STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JACK JONES, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1971-04-20
No. 70-932
Before PEARSON, C. J., and BARK-DULL and SWANN, JJ.
247 So. 2d 342 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1971) Caution
Cited by 31 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Florida's appeal of a dismissal order challenges the trial court's ruling that the State failed to provide adequate locational information for material witnesses who were informants and active participants in the crime. The court affirms dismissal, holding that when informants become material witnesses through government conduct, the prosecution must demonstrate good faith efforts to locate them and that 'identity' includes pertinent locational information.


Holding

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the information. When informants become material witnesses through intentional government conduct, the prosecution must demonstrate good faith efforts to locate them upon proper request. The duty to disclose a material witness informant's 'identity' includes all pertinent information helpful in locating the witnesses, and the State cannot satisfy this obligation by revealing only what it deliberately arranged to know if that is inadequate for location purposes.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the State's failure to disclose information about material witnesses, including their whereabouts, warrants dismis…

[2] The State's intentional failure to keep records or make efforts to ascertain the location of material informant witnesses can be grounds for dismissing an information.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The Court finds, therefore, than when an informant or informants become material witnesses to a crime and where such is the result of intentional conduct by the government, the prosecution, including the appropriate police agencies, must demonstrate that they have attempted in good faith to locate the informants where a proper request is made therefor.”

Establishes the core holding that prosecutors must affirmatively attempt to locate informant witnesses upon request when they have become material witnesses through government action.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The State used informants as witnesses who were active participants in the events leading to the crime charged. The main investigating officer, Detect…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Chief Judge.

PEARSON, Chief Judge.

The State appeals from an order of the Criminal Court of Record which dismissed an information upon the ground that the defendant could not be given a fair trial because of the actions of the State in, (1) failing to keep records or memoranda reflecting the location or whereabouts of witnesses who were used by the State as informants and who were active participants in the actions leading up to the crime charged; (2) failing to comply with an order requiring the State to provide necessary locational information as to the witnesses. The State urges that, (1) the failure of the State to provide an address of a witness who has moved his residence, is not a proper basis for dismissal of an information and, (2) that the order the State is charged with having disregarded provided only that the State should furnish information “if known to State.”

The record reveals that the State did not violate the literal terms of the order, because the State’s action did comply with the provision pointed out. If this *343were the only ground upon which the cause was dismissed, we would reverse because when a cause is dismissed for failure of the State to comply with an order, the order must be explicit as to what the State must do.

We hold however, that the first ground set forth by the trial judge in its order is sufficient. Rulings as to the necessity of providing the names and addresses of witnesses for the defendant to have a fair trial are rulings which must of necessity rest upon the broad discretion of the trial court. Compare Monserrate v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 232 So.2d 444; Mathews v. State, Fla.1950, 44 So.2d 664; Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); with Warriner v. Ferraro, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 723. In this case, the trial judge has fully set forth his interpretation of the situation and the necessity for the disclosure which the state was unable or unwilling to make:

