ULRICK B. STEUER AND EDITH R. STEUER, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
GEORGE GLEVIS AND FLORENCE M. GLEVIS, HIS WIFE, AND ROGER MALSBARY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Plaintiffs sought to cancel a real estate purchase contract and recover their deposit based on claims that the seller failed to provide marketable title due to a racially restrictive covenant and a mortgage variance. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for the defendants, finding the racial covenant void but holding that the title was otherwise marketable and insurable, and that no material mortgage variance existed.
The racial restriction clause is void and unenforceable. Although the covenant was of record, the parties' contract contemplated that such common restrictions would not constitute a defect in marketable title. The defendants provided marketable and insurable title, and there was no material variance in the mortgage terms. Plaintiffs' refusal to proceed was not justified by any title defect.
[1] A restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale, use, or occupancy of real property by persons of the Semitic branch of the Caucasian race is void.
[2] Parties to a real estate contract are presumed to have agreed that a restriction of record common to a subdivision will not constitute an exception to title if the title…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The race restriction clause objected to by the plaintiffs is void. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 and Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc., Fla.1959, 116 So.2d 622.”
Establishes that the racial covenant in the property deed is legally unenforceable.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs, who are Jewish, entered into a deposit receipt contract to purchase real property from defendants. The abstract of title revealed a 1962 c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Stipulated Damages cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellants were plaintiffs and the appellees were defendants in the trial court. They will be identified here as in the trial court.
The plaintiffs appeal from an adverse judgment entered in their suit for cancellation of a deposit receipt contract for the purchase and sale of real property and the return of the deposit paid in accord with the contract.
Plaintiffs assert entitlement to recover the deposit money because of their contention that the defendant-sellers failed to provide marketable or insurable title, and further, the existence of an alleged material variance in the terms of a third mortgage from those reflected in the deposit receipt contract.
The plaintiffs allege that they are Jews, members of the Semitic branch of the Caucasian race. The abstract furnished by the defendants reveals that in 1962 a deed was placed of record containing a covenant that applied to all of the subdivision — ran with the land — and such covenant purported to prohibit the sale, use, or occupancy of any lot or portion thereof “by any person of the Semitic branch of the Caucasian race”. The covenant *454further purported to provide that breach thereof would be a nuisance, subject to suit in equity for relief and for stipulated damages.
The race restriction clause objected to by the plaintiffs is void. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 and Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc., Fla.1959, 116 So.2d 622. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 1968, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189.
The contract under consideration contains a further provision as follows:
“The seller agrees to convey title free and clear of all encumbrances except restrictions of record common to the subdivision and easements for drainage, anchors and for public utilities in existence or shown by the plat or a matter of record and free and clear of all other encumbrances except as specifically set forth in the contract * * *.” (Emphasis ours.)
The parties must be considered as having agreed that such a restriction of record that was common to the subdivision, would not constitute a proper exception to the title if the title was otherwise “good and marketable or insurable”.
The plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ title was not “good and marketable or insurable” as provided by the contract. The defendants furnished abstract of title. There was no evidence presented that the title was not good and marketable or insurable. To the contrary, evidence in behalf of the defendants was to the effect that title insurance was available but the plaintiffs on day of closing took the position that they would not under any circumstances purchase real estate that had been restricted against their race.
The trial judge found against the plaintiffs on the further issue of alleged variance as to a third mortgage and the record sustains such finding.
We find no error and affirm the judgment appealed from.
CROSS, C. J., and OWEN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Shelley et ux. v. Kraemer et ux., 334 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1948)
- Jones et ux. v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1968)
- Harris v. Sunset Islands Prop. Owners, Inc., 116 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1959)