JOHNNY BLACKSHEAR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Johnny Blackshear was convicted of possessing and selling narcotic drugs and sentenced to prison. On appeal, he argued entrapment as a defense, but the court affirmed his conviction, finding insufficient evidence to support the entrapment claim.
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish entrapment because Blackshear had the requisite criminal intent and was not instigated, induced, or lured into committing a crime he otherwise would not have committed. Therefore, Blackshear was not entitled to a directed verdict or jury instruction on entrapment.
[1] Entrapment is not established as a matter of law when the evidence shows that law enforcement officers merely furnished the opportunity for the commission of a crime by a…
[2] A defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict or a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment if the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it cannot be said that it is reasonably susceptible of the conclusion that appellant was instigated, induced or lured into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise no intention of committing”
Establishes the legal standard for entrapment and why it was not met in this case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlackshear was tried by jury and convicted of possessing and selling narcotic drugs. State informers acting on behalf of the State purchased drugs fro…
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Appellant was tried by a jury, convicted for the offenses of possessing and selling narcotic drugs, and sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison. He seeks reversal of the judgment and sentence on the grounds that the court erred in several material respects.
By his first two points on appeal appellant contends that the evidence establishes as a matter of law the defense of entrapment and that the court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and for an instruction to the jury on the law relating to such defense.
We have carefully reviewed the transcript of the trial proceedings and fail to find therein any evidence legally sufficient to establish the defense of entrapment. Disregarding the testimony of the State’s witnesses and considering only that adduced by the defendant, it cannot be said that it is reasonably susceptible of the conclusion that appellant was instigated, induced or lured into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise no *174intention of committing. It clearly appears without dispute that the informers acting on behalf of the State, to whom appellant admittedly sold the drugs in question, were acting in good faith for the purpose of detecting a crime and merely furnished the opportunity for its commission by appellant who already had the requisite criminal intent to violate the law. The State’s witnesses were not used as decoys to ensnare the innocent and lawLabiding appellant into the commission of the crime with which he was charged, but merely presented to him the opportunity of doing what he was already willing to do. Since such evidence negates the defense of entrapment, appellant was not entitled either to a directed verdict or a jury instruction on the law relating to such defense.1
We have carefully considered appellant’s remaining point on appeal but find it to be without substantial merit. The judgment appealed is accordingly affirmed.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and WIGGIN-TON, and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Joiner v. State, 382 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…se, Weaver v. State, 370 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), the evidence here was insufficient to show that Joiner was instigated, induced, or lured into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise no intention of committing. Blackshear v. State, 246 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); Koptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Since the evidence was insufficient to raise the issue of entrapment, the court’s refusal to instruct on entrapment was proper. In light of Joiner’s announced reliance on an e…
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Brosi v. State, 263 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…on thereof by defendant who had the requisite criminal intent. Since the evidence negates the defense of entrapment, appellant was not entitled to jury instructions on the law relating to the defense of entrapment. Blackshear v. State, Fla.App.1971, 246 So. 2d 173; Koptyra v. State, supra; Kibby v. United States (8th Cir. 1967), 372 F. 2d 598, cert. den. 387 U. S. 931, 87 S.Ct. 2055, 18 L.Ed.2d 993. We have considered defendant’s remaining points on appeal and find them to be without substantial merit. The j…
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Shaw v. State, 264 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)…The first contention made by appellant is that the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the* issue of entrapment as requested by defense counsel. No error has been shown in this regard. See Blackshear v. State, 246 So. 2d 173 (Fla.App.1971). There is merit to appellant’s second point which contends that the trial court erred in imposing separate sentences for possession and sale of heroin when the record reflects that both offenses were a facet of the same transaction.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Koptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Wilcox v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 387 U.S. 931 (U.S. 1967)
- Am. Guild of Variety Artists v. Smith, 387 U.S. 931 (U.S. 1967)
- Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1967)