SAMMY LEE COLEMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Coleman appeals his conviction and twenty-year sentence for robbery after being found guilty. He challenged the voluntariness of his confession, which was determined to be voluntary by the trial court in the presence of the jury. The court affirmed his conviction, holding that there was no error in the voluntariness determination and that emotional concern for his girlfriend did not constitute legally sufficient coercion to render the confession involuntary.
The trial court committed no error in determining the voluntariness of the confession in the jury's presence, particularly where the defendant made no objection to this procedure. The fact that Coleman may have been motivated to confess out of concern for his girlfriend does not, as a matter of law, constitute sufficient coercion to render the confession involuntary. The court's determination of voluntariness satisfied the requirements of Jackson v. Denno.
[1] A trial judge may determine the voluntariness of a confession in the presence of the jury when defense counsel does not object to such procedure.
[2] A defendant who elects to represent himself at trial is not afforded greater latitude than an attorney regarding procedural objections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear that Jackson v. Denno requires only that the court determine the voluntariness of a confession before it can be considered by a jury for such weight as it might be entitled to. There is no requirement in Jackson v. Denno that such determination by the trial court must be outside the presence of the jury.”
Establishes the court's interpretation of the constitutional requirement for voluntariness determinations under Jackson v. Denno
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColeman was charged with robbing a liquor store. Although appointed a public defender, Coleman declined counsel and represented himself at trial. The …
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By this belated appeal, appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and sentence of twenty years imposed upon being found guilty of robbery of a liquor store.
Although the public defender was appointed to represent appellant, he declined such assistance of counsel and elected to represent himself at the trial.
The sole point raised for our consideration is appellant’s contention that his rights were violated when his confession was determined to be voluntary by the court in the presence of the jury. The contention is without merit so we must affirm.
We held in Brown v. State, Fla. App., 181 So.2d 578 (1965), that there is no error when the trial judge determines vol-untariness of a confession in the presence of the jury when counsel makes no objection to such procedure. That rule was adhered to in Gregory v. State, Fla.App., 181 So.2d 547, and Wade v. State, Fla. App., 204 So.2d 235. Appellant admits that he made no objection while he was acting as his own attorney in the case at bar but suggests that greater latitude should be afforded him since he is not an attorney. No authority for the proposition is advanced, and we know of none which might be applicable when a defendant discharges his appointed trial counsel and insists on representing himself. Appellant’s reliance on this court’s decision in Allen v. State, Fla.App., 239 So.2d 33, is unavailing. Allen is readily distinguishable from the case at *644bar since defense counsel in Allen requested a hearing on the question of voluntariness outside the presence of the jury. No such request was made in the case at bar.
The trial court made sufficient inquiry as to the voluntariness of appellant’s confession to warrant its submission to the jury. Thus the requirement of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, was met since the court determined voluntariness rather than the jury. It is clear that Jackson v. Denno requires only that the court determine the voluntariness of a confession before it can be considered by a jury for such weight as it might be entitled to. There is no requirement in Jackson v. Denno that such determination by the trial court must be outside the presence of the jury. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31, that it was not error to hold a voluntariness hearing in the jury’s presence.
The transcript of the trial testimony reflects that the robbery victim positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, appellant does not contend that his confession was the product of any physical coercion. Rather it appears that his claim is that the confession was the product of duress in that appellant’s girlfriend was being held in custody, and he was promised that she would be released if he gave a confession.
The fact that appellant may have been motivated to confess because of his concern for his girlfriend does not, as a matter of law, amount to sufficient coercion to characterize appellant’s confession as involuntary. Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964); Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959).
The judgment reviewed herein is affirmed.
WIGGINTON, Acting Chief Judge, and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur.
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Durham Eldon Stokes v. State, 403 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1981)…use of his concern for the welfare of his family in the face of reprisal threats by the Outlaws Motorcycle Gang is an insufficient basis on which to predicate a motion to suppress. See Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557 (Fla.1975); Coleman v. State, 245 So. 2d 642 (Fla.1st DCA 1971). The record clearly discloses that Stokes had received proper Miranda warnings, and it sustains the state’s assertion that his waiver of his privilege against self incrimination and his right to counsel was both knowing and volunt…
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Elwood Lamar Albright v. State, 378 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…suppression. United States v. Joslyn, 371 F.Supp. 423 (D.Ariz.1974). There was no atmosphere of coercion surrounding appellant’s confession and no reward or implied promise was offered. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla.1969); Coleman v. State, 245 So. 2d 642 (Fla.1st DCA 1971). Nor do we agree with appellant’s contention that the confession should be suppressed because the state failed to place him in contact with counsel until after the statement was taken. Monroe v. State, 369 So. 2d 962 (Fla.3d DCA…
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Raya v. State, 394 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on authority of Coleman v. State, 245 So. 2d 642 (Fla.1st DCA 1971). LETTS, C.J., ANSTEAD, J. and STONE, BARRY J., Associate Judge, concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1964)
- Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 (U.S. 1967)
- Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964)
- Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959)
- Brown v. State, 181 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Wade v. State, 204 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Gregory v. State, 181 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Allen v. State, 239 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)