EVAN KRAUS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the denial of the motion to suppress evidence and the denial of the motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant were not reversible errors.
[1] A motion to suppress evidence is properly denied when the showing relating to the custody of the evidence is sufficient.
[2] Failure to disclose the identity of a confidential informant is not reversible error when the sale of drugs was made directly to an officer, not the informant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was convicted of possession and sale of marijuana. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motions to …
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This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on two counts of possession and one count of sale of marijuana. Two one year sentences were imposed, to run concurrently, and probation was granted on one count. On consideration of the record and briefs we conclude no reversible error has been demonstrated, and affirm.
The motion to suppress, as evidence, the marijuana involved in the alleged sale, was properly denied on the showing relating to its custody, on the authority of Stunson v. State, Fla.App. 1969, 228 So.2d 294.
The appellant contends the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted for denial by the trial court of his motion to require the state to disclose the identity of a confidential informant. The testimony presented by the state on the sale count revealed a sale of marijuana made by the defendant to an officer (who so testified) at a time when the informant was present. Appellant relies on Monserrate v. State, Fla.App.1970, 232 So.2d 444. That case is distinguishable. There the evidence disclosed that the sale of a drug was made to the informant, who then delivered it to an officer who it appears was present, whereas here the evidence showed the sale was made to the officer. In the situation presented in this case the failure to require disclosure of the state’s confidential informant was not reversible error. See Harrington v. State, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 495, 497-498; Garcia v. State, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 709, 711; Treverrow v. State, Fla.1967, 194 So.2d 250, 252. Cf. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639.
A further contention of the appellant is that the court committed error in denying his motion for mistrial made on the ground that the prosecutor in argument had commented on failure of the defendant to testify. We do not so view the prosecutor’s *215statement, which was a comment on the evidence. See Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174, 28 So. 53, 54; Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So. 389, 390.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…said disclosure was that the informant, as here, was merely present during the illegal drug transaction with which the defendant was charged, and accordingly was a witness thereto, Doe v. State, 262 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Kraus v. State, 243 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d 324 (Fla.1971); see Savinon v. State, 277 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), or acted as a mere tipster, furnishing the police with information which provided a lead in the investigation of the case, State v. M…
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DOE v. State, 262 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…nd the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to disclose. The mere presence of the informant when the drug was sold by the defendant to a police officer would not require disclosure of his identity. Kraus v. State, Fla.App.1971, 243 So. 2d 214. This case is to be distinguished from those where a sale is made to a confidential informant, rather than to a police officer. Compare Monserrate v. State, Fla.App.1970, 232 So. 2d 444; Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.E…
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Drayton v. State, 372 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…of the informant was merely to allow the arresting officer to gain entry to the premises where the criminal conduct occurred. See Savinon v. State, 277 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Doe v. State, 262 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); and Kraus v. State, 243 So. 2d 214 (Fla.3d DCA 1971). Third, although there were references to the informant by appellee during the trial, these references were only peripheral and, because of their nature, could not have affected the jury’s decision. Fourth, even though the defense…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (U.S. 1957)
- Westberry v. Daves Auto Parts, 194 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1967)
- Harrington v. State, 110 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Stunson v. State, 228 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174 (Fla. 1900)
- Buck Clinton and Edward Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57 (Fla. 1908)
- Monserrate v. State, 232 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Gus Garcia v. State, 110 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)