JOSEPH ZUKOWSKI, JAMES R. GILPIN, RUTH C. HUDSON, MARIE H. DOLAN, D. VAN DER LINDEN AND B. G. AMERICK, AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLANTS,

v.

CITY OF CASSELBERRY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND EDITH DUERR, THOMAS E. NAPIER, RICHARD WIRZ, LOUIS KIRBY AND BILL GRIER, AS CITY COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CASSELBERRY, AND HENRY J. CONNELL AND BERNICE CONNELL, HIS WIFE, AND RICHARD S. LUSK AND MARION E. LUSK, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES

WALDEN, Judge.

Plaintiff below appeals from dismissal with prejudice of his action brought for review of a zoning change.

In July 1968 defendants filed an application with the City of Casselberry requesting that their property which was zoned R-l, single family residence, be changed to R-3, multiple family residence. The request was considered by the zoning board on several occasions. Although the only recorded vote showed the board opposed to the request by a vote of four to one, Mr. Wirz, Chairman of the Board, testified at a hearing before the City Council that the board really hadn’t taken a definite position. This hearing had been called on December 30, 1968, pursuant to Article XVI of City Ordinance 92, to settle the issue apparently unresolved by the zoning board. Article XVI provides that the City Council in conjunction with the zoning board may amend, supplement, change or repeal regulations, restrictions or district boundaries and designations after public hearing as provided in Chapter 176.06, Florida Statutes 1965, F.S.A. The hearing was conducted in polite parliamentary fashion with both sides given ample opportunity to express their respective positions. At the conclusion of the hearing vote of council was called for and the request for a change in the zoning district granted.

On February 27, 1969, plaintiffs, fearful of depreciation of their property, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, in-junctive relief and alternative petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Seminole County.

On March 14, Defendants Connells and Lusks filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to comply with Chapter 176, Florida Statutes 1967, F.S.A., and Rules 4.1, 4.5(c) (1) and 3.-2(b), Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A.

On June 5, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice and without opinion. The present appeal ensued.

The trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari as untimely. Even appellant concedes this

*181point.1 Appellants’ contention on appeal is that, although certiorari is a means of reviewing zoning changes, it is not the only means of review.

In this contention appellant is eminently correct. Suits in equity seeking injunctive relief against zoning ordinances on the ground that it “ * * * impinges on some right or guarantee of the Constitution of this State has long been the traditional method of assaulting the validity of zoning ordinances or resolutions.” Harris v. Goff, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 642. See also Keay v. City of Coral Gables, Fla. App.1970, 236 So.2d 133; Village of Pembroke Pines v. Zitreen, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So.2d 660; and our own decision in Carter v. City of Orlando, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 169. Such proceedings even though review are in the nature of proceedings de novo. Josephson v. Autry, et al., Fla.1957, 96 So. 2d 784.

The appellant has properly framed his complaint on constitutional grounds2 and should not be denied his day in court.

Reversed.

REED, J., and WILLIAMS, ROBERT L., Associate Judge, concur.