TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY
v.
W. O. JONES
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Tampa Electric Company appeals a judgment awarding damages to a passenger injured when an automobile collided with a street car. The court reverses, holding that the street car operator's alleged momentary lack of watchfulness was not the proximate cause of the injury because an independent intervening cause—the automobile driver's loss of control—directly caused the collision.
The court held that the street car operator's negligence, if it existed, was not actionable because it was not the proximate cause of the injury. An independent and efficient intervening cause—the automobile driver's loss of control due to skidding—broke the chain of causation. The operator had the right to assume other drivers would maintain control of their vehicles.
“In suits for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of another it is not only necessary that some negligent act of the defendant be shown but it must be shown that such negligent act caused, or contributed to, the result which inflicted the injury. The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.”
Establishes the fundamental requirement that negligence must be proven as proximate cause, not merely as some concurrent act
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff was a passenger on defendant's street car when an automobile driven by a third party collided with the side of the car after skidding on a w…
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The appeal brings for review judgment in favor of plaintiff in a suit against the defendant to recover damages alleged' to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of the negligence of defendant’s servants in the operation of a street car on which plaintiff was a passenger.
The alleged injury occurred when an automobile driven by another collided with the side of the street car, broke *748a window and shattered broken glass against and upon the plaintiff.
There is some evidence in the record showing that the motorman just prior to the collision had not maintained for every second as high a degree of watchfulness as he might have, but there is no evidence whatever that such lack of watchfulnes's, if it did occur, was in the whole or in part the cause of the collision or the injury.
The record shows conclusively that the involved automobile got out of control of the driver by skidding on a wet pavement and while so out of control, collided with the street car while the street car was being operated at a reasonable rate of speed between street intersections.
In suits for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of another it is not only necessary that some negligent act of the defendant be shown but it must be shown that such negligent act caused, or contributed to, the result which inflicted the injury. The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
In Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 70 Sou. 467, L. R. A. 1916A 982, Ann. Cas. 1918A 576, we said:
“Actionable Negligence exists when a los's or injury to one without fault results directly from another’s mere negligence, or when the loss or injury sustained by one is such as results in ordinary natural sequence from the negligence, or such as naturally and ordinarily should have been regarded as' a probable not as a merely possible result of the simple negligence of another. Conversely when the loss or injury is not a direct result of the mere negligence, and the loss or injury is not a natural ordinary sequence or such as naturally and ordinarily should have been regarded as a probable, and not a merely possible result of the simple negligence, the negligence is' not actionable. See 2 M. A. *749L., p. 114, et seq. If an independent efficient cause intervenes between the negligence and injury, the original negligence does not directly contribute to the force or effectiveness of the intervening cause, the original negligence is not regarded as a proximate cause of the injury, even though the injury might not have occurred but for the original negligence. A proximate cause stands next in causal relation to the effect. Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R. Co. v. Heery Adms., 105 Ill. App. 647; Perkins v. Morgan Lumber Co., 68 Fla. 503, 67 South. Rep. 126; Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 390. A proximate cause produces the result in continuous sequence, and without which the result would n'ot have occurred. Ramsbottom v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 138 N. C. 38, 50 S. E. Rep. 448.”
See also Williams v. A. C. L. Ry. Co., 56 Fla. 735, 48 Sou. 206, and Jacksonville, etc., R. Co. v. Peninsular Land, etc., Co., 27 Fla. 1, 157, 9 So. 661, 17 L. R. A. 33; Florida Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406, 20 So. 558; Hall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Fla. 275, 51 So. 819, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 639; Tatum v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 93 Fla. 1046, 113 So. 671, 674.
The motorman had the right to assume that the driver of every automobile passing the street car traveling in the opposite direction would retain control of the automobile and avoid collision with the side of the street car, and, thus assuming, he had the right to proceed on his course of travel at a reasonable rate of speed. The contents of the record here indicates that the collision would have occurred had the street car been standing still on the tracks at the place where the collision occurred.
The record discloses no actionable negligence on the part of the defendant and, therefore, the judgment must be revers'ed.
So ordered.
*750Reversed
Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Brown, Buford and Thomas, J. J., concur.
Chapman, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (34 total)
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Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984)…nd approve the decision of the district court. In negligence actions Florida courts follow the more likely than not standard of causation and require proof that the negligence probably caused the plaintiff’s injury. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26 (1939); Greene v. Flewelling, 366 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 99 (Fla.1979); Bryant v. Jax Liquors, 352 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 710 (Fla.1978). Prosser explored this standard o…
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Stahl v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ithout which” interchangeably in formulating the “but for” test, but the meaning here is precisely the same, with “but for” being the preferred terminology. Sardell v. Malanio, 202 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla.1967) (“but for”); Tampa Electric Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26, 27 (1939) (“without which”); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 70 So. 467, 470 (1915) (“without which”); General Telephone Co. of Fla. v. Choate, 409 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1278 (Fla.1982) (“but…
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Doyle Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., Inc., 120 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)…29 Ill. 390, 82 N.E. 362, IS L.R.A.,N.S., 819, 11 Ann.Cas. 368. A proximate cause produces the result in continuous sequence, and without which the result would not have occurred. Ramsbottom v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 138 N.C. 38, 50 S.E. 448.” [138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 27.] It would appear that the fire in the instant case, which occurred subsequent to defendant’s act of negligently cutting the telephone wire, was an independent intervening cause. That is to say the cutting of the wire, absent a subseque…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 34 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jacksonville v. Peninsular Land, 27 Fla. 1 (Fla. 1891)
- Fla. Cent. & Peninsular R.R. Co. v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406 (Fla. 1896)
- Williams v. The Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 56 Fla. 735 (Fla. 1908)
- Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450 (Fla. 1915)
- Tatom v. S. A. L. R. R. Co., 113 So. 671 (Fla. 1927)
- Hall v. W. Union Tel. Co., 59 Fla. 275 (Fla. 1910)
- Perkins v. Morgan Lumber Co., 68 Fla. 503 (Fla. 1914)