C. S. NICHOLS, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE, CITY OF MIAMI,
v.
STATE EX REL WEST D. ARCHER

Fla. | 1939-06-20
Whitfield, Brown; Buford, Chapman, and Thomas, J. J., concur.
138 Fla. 648 Florida Supreme Court (1939) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 190 So. 11
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus, ordering the City of Miami to reinstate a discharged employee. The court found the alternative writ sufficient, relying on prior precedent.


Holding

Yes, the alternative writ was legally sufficient. The court found no error in the lower court's judgment denying the motion to quash and issuing the peremptory writ.


Key Quotes

“It is contended that the alternative writ is defective in that it fails to allege any legal duty on the part of the City or that there are funds in the city treasury available to pay relator.”

This quote states the City's main argument against the sufficiency of the alternative writ.

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Facts & Procedural History

West D. Archer, a former employee of the City of Miami, was discharged and sought reinstatement through a writ of mandamus, citing his status under th…

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Opinion of the Court
Terrell, C. J. —

Terrell, C. J. —

West D. Archer, the defendant in error, was discharged as an employee of the City of Miami. He brought mandamus to enforce his reinstatement relying on his status under the Civil Service Code of Rules and Regulations. A motion to quash the alternative writ was' denied and the City 'announcing that it would rely on' the motion to quash, peremptory writ was issued to which judgment, the instant writ of error was prosecuted.

It is contended that the alternative writ is defective in that it fails to allege any legal duty on the part of the City or that there are funds in the city treasury available to pay relator.

The alternative writ has been' examined as have brief's of counsel, .'and the judgment below found to be free from error. It is affirmed on authority of State ex rel Whitehead v. Ulsch, et al., 137 Fla. 321, 188 So. 216.

Affirmed.

*649Whitfield, Brown; Buford, Chapman, and Thomas, J. J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State Ex rel. R. D. Hawkins v. McCALL, 158 Fla. 655 (Fla. 1947)
    …ismissed the cause at the cost of relator. That mandamus is a proper remedy in such cases is well settled in this jurisdiction. See Hammond v. Curry, 115 Fla. 245, 14 Sou. (2) 390; Nelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 Sou. (2) 131; Nichols v. State, 138 Fla. 648, 190 Sou. 11, and cases there cited. In this jurisdiction municipal officers are subject to removal only in the manner and by the authority determined by the legislature. Nelson v. Lindsey, supra; Bryan v. Landis, 106. Fla. 19, 142 Sou. 650; Rosenf…
  • Forrest E. Nelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596 (Fla. 1942)
    …eremptory writ should be issued only upon evidence duly adduced and clearly sufficient in probative force to prove the right of relator to the writ under the issues made. See Roark v. State, 122 Fla. 843, 165 So. 901; Nichols v. State, 138 Fla. 648, 190 So. 11; Bloodworth v. State, 139 Fla. 72, 190 So. 503. The relief sought in this case by writ of mandamus is to compel respondents “to cancel and rescind their order of January 29, 1942, attempting to reduce petitioner to the rank of Patrolman” from that…
  • Al Martel v. Carlson, 118 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
    …of the costs is improper, inasmuch as one plaintiff would thereupon be liable for the entire amount of the costs. It is proper under such circumstances to apportion the costs between the unsuccessful plaintiffs. See Coleman v. Johnson, 138 Fla. 687, 190 So. 11. The appellee agrees with the appellants that the costs were not taxed in this case upon a motion and hearing. The affidavit of costs on behalf of the defendant showing a claimed expenditure of $344.-11, does not reveal that the affidavit was serve…

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