgment rendered in his favor at the conclusion of the entire case. Empire State Surety Co. of New York v. Moran Bros. Co., 71 Wash. 171, 127 P. 1104, 1107; Dawson v. Shearer, 53 Wash.2d 766, 337 P.2d 46, 48; Ennis v. Ring, 56 Wash.2d 465, 353 P.2d 950, 954.
On the cross-assignment of Ceco, relating to the allowance of interest only from the date of the judgment, we find no error in that ruling in the circumstances of this case, and affirm the ruling on authority of Gerber Groves, Inc. v. Belle Glade Agricultural Contractors, Fla.App. 1968, 212 So.2d 669.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (29 total)
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Peter Marich & Assocs., Inc. v. Powell, 365 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…te the fact that the judgment is for less than initially sought in the complaint. R. F. Driggers Construction Co. v. Bagli, 313 So. 2d 450 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Foxbilt Electric, Inc. v. Belefant, 280 So. 2d 28 (Fla.4th DCA 1973); Sharpe v. Ceco Corp., 242 So. 2d 464 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). Therefore, appellant was entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee even though it did not recover the entire amount sought in its complaint.1 Though there was a bona fide question as to how much appellant was owed under the contrac…
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Ronald Jackson and Joanne v. Jackson, 288 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…ion. The appellee argues that the court below properly denied attorney’s fees because the defendants-appellants were not “prevailing parties” within the meaning of F.S. 713.29, F.S.A.1 The appellee relies on Sharpe v. Ceco Corp., Fla.App.3rd, 1970, 242 So. 2d 464, 465, wherein it is said that “the prevailing party is regarded as that party who has affirmative judgment rendered in his favor at the conclusion of the entire case.” From this, the appellee argues that the defendants below were not “prevailing par…
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Tubbs v. Mechanik Nuccio Hearne & Wester, P.A., 125 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…fees.” Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla.1992). The determination of which party has prevailed on the significant issues in the case cannot generally be determined until the entry of the final judgment. See Sharpe v. Ceco Corp., 242 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (“The prevailing party is regarded as that party who has affirmative judgment rendered in his favor at the conclusion of the entire case.”); see also Henry P. Trawick, Jr., Florida Practice and Procedure § 25:13 (2012 ed.) (“…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gerber Groves, Inc. v. Belle Glade Agric. Contractors, Inc., 212 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)