RICH MOTORS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
LOYD COLE PRODUCE EXPRESS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Rich Motors sought certiorari review of a trial court order that reinstated a conversion action after the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed it. The court held that once a plaintiff takes a voluntary dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1)(i), the trial court loses jurisdiction and cannot reinstate the action, and therefore quashed the reinstatement order.
A trial court has no authority to review or reinstate a voluntary dismissal taken by a plaintiff under F.R.C.P. 1.420(a)(1)(i) because the plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss, and the voluntary dismissal divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the action.
[1] A plaintiff has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss an action before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, or before the retirement of the jury in a jury trial…
[2] A voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff under Rule 1.420(a)(1) terminates the action and divests the trial court of jurisdiction.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since a trial court has no discretion under F.R.C.P. 1.420(a) (1) (i) in granting or denying a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff, it follows, then, that a trial court has no authority to review a voluntary dismissal.”
Establishes the core holding that lack of discretion means lack of authority to review voluntary dismissals
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt trial, respondent (Loyd Cole Produce Express) sought to prove ownership of a motor vehicle allegedly converted by petitioner (Rich Motors). Petitio…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Petition For Extraordinary Relief cases and more on FLexlaw
Petitioner, Rich Motors, Inc., by common law certiorari seeks review of an order entered by the trial court in favor of respondent, Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., reinstating a cause of action for damages for conversion of a motor vehicle. We grant certiorari and quash the order.
At the outset of the trial below, respondent-plaintiff sought to establish its ownership of the vehicle alleged to have been converted by eliciting testimony from an officer of respondent corporation. Petitioner objected on the grounds that ownership or right of interest could be established only if evidenced by a valid certificate of title, which respondent could not produce. After argument of counsel for the respective parties, it became apparent that the court was predisposed to sustain the objection in favor of petitioner. At that point counsel for respondent stated on the record, “We will take a voluntary dismissal.” The jury was then discharged.
Sixteen days after the dismissal respondent filed a “Petition for Extraordinary Relief” wherein respondent sought a rehearing on the dismissal. In its petition respondent alleged that its voluntary “non-suit” was in effect an involuntary dismissal; excusable neglect was asserted for respondent’s untimely filing of the petition. The trial court reinstated the action, and this petition for writ of certiorari followed.
Petitioner alleges in its petition that the trial court was without jurisdiction to reinstate the action. We agree.
At one time it was common procedure in Florida for the plaintiff in an action to take a non-suit when, at the close of his case, the court announced its intention to direct a verdict for the defendant. Under the rules then in effect a non-suit made compulsory because of an adverse ruling which was preclusive of recovery was considered to be an involuntary non-suit, since at that point the plaintiff had no absolute right to a non-suit. Crews v. Woods, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 526; Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 1939, 139 Fla. 328, 190 So. 533; J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp., 1934,118 Fla. 258,159 So. 39.
This procedure is no longer followed under the broader modern-day concept of the use of dismissals as embodied in F.R.C.P. 1.420, 30 F.S.A. Non-suits have been abolished in Florida. Crews v. Dobson, Fla. 1965, 177 So.2d 202.
Florida R.C.P. 1.420(a) (1) (i) provides that an action may be dismissed by a plaintiff without an order of court by serving, or by stating on the record during trial, a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for summary judgment, or if none is served or if such motion is denied before retirement of the jury in a case tried before a jury or before submission of a non jury case to the court for decision. This is an absolute right of the plaintiff without order of court, which gives to the plaintiff absolute control over continuation of the litigation. Meyer v. Contemporary Broadcasting Company, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 325.
Since a trial court has no discretion under F.R.C.P. 1.420(a) (1) (i) in granting or denying a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff, it follows, then, that a trial court has no authority to review a voluntary dis*528missal. A voluntary dismissal of an action by the plaintiff pursuant to F.R.C.P. 1.420 (a) (1) serves to terminate the action and to divest the trial court of jurisdiction.
In the case sub judice, respondent-plaintiff had an absolute right to dismiss the action when the dismissal was voluntarily taken. Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant a rehearing on the dismissal or to reinstate the action.
Certiorari is granted, and the order reinstating respondent’s cause of action is quashed.
McCAIN, J., and SACK, MARTIN, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
-
Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)…rdered. OVERTON, C. J., and SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(a)(1)(i). . Randle Eastern Ambulance Serv., Jnc. v. Vasta, 345 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). . Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). . Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. . Anderson v. Lovejoy, 354 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), pending on cert., No. 53,472 (Fla.). . See Gate City, Inc. v. Arnold Constr. Co., 243 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). This view as to…
-
Fears v. Muriel Booth Lunsford & the Ins. Co. of N. Am., 314 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975)…o that time, plaintiff can take a voluntary dismissal.” The Meyer case, cited in the dissent, was decided in 1968 by the Fourth District Court of Appeal and was followed by that court in 1970 in Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla.App. 4th 1970). In the Rich case, the court quoted Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) (identical to former Rule 1.35(a)(1) discussed in the Meyer case) and held that plaintiff’s right to take a voluntary dismissal (formerly a nonsuit)…
-
Shampaine Indus., Inc. v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 411 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…se of action, Sun First National Bank of Delray Beach v. Green Crane & Concrete Services, 371 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Randle-Eastern Ambulance Services v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla.1978); Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), Rule 1.540(a) allows the court to correct clerical mistakes, and errors from oversight or omission, in any part of the record at any time. The Rule provides: Rule 1.540. Relief from Judgment, Decrees, or Orders (a) Clerical Mi…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crews v. Dobson, 177 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965)
- Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 139 Fla. 328 (Fla. 1939)
- J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 118 Fla. 258 (Fla. 1934)
- Hal Meyer v. Contemporary Broad. Co., Inc., 207 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- Crews v. Woods, 59 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1952)