HENRY M. WEST, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1971-06-18
No. 71-27
LILES, J., concurs., MANN, J., concurs specially.
249 So. 2d 505 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1971) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Henry West appeals the denial of his post-conviction motion to vacate his guilty plea to robbery and larceny, claiming he was coerced by his public defender. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that West's motion was insufficient on its face as it alleged only conclusions rather than specific factual allegations.


Holding

The court held that West's post-conviction motion was insufficient on its face because it alleged only conclusions rather than facts justifying affirmative action by the court. The motion did not set forth facts sufficient to support the conclusions and prayers contained within it, and therefore did not warrant an evidentiary hearing.


Headnotes

[1] A post-conviction motion must allege facts, not conclusions, to justify relief.

[2] A post-conviction motion that fails to set forth sufficient facts to support its conclusions is insufficient on its face and does not warrant an evidentiary hearing.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A post-conviction motion for relief must allege facts, not conclusions, justifying affirmative action by the Court, and such motion that fails to set forth facts sufficient to support the conclusions and prayers contained in the motion or to justify relief under the post-conviction Rule is insufficient on its face and does not warrant an evidentiary hearing.”

Establishes the legal standard for sufficiency of post-conviction motions under Florida law

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

West was indicted for robbery and larceny of an automobile on September 25, 1968. He was arraigned on March 31, 1969, and entered a guilty plea. On Ma…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PIERCE, Chief Judge.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

Appellant Henry M. West appeals to this Court from an order entered by the trial Court, the Polk County Criminal Court of Record, denying his post-conviction motion under CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A. to vacate the judgment and sentence previously imposed upon him in a criminal prosecution.

On September 25, 1968, West was informed against for robbery and larceny of an automobile. On March 31, 1969, he was arraigned and pled guilty. On May 12, 1969, he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to a term in the State Prison.

He did not appeal the judgment and sentence nor in any way challenge the propriety of entry of his guilty plea until over a year and a half later. On December 29, 1970, he filed in the trial Court his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence. On December 30, 1970, the motion to vacate was denied by the trial Judge and in due course West appealed his denial to this Court, contending that the trial Judge committed reversible error in denying his motion. We disagree with West’s claim and affirm.

The motion to vacate properly alleges that Polk County Public Defender Honorable Lee Roy Horton, Jr., was appointed to, and did, represent him during the Court proceedings wherein he was arraigned and pled guilty. West does not challenge the propriety of the Public Defender’s said appointment except as may be impliedly or indirectly inferred. He says he was "coerced by the representation of counsel” to plead guilty by the promise that “if he pleaded guilty to Case No. 50280, he would be put on probation”, that he was told “by defense attorney” that absent a plea of guilty the case would go to trial and he would be found guilty and receive a life imprisonment sentence. He says he pled guilty because he was coerced “and also led to believe that he would receive probation”.

The foregoing is the substance of West’s post-conviction motion based upon alleged coercion to plead guilty. We hold the motion insufficient on its face and affirm the trial Court’s denial.

A post-conviction motion for relief must allege facts, not conclusions, justifying affirmative action by the Court, and such motion that fails to set forth facts sufficient to support the conclusions and prayers contained in the motion or to justify relief under the post-conviction Rule is insufficient on its face and does not warrant an evidentiary hearing. Bogan v. State, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 74; Gibson v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 8; Brumley v. State, Fla.App.1969, 224 So.2d 447; Ballard v. State, Fla.App.1967, 200 So.2d 597; Ward v. State, Fla.App.1970, 236 So.2d 187; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747.

West urges to this Court the case of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. But among other *507considerations the guilty plea here antedated the high Court’s decision in Boykin, which case has since been held to be not retroactive. See Odle v. State, Fla.App.1970, 241 So.2d 184; also Johnson v. Wainwright, Fla.1970, 238 So.2d 590; with which we agree.

The denial of the motion by the trial Court was correct and the order appealed from is therefore—

Affirmed.

LILES, J., concurs.

MANN, J., concurs specially.

MANN, Judge,

(concurring specially).

I concur, but for the reason that the record preserved in this case complies with Boykin. It is comparable to that involved in Steinhauser v. State, Fla.App.2d 1969, 228 So.2d 446. For the reasons there set forth by Judge McNulty, I concur.

Concurrence
MANN, Judge,

MANN, Judge,

(concurring specially).

I concur, but for the reason that the record preserved in this case complies with Boykin. It is comparable to that involved in Steinhauser v. State, Fla.App.2d 1969, 228 So. 2d 446. For the reasons there set forth by Judge McNulty, I concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Green v. State, 322 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See West v. State, Fla.App. 1971, 249 So. 2d 505.…
  • Doerr v. State, 275 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
    …, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. Appellant’s guilty plea was entered November 1, 1965, and Boykin has been refused retroactive appli [*594] cation by the courts of this state. Odle v. State, Fla.App.1970, 241 So. 2d 184; West v. State, Fla.App.1971, 249 So. 2d 505. The fourth ground of the motion to vacate is deprivation of right to appeal. This is not a proper ground for a motion to vacate. State v. Wooden, Fla. 1971, 246 So. 2d 755. Affirmed. REED, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.…
  • Evans v. State, 360 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Johnson v. State, 292 So. 2d 426 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); Williams v. State, 259 So. 2d 753 (Fla.1st DCA 1972); Kelly v. State, 254 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1st DCA 1971); West v. State, 249 So. 2d 505 (Fla.2d DCA 1971); Baker v. State, 188 So. 2d 346 (Fla.3d DCA 1966); Manning v. State, 176 So. 2d 380 (Fla.3d DCA 1965); § 801.121(2), Fla.Stat. (1971).…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw