H. L. FISK
v.
STATE
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H. L. Fisk was convicted of receiving stolen property based on a single transaction where he purchased gold from a self-confessed thief. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence to support guilt despite suspicious circumstances.
The conviction was reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Although circumstantial evidence of guilt may be drawn from unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, the witness testimony in this case contained little discrepancy and, even if believed in whole or in part, provided scant proof of the charge.
“if an explanation be given the jury must determine its reasonableness and credibility, McDonald v. State, 56 Fla. 74, 47 South. Rep. 485. If the account raises a reasonable doubt of guilt the defendant should be given the benefit and acquittal should follow.”
Establishes the legal standard that when a defendant provides an explanation for suspicious circumstances, the jury must assess its credibility, and acquittal must follow if it raises reasonable doubt.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFisk operated a retail business selling apparel and jewelry and repairing watches. He regularly purchased old gold for resale to the government mint. …
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Plaintiff in' error was found guilty by the jury and sentenced to serve two years in the penitentiary under an information charging him with receiving stolen property with knowledge that it had been stolen.
He conducted a mercaitile business where he sold wearing apparel and jewelry and also repaired watches. On several occasions he purchased old gold for resale to the government mint, and his conviction was based on one of these transactions with a self-confessed thief and drug addict who committed a robbery and delivered his loot to plaintiff in error who weighed it and paid him the prevailing price for the gold it contained.
It was established by the State that soon after the burglary the person whose property had been purloined called on the plaintiff in error at his place of business, whereupon the latter made available his books showing his purchases of old gold from the man who subsequently pleaded guilty to the actual theft.
The convict testified that the gold he sold plaintiff in error was weighed near the entrance of the store, in the daytime during business hours and that he advised plaintiff in error that he was buying the metal “from house to house.” In the course of their dealings plaintiff in error set a stone in a ring for the thief and charged him a small fee for the service.
The most damaging testimony was the statement by the burglar that plaintiff in error said he knew where the gold *817was being obtained and he didn’t care, but the time was not fixed and its materiality is therefore in' grave doubt.
Plaintiff in error testified that he asked the thief how he tested gold he bought and was told that he did so with acid, and to give emphasis to the statement was shown where the latter had burned himself with the fluid. This was denied.
It is true that an inference of guilt may be drawn from the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods sufficient to support a verdict, Tucker v. State, 86 Fla. 36, 96 South. Rep. 10, and if an explanation be given the jury must determine its reasonableness and credibility, McDonald v. State, 56 Fla. 74, 47 South. Rep. 485. If the account raises a reasonable doubt of guilt the defendant should be given the benefit and acquittal should follow.
We hesitate to interfere with the verdict of a jury and the rule is that such a finding will not be disturbed where there is sufficient testimony, even though conflicting, which if believed would substantiate the charge. Here, however, there is little discrepancy in the various stories related by the witnesses and believing all or any part of them there is scant proof to support the conviction. There are suspicions of guilt because of failure to report gold sales to the authorities and because of some former difficulty which was not of such consequence as to bear any weight with the jury, but there was a paucity of facts showing, conduct on the part of the accused that one naturally associates with the person who aids the thief by disposing of his ill-gotten wares.
Because of insufficient testimony, we think the judgment should be and it is—
Reversed.
Terrell, C. J., and Buford, J. ,concur.
Whitfield, J., concurs in opinion and judgment.
*818Justices Brown and Ci-iapman not participating as authorized by Section 4687, Compiled General Laws of 1927, and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this Court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1970)…ct, and if an explanation be given, the jury must determine its reasonableness and credibility. If the account raises a reasonable doubt of guilt, the defendant should be given the benefit of such doubt and an acquittal should follow. Fisk v. State, 138 Fla. 815, 190 So. 10 (1939). Even in the face of this rule, the Florida Court has reversed convictions where there was a paucity of facts showing conduct on the part of the accused that one naturally associates with the person who aids , the thief by dispos…
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Dusky ARD v. State, 108 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1959)…We do not think the law was properly stated and we have the view that by the statement there was a reference to the failure of the appellant to testify. Way v. State, Fla., 67 So. 2d 321. In McDonald v. State, 56 Fla. 74, 47 So. 485, Fisk v. State, 138 Fla. 815, 190 So. 10, in the other cases cited in this opinion, and in the many we have examined the word “recently”, relating to the theft appears, or it is said that the account by one discovered with purloined property must be “directly” given in order fo…
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Jackson v. State, 736 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…). The state’s argument is based on the McDonald line of cases. Ill Over time, Florida common law developed a different rule of circumstantial evidence in cases where the charge was receiving stolen goods and not larceny. See, e.g., Fisk v. State, 138 Fla. 815, 190 So. 10 (1939). In State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla.1970), the supreme court clarified whether the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, and nothing more, was sufficient to support a conviction for buying, receiving, or ai…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Angus McDonald v. State, 56 Fla. 74 (Fla. 1908)
- Park Tucker v. State, 86 Fla. 36 (Fla. 1923)