VICTOR MANUEL MORRERO, PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE JACK M. TURNER, JUDGE, CRIMINAL COURT OF RECORD, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court reviewed whether a defendant charged with robbery was entitled to dismissal under a speedy trial statute requiring three successive written demands for trial filed in three consecutive terms of court. The court affirmed that the defendant failed to meet the statutory requirements because only two full terms had passed after his first demand, not three as required.
The defendant is not entitled to dismissal because the statute requires that three full terms of court pass after the first motion is filed before the defendant becomes eligible for discharge. Here, only two full terms had passed when the defendant sought dismissal, and the State was ready to proceed during the third full term.
[1] A crowded court docket does not constitute a reasonable delay that tolls the effect of a speedy trial statute.
[2] A defendant's agreement to have pre-trial motions heard on a specific date does not constitute acquiescence to a continuance of trial if no objection is raised at the tim…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a crowded Court docket will not be considered as a reasonable delay under the statute”
Establishes that administrative convenience of the court is not a valid reason to deny speedy trial discharge
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMorrero was charged with robbery on March 19, 1969, and entered a plea of not guilty demanding jury trial. He was released on bond and filed written d…
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This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari' to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, to review the decision of that Court filed January 9, 1970.
An information charging petitioner with the crime of robbery was filed on March 19, 1969, to which he entered a plea of not guilty and demanded trial by jury. Released on bond, he filed written demand for a speedy trial in two successive terms of the trial court where the dockets were crowded (June 1969, August 1969) and the State requested and was granted a continuance. In the third term, trial was set to take place in the fourth term on January 12, 1970. After the case was set for trial, and with only three days remaining before the third term expired, petitioner filed a written demand for a speedy trial (October 1969). Pursuant to § 915.01(2), petitioner moved that the case be dismissed and he be discharged, which motion was denied. Then defendant-petitioner filed a suggestion for writ of prohibition in the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which was denied in a brief order, 230 So.2d 509.
*770Petitioner contends that he is entitled to be discharged under the provisions of Florida Statutes § 915.01(2), F.S.A. That Statute, which was recently repealed by the 1971 Legislature,1 provided in pertinent part as follows :
“When a person has been arrested and released on bond, and thereafter for three successive terms of court, files a written demand for trial (serving a copy on the prosecuting attorney) and he is not brought to trial at or before the third full term after the date he is first committed, he shall be forever discharged from the crime; provided, however, the attendance of the witnesses is not prevented by himself, and he has filed no pleading seeking a continuance.”
Petitioner contends that the decision of the District Court creates conflict with four cases involving Florida Statutes § 915.01(2), F.S.A.2 In addition, this Court’s attention is directed to its recent decision in State ex rel. Leon v. Baker,3 wherein the State’s contentions regarding crowded dockets and filing of demands on the last day of the term were rejected. In State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, the defendant had filed three written demands for a speedy trial. Two of the demands were filed on the last day of the terms within which they were filed. Motion for discharge was denied by the trial court and that denial was affirmed on appeal by the District Court. The basis of the District Court’s decision was acquiescence and the crowded docket of the trial court. In quashing the decision of the District Court, this Court stated that “a crowded Court docket will not be considered as a reasonable delay under the statute.”4
Moreover, in State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, supra, petitioner Leon filed three successive motions for a speedy trial, as in this case, but was not tried during the fourth term, which was the third full consecutive term after his initial filing. Since Leon was not tried during the third full term, although he had been ready at all times after the first motion was filed, he became eligible for release.
Additionally, this case is controlled by our recent decision in Clawson v. Baker, wherein we held in order to meet the requirements of the Statute, it is necessary that: (1) three motions for speedy trial be properly filed in three consecutive terms of court and (2) three full terms of court pass after the first motion is filed.5
Applying the above standard to the case before us it is apparent that three full terms did not pass after petitioner filed his first motion for speedy trial before seeking dismissal. The record shows the State was ready to try the petitioner during the third full term of court.
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, C. J., concurs in judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bernard v. State, 261 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1972)…g the June 1970 term, the trial judge dismissed the information and the case on July 2, 1970. Three full terms of court had not expired after the defendant filed his demands when the court dismissed the information. This Court in Morrero v. Turner, 246 So. 2d 769 (Fla.1971), in discussing Clawson v. Baker, 245 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1971), said: “[W]e held in order to meet the requirements of the Statute, it is necessary that: (1) three motions for speedy trial be properly filed in three consecutive terms of court…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Richard Atwood v. The Honorable Paul Baker, 250 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1971)…f the charge pending against him. In prior cases, we have considered the completion of three full terms as a condition precedent to any right to release under the speedy trial statutes. Clawson v. Baker, 245 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1971); Morrero v. Turner, 246 So. 2d 769 (Fla.1971); Bates v. Amidon, 249 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1971). Since Fla.Stat. § 915.01(2) F.S.A. was repealed prior to the completion of the third full-term, petitioner could not have accrued a right to release under the statute; the condition precedent of…
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Bates v. Amidon, 249 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971)…erm, but only two full terms intervened between the first demand and the motion for discharge. Defendant sought his release prematurely and the motion for discharge was properly denied. Clawson v. Baker, 245 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1971); Morrero v. Turner, 246 So. 2d 769, (Fla., op. filed March 31, 1971). The question of whether or not good cause existed for the granting of the continuance becomes immaterial, and there is no conflict with the cases cited by the Defendant. The writ of certiorari having been improvi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dickoff v. Dewell, 152 Fla. 240 (Fla. 1942)
- Wm. G. Feger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564 (Fla. 1932)
- The State of Fla. ex rel. Leocadio Leon v. Honorable H. Paul Baker, 238 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1970)
- Gossett v. Hanlon, 195 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- Wincor v. The Honorable Jack M. Turner, 215 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1968)
- Clawson v. Baker, 245 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1971)
- Grady Alonzo Graham v. State, 230 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Nattell v. State, 230 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)