JAMES FIVECOAT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
James Fivecoat appeals his conviction for rape, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding an alleged prior rape attack. The court upheld the conviction, finding that the prior-crime testimony was admissible under the Williams Rule to establish identity, method of operation, and common scheme, and distinguished the case from prior precedent on the ground that the testimony was properly limited by jury instruction and was not the focal point of trial.
The trial court properly admitted the testimony regarding the prior rape because it was relevant to establish identity, method of operation, and common scheme under the Williams Rule, particularly where the trial court gave a limiting jury instruction and the testimony was not the focal point of the trial.
[1] Evidence of a prior similar crime is admissible to prove identity, intent, or a common scheme or design, provided it meets the requirements of the Williams Rule.
[2] A limiting instruction to the jury regarding the purpose of admitting evidence of a prior similar crime can distinguish the present case from prior precedent where such a…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The girl testified that the prior attack occurred at approximately the same time of night as the assault charged in the information. She established that the automobile was a red Barracuda. She described the same method used in picking her up. The holster and the revolver used in the attack was described as being the same type used in the instant case. The same type of threats were made by putting the gun to her head, and the same type of crime was committed.”
Illustrates how the prior-crime testimony established specific parallels relevant to identity and common scheme under the Williams Rule.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe victim was walking home from work late at night without a ride, accepted a ride from a stranger at a street corner, and was driven at gunpoint to …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Common Scheme Or Design cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant Fivecoat appeals a judgment and sentence to life in prison pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of the crime of rape, with recommendation of mercy.
The testimony reveals that the prosecu-trix was walking home from work at approximately 10:15 p. m. because she had worked overtime and did not have a ride. She accepted a ride from a strange man at a street corner. At gunpoint the man drove her to some garages a short distance away and criminally assaulted her. Thereafter he drove her almost to her home and released her. Soon after she reached home the police were called and she gave them a description of her attacker. The next day Fivecoat was arrested and charged with forcible rape.
During the trial, after a proffer and argument of counsel, the court admitted the testimony of a fifteen year old girl who testified as to a similar attack by Fivecoat, but only after the court had admonished the jury that her testimony was to be considered only for the purpose of whatever probative value it might have touching upon the issues of identity and intent.
Fivecoat contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony regarding the alleged prior rape because the testimony was irrelevant and tended to show no more than the bad character of the accused. He further maintains that the only purpose this witness served was to inflame the minds of the jurors and her testimony became the focal point of the trial, condemned by Green v. State, Fla.App.1969, 228 So.2d 397.
Green, supra, is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In the first place, the trial judge in this case gave a limiting instruction to the jury before the introduction of the testimony, which was not done in Green. We held in Green that the prior crime became the feature of the trial for intent to commit murder because that case was almost entirely devoted to the prior offense, whereas in the instant case the testimony of only one of thirteen witnesses related to the prior crime, and that witness’ direct testimony consisted of only seven of 230 pages of the transcript. The young girl’s testimony was merely incidental to the trial in question, Hines v. State, Fla App., 243 So.2d 434, opinion filed in this Court on January 27, 1971. A reading of her testimony reveals that it was not inflammatory in and of itself, Hines, supra.
The girl testified that the prior attack occurred at approximately the same time of night as the assault charged in the information. She established that the automobile was a red Barracuda. She described the same method used in picking her up. The holster and the revolver used in the attack was described as being the same type used in the instant case. The same type of threats were made by putting the gun to her head, and the same type of crime was committed. She also gave a description of her attacker similar to the description given by the prosecutrix. The young girl’s testimony established the similar method of operation, showed a common scheme or design and aided in proving identity. This evidence was therefore relevant and properly admitted under the Williams Rule, announced in Williams v. State, Fla. 1959, 110 So.2d 654. See Hines, supra; cf. Green v. State, Fla.App.1966, 190 So. 2d 42.
We have reviewed the other points raised by appellant and find no reversible error.
The judgment appealed is, therefore,
Affirmed.
LILES and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Marion v. State, 287 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…; see, in particular, Williams v. State, Fla.1960, 117 So. 2d 473; Williams v. State, Fla.1962, 143 So. 2d 484. See also Bogan v. State, Fla.App.1969, 226 So. 2d 110; Winkfield v. State, Fla.App.1968, 209 So. 2d 468; Fivecoat v. State, Fla.App.1971, 244 So. 2d 188; Talley v. State, 1948, 160 Fla. 593, 36 So. 2d 201. It is fervently hoped that the prosecution will be mindful of the admonitions set forth in Davis v. State, supra; utmost care must be taken to insure the proper utilization of “Williams rule” evi…
-
Hodges v. State, 403 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…uses to accomplish a particular act. See Dean v. State, 277 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1973); Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959); Talley v. State, 160 Fla. 593, 36 So. 2d 201 (1948); Sweet v. State, 313 So. 2d 130 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Fivecoat v. State, 244 So. 2d 188 (Fla.2d DCA 1971); Hines v. State, 243 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Mims v. State, 241 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970); Blackburn v. State, 208 So. 2d 625 (Fla.3d DCA 1968); Coney v. State, 193 So. 2d 57 (Fla.3d DCA 1966). See generally Annot., 2 A…
-
Whiteman v. State, 343 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…r material aspect of the crime charged. The court held that the testimony about the collateral crime (the Blue Grass Market robbery) was so disproportionate that the latter offense was made a “feature instead of an incident.” See Fivecoat v. State, 244 So. 2d 188 (Fla.2d DCA 1971); Green v. State, 228 So. 2d 397 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). The court found that measured by volume, the evidence relating to the collateral crime exceeded all other testimony combined and most of it was immaterial to show the material fact…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Green v. State, 228 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Rice v. State, 228 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Hines v. State, 243 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)