GERALDINE S. FURNARI AND RICHARD V. FURNARI, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
JACK LURIE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this dental malpractice case, the trial court erroneously directed a verdict for the defendant dentist after he left an infected root tip in the patient's jaw during a difficult tooth extraction. The appellate court reversed, holding that a jury could reasonably conclude negligence occurred based on the dentist's own testimony that he failed to use available means to discover the retained root fragment.
A jury could reasonably conclude, even without expert testimony, that the defendant was negligent in failing to discover and remove the palatal root fragment. The trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant because the case involves a situation where jurors of ordinary intelligence could evaluate the dentist's conduct in administering the approved treatment method.
[1] In a dental malpractice action, a jury may reach a conclusion regarding negligence in the administration of an approved treatment without expert testimony if the facts ar…
[2] A directed verdict in a dental malpractice action is error if the evidence presented would permit a jury to conclude, even without expert testimony, that the dentist was…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law in this jurisdiction is clear that in a malpractice case where the negligence charged is in the application or administration of an approved medical treatment, jurors of ordinary intelligence, sense and judgment are capable, in many cases, of reaching a conclusion without the aid of expert testimony.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that lay jurors can evaluate negligence in treatment administration without expert testimony in certain circumstances.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Furnari consulted defendant Dr. Lurie on an emergency basis for a severe toothache. Dr. Lurie correctly diagnosed and recommended extraction of a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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This is a dental malpractice action in which the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. We conclude that this was error and reverse.
Mrs. Furnari developed a severe toothache for which she consulted the defendant on an emergency basis. The defendant correctly diagnosed Mrs. Furnari’s difficulty as an infected second molar, and recommended its extraction as the proper method of treatment. No complaint is made here as to either the diagnosis or the method of treatment undertaken. The negligence charged to the defendant was in the manner in which he administered such approved method of treatment. The issue here is simply whether the jury could be permitted to reach a conclusion as to whether the defendant was negligent in the administration of that treatment in the absence of any expert testimony to that effect.
The law in this jurisdiction is clear that in a malpractice case where the negligence charged is in the application or administration of an approved medical treatment, jurors of ordinary intelligence, sense and judgment are capable, in many cases, of reaching a conclusion without the aid of expert testimony. Atkins v. Humes, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 663; Levy v. Kirk, Fla.App.1966, 187 So.2d 401; Cook v. Lichtblau, Fla.App.1965, 176 So.2d 523; Brown v. Swindal, Fla.App.1960, 121 So.2d 38. The difficulty arises in determining whether the facts in a specific case are such as to bring that case within the principle.
Dr. Lurie saw Mrs. Furnari as an emergency patient at 5:30 in the afternoon. The extraction of the infected molar proved to be quite difficult, and in fact, the tooth was broken during the operation as a result of which the infected palatal root was left in the patient’s jaw. Neither patient nor dentist was aware of that fact at the time. The presence of the infected root tip in the jaw was discovered several days later when Mrs. Furnari consulted another dentist. The defendant testified that it was not unusual for teeth to break during extraction, and there is certainly no evidence that breaking the tooth was negligence. However, the defendant also testified (1) that the infected root tip should have been extracted, (2) that its continued presence in the patient’s jaw could have been determined by him through any one of several means including an examination or inspection of the removed tooth fragments, or by post operative x-ray, or by probing of the extraction area, and (3) that none of these means were utilized at the time because, by the' time this difficult operation was completed, both the dentist and the patient “had had it”. When Mrs. Furnari returned to Dr. Lurie’s office two days after the operation still complaining of intense pain, he assured her that all fragments of the tooth had been removed and that the wound was healing satisfactorily.
This evidence, which we have stated most favorably to Mrs. Furnari, would certainly permit (although not require) a jury to conclude even without the aid of expert testimony that the defendant was *744negligent in failing to discover and remove the palatal root of the molar which the dentist had undertaken to extract. It was thus error for the court to withhold this case from the jury. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
WALDEN and REED, JJ., concur.
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Pierce v. Smith, 301 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…ncorrect diagnosis or the adoption of the wrong method of treatment, Florida juries have been permitted to determine liability without the necessity of expert testimony. Atkins v. Humes, Fla.1959, 110 So. 2d 663; Furnari v. Lurie, Fla.App.4th, 1971, 242 So. 2d 742. Thus, in Atkins the Supreme Court said: "... jurors of ordinary intelligence, sense and judgment are, in many cases, capable of reaching a conclusion, without the aid of expert testimony, in a malpractice case involving a charge of negligence in t…
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Sasser v. Humana OF Fla., Inc., 404 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…in a “sponge-in-the-abdomen” case. See Atkins v. Humes, 110 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1959); Reynolds v. Burt, 359 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Appellants were required to produce expert testimony in order to establish negligence. Compare Furnari v. Lurie, 242 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Sims v. Helms, 345 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1977); Thomas v. Berrios, 348 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977); South Miami Hospital v. Sanchez, 386 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). Although there was general agreement among the experts concern…
Authorities Cited
- Atkins v. Humes, 110 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1959)
- Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Brown v. Swindal, 121 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Levy v. Michael J. Kirk, M.D., 187 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)