ART BERMAN CONCRETE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
SEY CONSTRUCTION CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, MILTON F. STEINHARDT AND FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, AS SURETY, APPELLEES
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Art Berman Concrete appeals the dismissal of its mechanic's lien foreclosure complaint. The court addresses whether F.S. § 713.06(3)(d)1 requires sub-contractors to provide notice of unpaid lienors to the owner as a prerequisite to enforcing a mechanic's lien. The court holds that the statute applies only to general contractors and direct contracts, not sub-contractors, and therefore reverses the dismissal with prejudice.
The notice requirement applies only to general contractors under direct contracts and does not apply to sub-contractors. The trial court erred in dismissing the lien foreclosure complaint with prejudice based on failure to provide such notice.
[1] A statutory notice requirement for contractors does not apply to subcontractors unless the statute explicitly includes them.
[2] Mechanic's lien laws are to be interpreted favorably to the lienor to achieve the statute's protective purpose.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the entire lien law must be interpreted favorably to the lienor in order to achieve the beneficial purpose of the statute which is the protection of those entitled to receive the fruits of their labor”
Establishes the fundamental principle that mechanic's lien statutes must be construed in favor of lienors to protect workers and materialmen.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArt Berman Concrete filed a complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien against Sey Construction Corp., Milton F. Steinhardt, and Fidelity and Deposit Co…
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The controlling question in this appeal is whether the notice indicated by F.S. § 713.06 (3) (d) 1, F.S.A., of the mechanic’s lien law must be given by a sub-contractor who claims under a mechanic’s lien. The section reads as follows:
“(3) The owner may make proper payments on the direct contract as to lienors under this section, in the following manner:
* * * * *
* * * * *
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
(d) When the final payment under a direct contract becomes due the contractor :
1. The contractor shall give to the owner an affidavit stating, if that be the fact, that all lienors have been paid in full or, if the fact be otherwise, showing the name of each lienor who has not been paid in full and the amount due or to become due each for labor, services or materials furnished. The contractor shall have no lien or right of action against the owner for labor, services or materials furnished under the direct contract while in default by reason of not giving the owner such affidavit. The contractor shall execute said affidavit and deliver it to the owner at least five *792days before instituting suit as a prerequisite to the institution of any suit to enforce his lien under this chapter.”
The question which we must decide arose by the filing of appellant’s complaint to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. The complaint did not allege that the notice had been given. It is not clear from the complaint whether appellant alleges itself to be a sub-contractor but the complaint is susceptible to that interpretation. The trial court dismissed appellant’s complaint with prejudice as to the prayer to enforce a mechanic’s lien but with leave to institute an action upon any contract rights it might claim. We hold that it was error for the trial court to dismiss with prejudice the complaint to foreclose the lien.
It will be noted from a reading of the quoted section that by the terms of the section itself, it applies to “contractors” and not sub-contractors; further, that the section refers to “the direct contract” which would further indicate an applicability only to the general contract.
Appellee suggests that the term “contractor” as used within the section should be interpreted as a generic term including subcontractor inasmuch as this would aid in the protection of the owner from unjust claims. This last purpose is urged by the appellee as the purpose of the section. We are convinced first that the entire lien law must be interpreted favorably to the lienor in order to achieve the beneficial purpose of the statute which is the protection of those entitled to receive the fruits of their labor. Crane Co. v. Fine, Fla.1969, 221 So.2d 145; United States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., Fla.1953, 62 So.2d 589; Ceco Corporation v. Goldberg, Fla.App.1969, 219 So.2d 475.
Second, we are convinced that the interpretation urged by appellee is both strained and unreasonable under the language of the section. It is the duty of the court in interpreting a statute to follow the plain language thereof. Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, Fla.1960, 121 So.2d 779; City of Sarasota v. Burch, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 9; Biddle v. State Beverage Department, Fla.App.1966, 187 So.2d 65.
The judgment appealed is reversed with directions to enter an order dismissing appellant’s complaint as failing to comply with RCP 1.Í10, but granting to appellant the right to amend its complaint for claim of lien and for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein set out.
Reversed and remanded.
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Sowers v. Hoenstine, 417 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…g requirement is not applicable to him because he was not a “contractor,” but rather was a “sub-contractor.” See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Lowry Electric Co., 269 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Art Berman Concrete, Inc. v. Sey Construction Corp., 247 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). The installation of the pad was only a small part of the improvements being made. Hoenstine contends that the “contractor” was the person [*1139] responsible for the larger portion of the work. There is no dispute that Hoenstine…
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DeTHORNE v. Beck, 280 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)…wagon that is not used as public livery conveyance for passengers but is used primarily in the business of the insured, is a motor vehicle, as defined by Section 627.732, supra. Art [*449] Berman Concrete Co. v. Sey Construction Corp., Fla.App.1971, 247 So. 2d 791; Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc., Fla. 1970, 239 So. 2d 256. Any administrative rule promulgated in furtherance of said statute must be consistent with the provisions thereof. 1 Fla.Jur., Administrative Law, Sec. 92. The certif…
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Mid-State Contractors, Inc. v. Halo Dev. Corp., 342 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…CA 1974). “ . . . [T]he mechanic’s lien law is remedial in nature and is liberally construed to protect the laborer and the materialman. Crane Co. v. Fine, Fla.1969, 221 So. 2d 145; Art Berman Concrete, Inc. v. Sey Construction Corp., Fla.App.1971, 247 So. 2d 791.” Upholding this claim of lien also comports with the general rule regarding the sufficiency of statements as to the amount owed under mechanics’ lien statutes. As noted in 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 153 (1948): “ . . . [T]he notice, claim, or s…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969)
- Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1960)
- Biddle v. State Bev. Dep't of Fla., 187 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)
- United States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., Inc, 62 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1953)
- The Ceco Corp. v. Burton Goldberg, 219 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- City OF Sarasota v. Leonard L. Burch et ux., 192 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)