⅜ * ⅝ ⅜ * ⅜
“6. That other than the names and physical descriptions indicated above, Dectecive D’Azevedo, who was the main investigating officer for the State, was unable to provide to the defendant any other information reflecting the present whereabouts of these witnesses or the names of any other law enforcement officers who were connected with the investigation who had information reflecting the present whereabouts of the witnesses.
“7. That Detective D’Azevedo indicated that he had failed to keep any records or memoranda reflecting the location or whereabouts of these witnesses at the time of the incident in question and, in addition, that he had made no efforts at the time of the incident in question to establish a means by which he could locate these witnesses at any time in the future.
“8. That the conduct referred to in the paragraph above was engaged in at a time when the State of Florida knew or should have known that the said witnesses possessed firsthand information material to the charges contained in the Information and would, therefore, be material witnesses for either the State or the defendant.
“9. That in an effort to acquire more complete locational information the defendant filed a Motion to Compel More Complete Disclosure of Identity of Witnesses on July 16, 1970. In that motion the defendant alleged that the information so far provided was totally inadequate for locational purposes and that without more the defendant would be unable to locate the witnesses and, therefore, could not examine the witnesses to determine the nature and extent of their knowledge of material facts. In the motion the defendant also alleged that he believed that the sought after witnesses had intimate knowledge of the alleged criminal acts the defendant is accused of having committed and that it was a vital step in the preparation of his defense that he be afforded the opportunity to examine these witnesses particularly in light of the fact that the defendant pleaded not guilty and that an issue of entrapment as a legal defense might exist.”
* * * * * *
“13. The Court finds, therefore, than when an informant or informants become material witnesses to a crime and where such is the result of intentional conduct by the government, the prosecution, including the appropriate police agencies, must demonstrate that they have attempted in good faith to locate the informants where a proper request is made therefor. The Court further finds that in such a case it will not suffice for the prosecution, in attempting to display good faith, to say that it cannot provide the necessary locational information where the facts display that the State deliberately avoided ever acquiring infor*344mation necessary for locating the informants in the first place.
“14. In addition, the Court finds that the duty of the State to disclose a material witness informer’s identity on pain of dismissal imposed by Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 [77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639], 1957; Matthews v. State [Fla.], 44 So.2d 664, and Monserrate v. State [Fla.App.], 232 So.2d 444, contemplates an “identity” that includes all pertinent information helpful in locating the witnesses. The Court specifically rejects the view that the State has fulfilled its obligation in this regard when it reveals all that it knows, if what it has arranged to know is inadequate for location purposes. See Velarde-Villarreal v. U. S. [9 Cir.], 354 F.2d 9; U. S. v. Clarke [D.C.], 220 F.Supp. 905, and Eleazer v. The Superior Court, 83 Cal.Rptr. 586, 464 P.2d 42, 6 Cr.L. 2376, California Supreme Court decided January 30, 1970, and the Declaration of Rights, Section 16, Florida Constitution [F.S.A.].”
# * * * * *

For the reasons set forth by the trial judge the order appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BARKDULL, Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The impact of the holding of the majority is to require the State to go beyond disclosing to a defendant all its information that it knows about a particular witness and to place an affirmative duty on the State to track down the whereabouts of witnesses who have removed themselves from this jurisdiction.

Dissent
BARKDULL, Judge

BARKDULL, Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The impact of the holding of the majority is to require the State to go beyond disclosing to a defendant all its information that it knows about a particular witness and to place an affirmative duty on the State to track down the whereabouts of witnesses who have removed themselves from this jurisdiction.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (15 total)

  • State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …al informant upon court order, but, through their calculated official ignorance or deliberate intentional activity, the informant has disappeared and his whereabouts are unknown. Aldazabal v. State, 471 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); State v. Jones, 247 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); compare Guzman v. State, 498 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); State v. Saldarriaga, 486 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). There is further authority that a trial court is precluded from dismissing an information or indictment without…
  • Elkins v. State, 388 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
    …om the State’s inability to produce the informer’s identity. Appellant does not argue the trial court’s finding that the State neither deliberately nor negligently failed to preserve a record of the informer’s identity. Thus, neither State v. Jones, 247 So. 2d 342 (Fla.3d DCA 1971) nor Munford v. State, 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), quashed in part, 357 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1978), is on point. Since the State would have been correct in refusing to disclose the identity of the informer under the circumstances o…
  • Aldazabal v. State, 471 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …e was a material and vital witness in the case. Nonetheless, they deliberately failed to determine the c.i.’s whereabouts and then, as ordered, to provide the defense with his address so he could be located to appear at the trial. In State v. Jones, 247 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) we held, approving the trial court’s dismissal of the prosecution on this basis, that “the duty of the State to disclose a material witness informer’s identity on pain of dismissal imposed by Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 5…

Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw